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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the informational efficiency of the European carbon market based on 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The issue is approached from 
three different perspectives. I explore whether the volatility embedded in carbon options is 
a rational forecast of subsequently realized volatility. Then, I investigate if, and to what 
extent, new information about the structural and institutional set-up of the market impacts 
the carbon price dynamics. Lastly, I examine whether the European carbon market is 
relevant for the firm valuations of covered companies.   
First, perhaps because the market is new and derivatives’ trading on emission allowances 
has only started recently, carbon options have not yet been extensively studied. By using 
data on options traded on the European Climate Exchange, this thesis examines an aspect 
of market efficiency which has been previously overlooked. Market efficiency suggests 
that, conditional upon the accuracy of the option pricing model, implied volatility should 
be an unbiased and efficient forecast of future realized volatility (Campbell et al., 1997). 
Black (1976) implied volatility and implied volatility estimates directly surveyed from 
market participants are used in this thesis to study the information content of carbon 
options. Implied volatility is found to be highly informative and directionally accurate in 
forecasting future volatility. There is no evidence, however, that volatility embedded in 
carbon options is an unbiased and efficient forecast of future realized volatility. Instead, 
historical volatility-based forecasts are shown to contain incremental information to 
implied volatility, particularly for short-term forecasts. In addition, this thesis finds no 
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evidence that directly surveyed implied volatility estimates perform better as a forecast of 
future volatility relative to Black’s (1976) estimates.  
Second, the market sensitivity to announcements about the organizational and institutional 
set-up of the EU ETS is re-examined. Despite their importance for the carbon price 
formation, demand-side announcements and announcements about the post-2012 
framework have not yet been researched. By examining a very comprehensive and updated 
dataset of announcements, this thesis adds to the earlier works of Miclaus et al. (2008), 
Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009) and Lepone et al. (2011). Market participants are 
found to rationally incorporate new information about the institutional and regulatory 
framework of the emissions trading scheme into the carbon price dynamics. However, they 
seem to be unable to accurately assess the implications of inter-temporal banking and 
borrowing on pricing futures contracts with different maturities. The impact of 
macroeconomic conditions on the market responsiveness is investigated by splitting the 
dataset into subsamples according to two alternative methods: 1) a simple split into pre-
crisis and full-crisis time periods, and 2) according to a Bai-Perron structural break test. 
Evidence is found that in the context of economic slowdown and known allowances 
oversupply, the relationship between the carbon price and its fundamentals (institutional 
announcements, energy prices and extreme weather) breaks down. These findings are 
consistent with the arguments in Hintermann (2010), Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller 
(2010) and Koop and Tole (2011) that carbon price drivers change in response to the 
differing context of the individual trading periods.  
Third, the role of carbon performance in firm valuation is understudied. Since companies 
were not obliged to disclose their carbon emissions prior to the launch of the EU ETS, 
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there exists little empirical evidence of the effect of carbon performance on market value. 
Earlier studies of the European carbon market have only focused on the impact of ETS 
compliance on the profitability and competitiveness of covered companies (e.g. Anger and 
Oberndorfer, 2008). There is also little research on how the newly available emissions data 
has altered the carbon performance of companies. This thesis addresses these gaps in the 
literature by examining the stock price reactions of British and German firms on the day of 
verified emissions release under the EU ETS over the period 2006 – 2011. An event study 
is conducted using a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions model to deal with the event 
clustering present in the dataset. Limited evidence is found that investors use information 
about the carbon performance of companies in their valuations. The information contained 
in the carbon emissions reports is shown to be somewhat more important for companies 
with high carbon-intensive operations. This thesis finds no conclusive evidence that the 
cap-and-trade programme has been able to provide regulated companies with enough 
incentives to de-carbonize their operations. The market does not punish companies which 
continue to emit carbon at increasing rates or reward companies which improve their 
carbon performance.  
In brief, the results of the thesis suggest that the market is not fully efficient yet. 
Inefficiently priced carbon options may allow for arbitrage trades in the market. The 
inability of investors to incorporate rules on inter-temporal banking and borrowing of 
allowances across the different trading periods leads to significant price reactions when 
there should be none. A recessionary economic environment and a known oversupply of 
emission allowances have led to a disconnect between the carbon price and its fundamental 
drivers. And, lastly, the signal embedded in the carbon price is not strong enough to invoke 
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investor action and turn carbon performance into a standard component of investment 
analysis.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
Acronym Term Meaning 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate 
Change 
The overall framework for intergovernmental 
efforts to address climate change. The Kyoto 
Protocol is an extension of the Convention, 
whereby industrialized countries legally commit 
themselves to reduce their carbon emissions.  
COP/MOP Conference of 
Parties/Meeting of Parties 
The Conference of the Parties is the governing 
body of the UNFCCC. 
EU ETS 
(ETS) 
European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme 
EU ETS is a multi-country emissions trading 
scheme introduced in the European Union in order 
to help Member States meet the emission 
reductions pledged under the Kyoto Protocol.    
CDM Clean Development 
Mechanism 
Under the Clean Development Mechanism, 
developed countries can earn carbon credits 
towards meeting their Kyoto reduction targets by 
investing in carbon-reducing projects in 
developing countries. 
JI Joint Implementation Under the Joint Implementation Mechanism 
developed countries can earn carbon credits 
towards meeting their Kyoto reduction targets by 
investing in carbon-reducing projects in other 
developed countries. 
EUA European Union 
Allowance 
EUAs are tradable carbon emission credits which 
allow installations regulated under the EU ETS to 
emit a metric tonne of carbon into the atmosphere. 
CER Certified Emission 
Reduction 
A project-based carbon offset created under the 
CDM. 
ERU Emission Reduction Unit A project-based carbon offset created under the JI. 
CITL Community Independent 
Transaction Log 
An electronic system which connects the 
standardized national registries of all EU Member 
States covered by the emissions trading scheme. 
ITL International Transaction 
Log 
An electronic system which connects the 
standardized national registries of all Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
NAP  National Allocation Plan National Allocation Plans set out the amount of 
CO2 emission allowances allocated to each EU 
Member State under the emissions trading 
scheme.  
VER Verification An annual procedure whereby all covered 
installations report their actual emissions during 
the year. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1. MOTIVATIONS  
The development and growth of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions trading schemes is 
perhaps the most visible result of worldwide efforts to mitigate climate change and has 
resulted in the emergence of CO2 (hereafter carbon) as a mainstream commodity. 
Emissions trading is the pillar of the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations, 1998) and it has 
enabled the financial market to put a price on the right to pollute the atmosphere. These 
rights are tradable both at country and company levels. Although voluntary carbon markets 
and regional initiatives have been in existence for a while, carbon trading picked up and 
became a truly global industry after the launch of the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005. At the end of 2011, the global carbon market had a total market 
value of approximately US$176 billion, of which 84% was accounted for by the EU ETS 
(World Bank, 2012).   
To date, the EU ETS is the largest emissions trading scheme in terms of coverage and 
traded volumes. Over 11,500 installations, which are responsible for nearly half of 
Europe’s emissions, fall under its scope1. The scheme was created to help the European 
Union cost-effectively meet its emission reduction targets committed under the Kyoto 
Protocol. The EU ETS is designed as a cap-and-trade programme and is modelled after the 
U.S. sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions trading programme established in 1990. The so-
called Acid Rain Program was the first large-scale application of a market-based policy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and f the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Directive 96/61/EC.  
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instrument to tackle an environmental problem. During the first decade of its existence, 
SO2 trading created a liquid market that enabled electricity producers to decrease their 
emissions. The success of the sulphur market is often seen as evidence that emissions 
trading is a viable approach to addressing environmental concerns in a cost-efficient 
manner (for a detailed overview of the history of the sulphur market, see Burtraw and 
Szambelan, 2009). 
In the EU ETS, it is the European Commission that sets the CO2 cap by issuing permits at 
the targeted level of emissions to all member states covered by the scheme. Each issued 
permit - called a European Union Allowance (EUA) – entitles its holder to the right to emit 
a tonne of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. The total amount of issued allowances 
(through free allocation and auctions) across European member states determines their 
scarcity, and in turn, the price of carbon. Up until 2013, each of the member states was in 
charge of developing their own National Allocation Plan (NAP) which specifies the total 
amount of carbon emissions (i.e. the national cap) and the distribution of this total across 
all regulated installations. The plans are subject to the European Commission’s oversight, 
appraisal and sanction. The severity of the implied reduction targets varies considerably 
across countries – for example, the United Kingdom has had a consistent deficit of EUAs 
since the launch of the scheme, while Eastern European countries have enjoyed generous 
EUA allocations far in excess of their business-as-usual activities.  
As will be discussed in detail in Section 3.2.1.1, the majority of regulated installations are 
issued with carbon allowances for free. Because different companies face different costs of 
internal abatement, a market-based approach to carbon reduction enables them to choose 
the best course of action in order to minimize their costs and/or maximize profits. In 
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essence, the free allocation of EUAs resembles a real option granted to the covered 
company. If the company’s cost of carbon reduction exceeds the market price of the 
allowances, it can choose to use up all of its allocated EUAs and forgo the investment in 
carbon-efficient equipment. For those companies which can abate internally at a cheaper 
cost, reduction of emissions by more than what is required will generate a surplus of 
unused allowances. These excess EUAs can be saved for future use (or in the carbon 
market’s jargon, they can be banked inter-temporally), they can be sold in the market to 
companies which exceed their emissions limits, or they can be used for speculative trading.  
Covered installations can trade EUAs directly with each other (over-the-counter), on 
electronic exchanges (i.e. secondary markets) or via brokers. The scheme is structured so 
that highly-polluting installations in sectors which are relatively protected from 
international competition, such as electricity generation, bear the brunt of emissions 
reduction. This approach has led to a considerable heterogeneity in the EUA allocations 
across sectors. Combustion2 is the only sector which has had a deficit of allowances since 
the launch of the EU ETS. Trotignon and Debolsc (2008) estimate that allocations to power 
plants represent over 50% of a country’s total allocations on average. The authors also find 
that more than 90% of the entire allowance shortage in the scheme during the period 2005-
2007 was caused by EUA deficits of power plants.  
Unlike other conventional markets, the carbon market is a product of environmental policy. 
Given its fairly short history and its politically-driven nature, the question then arises – is 
the market actually working? Two aspects need to be addressed – whether the EU ETS 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 The combustion sector includes power and heat producers, as well as in-house combustion installations of food 
&beverage companies, pharmaceuticals, etc.  
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functions efficiently as a financial market and whether it achieves its intended socio-
economic results. For the market to be an effective tool of environmental policy, it must 
provide the necessary incentives to companies to alter their carbon performance. Academic 
research into this new European carbon market has quickly gained momentum over the 
past few years. Much of the existing research into the efficiency of the carbon market has 
focused on the spot-forward parity (e.g. Borak et al., 2006; Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner, 
2009), the existence of a single, arbitrage-free carbon price despite the multiple European 
trading platforms (e.g. Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2008;Boutaba, 2009), and the overall 
efficiency of the market (e.g. Daskalakis et al., 2008; Montagnoli and de Vries, 2010). 
Several recent papers have tested the market efficiency hypothesis in an event study 
framework by looking at market responses to regulatory announcements by the European 
Commission (e.g. Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2009; Rotfu! et al., 2009).  
With this thesis, I attempt to fill several gaps in the existing carbon literature. While market 
efficiency is typically defined as asset price behaviour which is consistent with Fama’s 
1970 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), I interpret efficiency in a broader context. Fama 
(1970) argues that a market is efficient if prices reflect all available information, so that 
investors cannot achieve abnormal profits by trading on the basis of information contained 
in historical prices. In addition to this traditional EMH interpretation, I extend the 
definition to cover the environmental aspect of the market and argue that the market can be 
referred to as efficient only if the carbon performance of regulated companies is reflected 
in their stock prices. Therefore, I proceed with the thesis by examining the informational 
efficiency of the EU ETS in its completeness – from both a financial market perspective 
and an environmental perspective. I look at the information content of carbon options, I 
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assess whether investors respond to new information accurately and, finally, I examine 
whether the carbon performance of companies has implications for their market valuations.  
A priori should the carbon market be expected to be efficient? First, carbon permits 
resemble other financial instruments in that they are entirely fungible across companies and 
they require no transportation or storage charges. Second, as already highlighted, the 
allocation of allowances and the emission reduction burden are not distributed equally 
across all regulated sectors. Even within those sectors which have a net excess of 
allowances, there are firms with deficits of EUAs and firms with surpluses. Furthermore, 
demand is additionally affected by unpredictable factors like the weather, the economy, 
energy prices and innovation in carbon-reducing technologies. As long as there are buyers 
and sellers of allowances, trading in carbon is ensured and the scheme can be expected to 
function efficiently from a financial perspective. This implies that for some companies with 
a deficit of allowances, carbon reduction is, and will continue to be, costlier than the 
purchase of allowances in the market.  
A certain level of inefficiency is natural at the very inception of the scheme as there is 
uncertainty about the risk premium which should be reflected in underlying spot carbon 
prices, and the fair pricing of derivatives is complicated by the lack of a sufficiently long 
spot trading history. However, with the presence of energy trading companies, hedge funds, 
pension funds and various financial investors on the market, inefficiencies that create 
money-making opportunities should be quickly arbitraged away. I therefore expect pricing 
inefficiencies to be resolved early on and carbon permits to be valued fairly, with new 
information reflected in their prices in a timely and accurate manner. By the same token, I 
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expect all derivative instruments which have the right to emit carbon as an underlying asset 
(futures and options) to be efficiently priced.  
With regard to the efficiency of the market in meeting its environmental objectives, I do 
not expect that compliance with the EU ETS has led companies to dramatically cut back on 
their carbon emissions. Generous allocations of free allowances in the early years of the 
scheme and a slowdown in economic activity following the crisis in 2008 have created a 
supply of unused EUAs in the system and have distorted the incentives of companies to de-
carbonize their operations. Although the market is probably not yet meeting the socially 
desirable objectives of altering corporate behaviour, I anticipate that carbon performance is 
at least reflected in the financial performance of companies. As carbon permits represent 
tradable assets with a quantifiable monetary value, excess allowances (shortages) of EUAs 
should increase (decrease) the market values of covered companies.  
First, I address market efficiency by examining the forecasting accuracy of volatility 
embedded in carbon options. Since the carbon market is new, and derivatives’ trading on 
emission allowances has only started very recently, carbon options have not yet been 
extensively studied. The rapid development of the carbon option market does not come as a 
surprise. Long call positions are a natural hedge for a regulated emitter which emits more 
than its allocated quota. Similarly, companies with excess allowances can buy put options 
and lock in a selling price. Market efficiency suggests that, conditional upon the accuracy 
of the option pricing model, implied volatility should be an unbiased and efficient forecast 
of future realized volatility (Campbell et al., 1997).  Several idiosyncratic aspects of the 
carbon market could negatively impact the hypothesized relationship. These include the 
concentration of trading in futures with long maturities, the fairly low liquidity of the 
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market, and the high level of uncertainty inherent in a market conceived as a solution to an 
environmental problem. To my knowledge, there is no published study yet which examines 
the hypothesis that carbon option implied volatility is a rational forecast of subsequently 
realized volatility. In Chapter 2, I provide empirical evidence about the information content 
of carbon options over the three-year period between January 2008 and December 2010.  
Second, I re-examine the ability of market participants to accurately respond to new 
information about the institutional framework of the EU ETS. The institutional framework 
is defined as emission caps, the rules for distributing carbon allowances across companies, 
the linking of the EU ETS to Kyoto projects, and the availability of alternative carbon 
financial instruments for compliance. Prior literature has examined reactions to 
announcements about the emission caps over the first two trading periods of the EU ETS 
and the releases of verified emissions data (e.g. Miclaus et al., 2008; Rotfu! et al., 2009; 
Lepone et al., 2011). In addition to these, I study the impact of a wider spectrum of 
announcements on carbon returns, on the variance of carbon returns and on option implied 
volatility. I also examine the change in market responsiveness to institutional 
announcements following the onset of the financial crisis, an issue which has not been 
addressed so far in the existing literature. In Chapter 3, I provide the empirical evidence on 
the ability of investors to accurately price in new information in the context of different 
rules on inter-temporal banking and borrowing of allowances.  
Third, I explore the relationship between carbon emissions and financial performance for 
British and German publicly-traded companies covered by the EU ETS. I establish whether 
the carbon market conveys value-relevant information to investors. The issue of whether 
carbon performance is priced in firm valuations is of practical significance for covered 
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companies, investment analysts and policy makers alike. There is a growing body of 
research on the impact of the scheme on individual sectors and companies but the focus has 
been on potential losses in competitiveness and reductions in profitability (e.g. Neuhoff et 
al., 2006; Quirion and Demailly, 2006; Demailly and Quirion, 2008). In Chapter 4, I 
explore the change in financial performance following repeat disclosures of firm-specific 
carbon emissions data. I also provide empirical evidence to fill in the gap in the literature 
on the effectiveness of the scheme as a mechanism for facilitating the move to a low-
carbon economy. Environmental effectiveness is evaluated by examining whether covered 
companies alter their carbon performance and de-carbonize their operations as a result of 
stock price pressures following emission reports publication. I also try to find evidence of 
changes in the carbon performance of covered companies as a result of such stock price 
pressures.  
1.2. MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
In this thesis I provide new evidence on the efficiency of the carbon market and its 
relevance for the valuation of regulated companies. In Chapter 2, I find that implied 
volatility is a biased and inefficient forecast of future realized volatility. In Chapter 3, I 
demonstrate that although market participants react to new information, they are not able to 
accurately assess the implications of inter-temporal banking and borrowing for carbon 
prices. I also show that no stable relationship exists between the carbon price and its market 
fundamentals – the institutional framework, energy variables and extreme weather. In 
Chapter 4, I report that despite the market’s rapid growth and the increasing importance of 
environmental performance, the EU ETS is not relevant for the financial performance of 
covered companies.  This suggests that, at present, the signal embedded in carbon prices 
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does not stimulate investor action and incentivise companies to transition to low-carbon 
operations. The findings in these three chapters lead me to conclude that the market is not 
yet fully informationally efficient.  
To begin with, I explore an aspect of market efficiency which has been overlooked so far – 
the relationship between implied and realized volatility in the carbon market. Although 
there is substantial work on the information content of options for various financial and 
non-financial instruments (e.g. Canina and Figlewski, 1993; Fleming, 1998; Szakmary et 
al., 2003), no published study has yet addressed this issue for the carbon market. I find that 
implied volatility is highly informative about future volatility despite the prevalence of 
long-dated futures contracts, the fairly low trading volumes and the high level of regulatory 
uncertainty in the market. No evidence is found that implied volatility estimates obtained 
from direct surveys of carbon traders perform better than Black’s (1976) classical option 
pricing model estimates in forecasting future volatility. Implied volatility is shown to be 
directionally accurate in forecasting future volatility. I do not find evidence to support the 
hypothesis that implied volatility is unbiased or informationally efficient. Instead, the 
results demonstrate that historical volatility contains incremental information which is not 
contained in option prices, especially in predicting volatility over short periods of time. 
These findings suggest that inefficiencies in the carbon market do exist. Inefficiently priced 
options leave room for arbitrage strategies and speculation. The findings in Chapter 2 offer 
a possible explanation for the reported prevalence of speculative volatility-based trading in 
the market (World Bank, 2010).  
Second, I re-examine the impact of institutional and regulatory announcements on the 
carbon price dynamics in Chapter 3. Compared to earlier works in the area (e.g. Rotfu! et 
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al., 2009; Lepone et al., 2011) my analysis covers a substantially wider range of 
announcements. In addition to the traditional supply-related events examined to date 
(announcements about Phase I and II National Allocation Plans and verification events) I 
consider a comprehensive set of both supply- and demand-related announcements. This 
thesis also studies market sensitivity to post-2012 announcements and looks at the impact 
of these announcements on Phase III carbon futures. I provide new evidence about the 
impact of institutional announcements on carbon returns and option implied volatility. 
Using two alternative model specifications (univariate time series analysis and a 
multifactor model) of the carbon price, I find that market participants react to new 
information about the institutional construct of the EU ETS but fail to assess the 
differential impact which the rules on inter-temporal borrowing and banking of allowances 
have for futures contracts with expirations in different trading periods. I confirm prior 
findings (Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2009; Lepone et al., 2011) that institutional 
disclosure does not affect the variance of returns. At the same time, I document statistically 
significant increases in option implied volatility before scheduled institutional events and a 
reduction afterwards. 
Chapter 3 also differs from prior studies by examining changes in the market 
responsiveness to institutional announcements before and after the financial crisis. Two 
different techniques are employed in splitting the dataset into subsamples – a Bai-Perron 
structural break test as well as a naïve pre-crisis/full-crisis split. I demonstrate that the 
institutional framework is only a secondary consideration for the carbon price dynamics 
and institutional announcements explain much less of the variance in carbon returns 
following the onset of the financial crisis. Even more, the results suggest that after the start 
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of the crisis the relationship between the carbon market and its fundamentals (institutional 
framework, energy prices and extreme weather) breaks down altogether. These findings 
may also suggest that the market is not fully efficient yet.  
In Chapter 4, I examine the market response of German and British ETS-covered 
companies to the publication of their actual carbon emissions over the period 2006-2011. 
To my knowledge, no published study has yet examined stock price reactions of regulated 
companies to multiple annual compliance events. The contribution of the chapter is two-
fold. I add to the growing literature on the interaction between environmental and financial 
performance and I also contribute to the scant literature on the impact of emissions trading 
on individual firms. I examine a unique set of hand-collected data on the carbon 
performance of companies which was not available prior to the launch of the EU ETS. The 
event study is performed in a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions framework to deal with the 
issue of event clustering which arises because all companies are affected simultaneously.  
I predict that firms which emit more (less) than anticipated by the market and firms which, 
contrary to market expectations, find themselves short (oversupplied) of carbon allowances 
should experience substantial negative (positive) price reactions. I find limited evidence 
that carbon performance matters to investors by reporting statistically significant market 
responses only for the disclosure of verified emissions during 2008. The observed 
significant event returns lend some support to the view that investors react to unanticipated 
changes in the net EUA position of a company rather than unanticipated changes in its 
level of emissions. Information about the firms’ carbon performance is not instantaneously 
reflected in stock prices, which I attribute to the format of carbon reporting and the time it 
takes to convert installation-level data into usable firm-level information.  I find no proof 
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that the amount of freely allocated allowances and the amount of actual emissions are 
significant in explaining the observed market reactions. There is some evidence that 
information in the carbon reports is more important for companies with high carbon-
intensive operations.  
Fourth, this thesis contributes to the existing body of knowledge by shedding some light on 
the social utility of the European carbon market. I predict that negative market responses 
following the publication of actual emissions lead companies to alter their carbon 
performance. I also predict that the market rewards companies which have reduced the 
emissions intensity of their operations and punishes companies which continue to emit 
carbon at increasing rates. No evidence is found to support either of these hypotheses. The 
lack of stock price pressures associated with the release of carbon emissions data suggests 
that, in its current state, the EU ETS does not provide regulated companies with enough 
financial incentives to de-carbonize their activities.   
1.3. THESIS DESIGN 
The three aspects of informational efficiency examined in this thesis are organized as 
individual chapters. Chapter 2 looks into the information content of carbon options traded 
on the European Climate Exchange. Chapter 3 examines the ability of market participants 
to accurately price in new information regarding the institutional framework of the carbon 
market. The relationship between carbon emissions and financial performance is 
investigated in Chapter 4. I conclude with a chapter which summarizes the key empirical 
results, presents the caveats to the analyses and recommends future areas of research.  
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CHAPTER 2 THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF CARBON 
OPTIONS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
As the EU ETS is an entirely political creation, regulatory institutions play a key role in 
shaping the carbon market (Convery, 2009; Knox-Hayes, 2009). In its short history, the 
market has witnessed several periods of high volatility caused by regulatory uncertainty. 
For example, in April 2006 the carbon price collapsed when leaked information about the 
verified emissions for the previous year showed that, contrary to expectations, there would 
be no scarcity of emission allowances. More recently, in June 2009, evidence was found of 
fraudulent trading of emission allowances, leading to the temporary suspension of trading 
activity in Europe’s largest spot carbon market, BlueNext. In early 2011, trading of carbon 
emissions was temporarily halted again after the discovery that hackers had broken into the 
EU ETS electronic registries and stolen "30 million worth of allowances (Wall Street 
Journal, 2011). These irregularities prompted the European Commission to take steps to 
improve the functioning of the EU ETS, including the creation of a single EU registry3.  
Since the launch of the EU ETS in 2005, the range of carbon derivative products available 
for trading has grown to include futures, forwards and options on futures. Although the 
majority of transactions are attributed to futures trades, there has been a steady growth in 
the number of traded option contracts with the value of the EUA-based options estimated at 
US$14.2 billion as of December 2011 (World Bank, 2012).  The increasing liquidity and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 European Commission, “EU Emissions Trading System - Transition to the Union Registry”. Available online at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2011071802_en.htm!!
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volume of trading in the carbon market has attracted many investors to access this 
emerging asset class. In addition to regulated industrial emitters, carbon trading has 
become popular with financial institutions and private individuals, hedge funds and 
insurance companies. While some of these investors may seek the potential portfolio 
diversification benefits of the new carbon financial instruments or find them suitable as a 
part of socially responsible investment strategies, many seem to be drawn to the possibility 
of gains from speculation and the exploitation of market inefficiencies.  
In its annual 2010 overview of the state and trends in the carbon market, the World Bank 
highlighted that “the bulk of activity now comes from volatility and other relative value 
trades (i.e. financial and technical trades now account for a greater portion of market 
activity than do trades for  compliance purposes)” (World Bank, 2010:  p.16). The reported 
prevalence of speculative volatility-based trading by financial institutions casts some doubt 
on the efficiency of the carbon market. Assuming the market is efficient and the model 
used to derive implied volatility is an accurate description of the way in which the market 
prices options, implied volatility should be an unbiased and efficient forecast of future 
realized volatility (Campbell et al., 1997). While the empirical literature on the information 
content of implied volatility is extensive, no published paper has yet examined the 
relationship between implied and realized volatility in the carbon market. The hypothesis 
that implied volatility is a rational forecast of subsequently realized volatility has been 
frequently tested in the literature for a variety of underlying assets, but the results are 
equivocal and vary across different options markets.  This chapter therefore makes a 
contribution to the literature on the predictive power of implied volatility as well as adding 
to the scarce studies of carbon options. 
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Why is forecasting volatility important for the carbon market? The practical applications 
and benefits of volatility predictions vary across the different market participants. For a 
company covered by the EU ETS, carbon price volatility carries several costs. Difficulty in 
forecasting carbon prices delays investments in low-carbon technology. Firms will choose 
to hold out and get more insight into the potential price path in order to make a more 
informed decision. Ability to forecast volatility therefore reduces uncertainty and risk 
aversion. Promoting investments in carbon-reducing technologies is only one of the reasons 
why predicting volatility is important for regulated installations. Mitigation of cash flow 
risk is another benefit. Under the rules of the scheme, firms are required to surrender 
allowances for the emissions they have released in the atmosphere at the end of April each 
year. If a company knows it will need to buy more allowances in the market in order to 
achieve compliance, without an ex-ante accurate assessment of price volatility it risks 
paying too much. Thus, failure to assess volatility properly can leave covered companies 
with excessive exposure to market fluctuations. Alternatively, market participants can use 
derivatives to hedge their cash flow risk. Because volatility is a key input in derivatives’ 
valuations, volatility forecasts will aid regulated emitters in assessing whether they are 
paying a fair price to buy these financial instruments.  
Volatility forecasts are critical components for the development of speculative trading 
strategies and betting on the future volatility by regulated companies and financial 
investors alike. In their in-depth overview of trade patterns during Phase I of the EU ETS, 
Trotignon and Delbosc (2008) note that regulated entities known to have excess EUAs still 
buy and surrender allowances from other installations – a finding which implies that either 
managers of these companies find it difficult to assess the amount of the EUAs needed 
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(which is unlikely given their ability to borrow permits inter-temporally) or that regulated 
companies engage in speculative trading of allowances. Price volatility creates an 
opportunity for speculation based on valuations – assets can be bought cheap and sold 
when overpriced. Furthermore, mispriced options can be identified on the basis of volatility 
forecasts. For financial investors in the carbon market, aside from being critical in asset 
valuations volatility estimates are also central to asset allocation and risk management 
decisions. For instance, portfolio allocations often rely on Markowitz risk-return 
optimization where volatility is a key input. Similarly, risk mitigation strategies generally 
use variance-covariance matrices between different asset classes in order to assess 
maximum possible losses.  
This chapter examines the information content of volatility implied by options on the 
carbon futures traded on the European Climate Exchange (ECX), Europe’s largest carbon 
derivatives trading platform, over the period January 2008 – December 2010. Two distinct 
features of the carbon market compared to other, more traditional, options and futures 
markets are the prevalence of long-dated (December) contracts and the uncertainty 
surrounding the carbon market due to its politically-driven nature. Both of these features 
can potentially have a negative impact on the information content of the option prices.   
The following empirical results are obtained. First, implied volatility is highly informative 
about the future variance of returns despite the long maturity cycle of the carbon options 
and their still relatively infrequent trading. Second, directly surveyed implied volatility 
does not appear to be a better forecast of future volatility than Black implied volatility. 
Third, despite its significant predictive power, implied volatility is a biased forecast of 
future volatility over the remaining life of the options as well as over shorter forecasting 
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horizons. Fourth, I find no evidence to support the hypothesis of informational efficiency 
and conclude that implied volatility is an inefficient estimator of future volatility. Last, the 
results indicate that forecasts based on implied volatility have statistically significant power 
in predicting future volatility changes.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes existing empirical 
research on the information content of implied volatility. The methodology and data used 
in this chapter are presented in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. Section 2.5 discusses the 
results, and Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2. PRIOR RESEARCH 
Since the carbon market is new, and derivatives’ trading on emission allowances has only 
started very recently, carbon options have not yet been extensively studied. Much of the 
existing research about this market is focused on the spot price dynamics of emission 
allowances (Paolella and Taschini, 2008; Benz and Trück, 2009; Daskalakis et al., 2009) 
on spot-forward parity (Borak et al., 2006; Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner, 2009) the ability 
of historic volatility data to forecast realized volatility (Chevallier and Sevi, 2011; 
Isenegger and von Wys, 2010) the impact of the introduction of carbon options in 2006 on 
the volatility of carbon futures returns (Chevallier et al., 2009b) or the overall efficiency of 
the market (Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2008; Boutaba, 2009; Montagnoli and de Vries, 
2010). The aim of this chapter is to fill a gap in the literature by analysing the implied 
volatility of carbon options. 
Implied volatility can be defined as the volatility for which the current market price of an 
option equals the theoretical option price estimated according to a specific option pricing 
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model. The use of implied volatility as a forecast of the expected variance of returns of the 
underlying asset can be justified if two assumptions are made. First, markets are assumed 
to be efficient so that all publicly available information is incorporated in option prices. 
Second, the option pricing model used to derive implied volatility correctly captures the 
mechanism used by the market in pricing the option. If the market values options in a 
manner different from that suggested by the model used to obtain implied volatility, 
volatility estimates will be imprecise and will differ from the market’s true expectations 
(Campbell et al., 1997). This is referred to as model misspecification and leads to 
inaccurate inferences about the underlying volatility dynamics and invalid conclusions 
about the information content of implied volatility.  
A common approach in the existing body of research is to derive implied volatility from 
the Black (1976) model for options on futures. At-the-money options are considered the 
most robust source for implied volatility estimations due to their liquid trading and high 
sensitivity to the variance parameter (Poon and Granger, 2003). When at-the-money 
options are not available, studies have used the most actively traded options (Kumar, 
2008), nearest-to-the-money or nearest-to-expiration options (Canina and Figlewski, 1993). 
Different weighting schemes for nearest-to-the-money proxies of implied volatility exist in 
the literature (see Ederington and Guan, 2002 for a comprehensive overview) with the 
results suggesting that the choice of weighting structure is not of primary importance. 
The conventional approach to testing the predictive power of implied volatility in terms of 
unbiasedness and efficiency is to estimate an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of 
ex-post realized volatility on implied volatility and alternative historical information-based 
predictions. If implied volatility is an unbiased estimator, ex-post realized volatility should 
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equal implied volatility plus a white noise disturbance term. To meet the efficiency 
criterion, implied volatility should encompass all information contained in historical 
volatility. The downside to such an econometric analysis of the predictive power of implied 
and historical volatility is that conclusions are based on how closely the sample data fits the 
selected models for measuring volatility. The quality of the prediction is based entirely on 
the coefficient of determination from the regression equation. Forecasts resulting in a high 
coefficient of determination and low standard errors are interpreted as good estimators but 
they only reflect the sample data, which may differ from the true population parameters. 
Thus, the predictive power of the explanatory variables might be strongly exaggerated 
(Brooks, 2008). Estimating the volatility parameter is additionally affected by the choice of 
a sampling methodology, the time interval over which returns are measured and the length 
of the time period under investigation.  
Early studies on the information content of implied volatility generally conclude that it 
outperforms historical volatility (Latane and Rendleman, 1976; Chiras and Manaster, 1978; 
Schmalensee and Trippi, 1978; Beckers, 1981). Following these studies, research has 
focused on refining the methodology by increasing sample sizes, taking into account time 
series properties of the data, dividend payments and transaction costs. Subsequent 
researchers also expanded the conditioning set of information available to investors to 
include more sophisticated forecasts based on autoregressive time series models – ARCH, 
GARCH and various extensions of these.   
The conclusion from later research suggests that implied volatility is a biased yet efficient 
forecast, but the results are far from unanimous. For example, Canina and Figlewski (1993) 
find virtually no correlation between ex-post realized volatility and volatility implied by the 
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options on the S&P 100 index. The authors attribute the biasedness and inefficiency of 
implied volatility forecasts to the fact that classical option pricing models fail to 
incorporate many factors important to investors in the real world such as liquidity, 
correlations between different indexes and investors’ preferences for specific payoff 
profiles. In a later study, Christensen and Prabhala (1998) employ a non-overlapping 
sampling framework over the same period as in Canina and Figlewski (1993) and report 
that S&P 100 implied volatility is both unbiased and efficient, subsuming all information 
contained in historical data. Analysing a different time period, Fleming (1998) concludes 
that volatility implied by the S&P 100 index options is an efficient but biased estimator 
which tends to considerably exaggerate ex-post realized volatility. 
Corrado and Miller (2005) investigate the predictive power of volatility implied by the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange volatility indexes based on the S&P 100, S&P 500 and 
NASDAQ stock indexes – VXO, VIX and VXN, respectively. VXO and VIX implied 
volatility is demonstrated to be an efficient estimator of future volatility, subsuming all 
information contained in naïve and GARCH-based historical volatility. Examining intraday 
returns for the S&P 500 index over an almost identical time period to that of Corrado and 
Miller (2005), Becker et al. (2006) confirm the highly informative power of VIX implied 
volatility but conclude that it is an inefficient forecast of future volatility.  
Analyses of the implied volatility embedded in equity options from different countries are 
also provided by Li and Yang (2009) and Frijns et al. (2010) for Australia, Kumar (2008) 
for India and Moraux et al. (1999) for France. Szakmary et al. (2003) study the predictive 
power of option implied volatility by examining 35 futures markets including currencies, 
interest rates, and various non-financial products in addition to equities. For the majority of 
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the markets examined, the authors find that implied volatility is a biased but efficient 
estimator of ex-post realized volatility.  
Mixed results as to the information content of implied volatility are observed in the 
literature on commodities and foreign exchange rates as well. Some authors maintain that 
implied volatility is a biased estimator but that it subsumes all information contained in 
historical time-series data (Jorion (1995) on foreign exchange rates; Manfredo and Sanders 
(2004) on agricultural commodities; Bakanova (2010) on the crude oil market), while 
others demonstrate that GARCH models dominate implied volatility forecasts (Agnolucci 
(2009) on the crude oil market; Martens and Zein (2004) on the crude oil and foreign 
exchange markets; Neely (2004) on gold futures).  An unobserved time-varying volatility 
risk premium is the most common explanation for the systematic bias of implied volatility 
in forecasting future variance of returns (Poteshman 2000; Bandi and Perron, 2006; Neely, 
2009). 
Recent advances in the field have focused on improving investors’ understanding of the 
latent volatility dynamics by employing high frequency data (Andersen and Bollerslev, 
1998; Blair et al., 2001) and modelling volatility as a long-memory process (Li, 2002; 
Andersen et al., 2003; Neely, 2004; Bandi and Perron, 2006). Despite the improved 
performance of time series-based forecasts when intraday returns are employed, Blair et al. 
(2001) find that implied volatility still outperforms alternative forecasts.  
2.3. METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1. PREDICTIVE POWER OF IMPLIED VOLATILITY 
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The hypothesis that implied volatility contains information about ex-post realized volatility 
and can be used as a forecast of how volatile carbon prices can be is tested by estimating an 
OLS regression of the form: 
     !!"#$%&"'!! ! ! ! !!!!"#$!%&!! ! !!!    (1) 
where !!"#$%&"'!! is the volatility realized over the remaining life of the options. 
If option implied volatility contains information about future volatility, the regression 
coefficient ! will be statistically different from zero. In addition, if implied volatility is an 
unbiased predictor of realized volatility, the regression coefficient will be 1 and the 
intercept will not be statistically significant from zero. In other words, it is a test of the 
joint hypothesis that "=0 and !=1, referred to as the “rationality test” by Canina and 
Figlewski (1993). 
Due to the use of overlapping samples, the forecast error is not white noise, but rather a 
moving average.  For example, when volatility is measured on a daily basis and volatility 
forecasts are made for 10 days ahead, the error term will follow a ninth-order moving 
average process. OLS is still applicable under such conditions but Newey-West robust 
standard errors are employed to account for the serially correlated error terms. Therefore, 
all regression results reported in this chapter rely on Newey-West standard errors which 
adjust for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  
To capture the effect of time to maturity on implied volatility as a predictor of future 
variance, five dummy variables are introduced in the OLS regression equation, defined as 
follows: 
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D1=1 if the option has #1 month (approximated by 22 trading days) until expiration, 0 
otherwise 
D2=1 if the option has > 1 and #2 months (between 23 and 44 trading days) until 
expiration, 0 otherwise 
D3=1 if the option has > 2 and #4 months (between 45 and 88 trading days) until 
expiration, 0 otherwise 
D4=1 if the option has > 4 and #6 months (between 89 and 132 trading days) until 
expiration, 0 otherwise 
D5=1 if the option has > 6 and #9 months (between 133 and 198 trading days) until 
expiration, 0 otherwise 
In addition, five interactive terms are created by multiplying the dummy variables by the 
implied volatility time series (D1!!"#!!, D2!!"#!!, D3!!"#!!, D4!!"#!!, and D5!!"#!!). The 
new regression equation takes the form: 
!!"#$%&"'!!!!= !!  + !1D1 + !2D2 + !3D3 + !4D4 + !5D5 + #1D1!!"#!! !  #2D2!!"#!! !  
#3D3!!"#!! ! #4D4!!"#!! ! #5D5!!"#!! ! !!!"#!! !!!!               (2) 
where i signifies the alternative specifications of ex-post realized volatility employed in 
this chapter.    
2.3.2. INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF IMPLIED VOLATILITY 
Following prior research in the area of predicting financial volatility (Fleming, 1998; 
Christensen and Prabhala, 1998), I examine the efficiency of the implied volatility forecast. 
  Chapter 2 
!
24 
!
In order to test the efficiency hypothesis, realized volatility is regressed against both 
implied and historical information-based forecasts. That is, 
 !!"#$%&"'!! ! ! ! !!!!!!"#$%!&'(!!!! ! !!!!"#$!%&!! ! !!!                              (3)            
For option implied volatility to be an informationally efficient forecast, it should 
incorporate all publicly available information. Adding historical volatility as al regressor 
should result in no observed performance improvement. The slope regression coefficient of 
historical volatility is expected to remain statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
Deviation from the results "=0, !1=0, !2=1 is evidence of bias and inefficiency. 
2.3.3. DIRECTIONAL ACCURACY OF IMPLIED VOLATILITY FORECASTS 
To assess the directional accuracy of implied volatility forecasts, this chapter employs the 
methodology of Levich (1979). As noted by the author, useful forecasts are the ones that 
lead you to be “on the right side of the market” (Levich, 2001: p. 275). Following his 
approach, the directional accuracy of implied volatility from carbon options is examined 
using a binomial test. The percentage of correct forecasts of future volatility increases and 
decreases is tested individually. Under the null hypothesis: 
H0: p = 0.5  where p is the percentage of successful forecasts and is expected to be 50% if 
implied volatility is not superior in forecasting the future direction of volatility than a 
simple guess 
H1: p > 0.5   
The standard deviation of p under the null hypothesis is therefore! !!!! !!!!, where n is 
the total number of forecasts. 
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2.4. DATA  
Options on carbon futures were formally launched in October 2006; the initial learning 
phase of the EU ETS ended in December 2007 and the scheme entered into its second 
phase on January 1st, 2008. The analysis focuses on futures which expire in the second 
phase only. The ECX presently trades options written on two underlying products: 
European Union Allowances (EUAs) and Certified Emission Reduction units (CERs). The 
chapter focuses on options with underlying allowances because of their higher liquidity and 
transaction volume. These options currently trade on a quarterly expiry, following a March-
June-September-December cycle. The underlying contract is the December future of the 
relevant year, with most of the liquidity concentrated in options with a December expiry. 
Over the sample period, the nearest-to-maturity non-December option contracts represent 
merely 0.23% of the trading volume in the closest December contract.   
The available data consist of daily settlement prices as well as high, low, opening and 
closing prices for all relevant ICE ECX EUA futures contracts. Given the concentration of 
liquidity in options with December expirations, only these are kept in the sample. 
Moreover, for a given year the sample of data is constructed to include only options with 
the nearest expiration. That is, the set of observations for 2009, for example, contains the 
December options for the futures contract expiring in 2009. This was done to limit the life-
cycle of carbon options covered by the analysis to a maximum of one year. The futures 
contracts with nearest expiration make up the majority of the exchange-traded volume 
throughout the year: 69% in 2008, 70% in 2009 and 69% in 2010. This leads to a total of 
714 daily settlement prices of ICE ECX EUA futures contracts covering the period 
02/01/2008 – 08/12/2010. All data were taken directly from the official website of the 
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ECX, the InterContinental Exchange (www.theice.com).  
The settlement prices of the futures during the time period covered by this study are 
converted into continuously compounded rates of return, !! ! !"!! !!!!!!!. The descriptive 
statistics in Table 2.1 in reveal a skewness of 0.03, indicating a fairly symmetric 
distribution of returns. The excess kurtosis, however, implies fat tails and suggests that the 
shape of the data does not follow a Gaussian distribution. The Jarque-Bera statistic 
provides evidence that the null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals can be rejected 
with nearly 100% confidence.   
Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the log-returns for the ICE ECX EUA futures contracts and the 
realized (RV) and implied (IV) volatility time series over the period 02/01/2008 – 08/12/2010. The volatility 
of the underlying futures contract realized until the expiration of the option written on the given contracts is 
measured by squared returns, Parkinson’s and Rogers and Satchell’s variance estimators. Implied volatility 
reported by the European Climate Exchange and Black (1976) implied volatility are reported as well.  
 Log returns Squared 
Returns RV 
Parkinson 
RV 
Rogers and 
Satchell RV 
ECX Implied 
Volatility 
Black Implied 
Volatility 
Mean       -0.06 33.83 33.06 32.91 46.17 45.30 
Median   0.00 34.20 33.14 31.95 47.15 45.97 
Maximum  11.37 69.28 53.31 59.31 67.88 67.40 
Minimum  -9.43 0.10 17.34 17.52 27.97 26.44 
St. Deviation   2.43 11.28 10.00 10.53 9.85 9.71 
Skewness   0.03 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.00 0.00 
Kurtosis   5.12 2.62 1.85 1.82 2.15 2.20 
Jarque-Bera 133.74 3.99 31.87 35.83 17.22 15.23 
Probability 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 713 569 569 569 569 569 
 
2.4.1. REALIZED VOLATILITY  
One of the objectives of this chapter is to examine how the measurement of realized 
volatility influences the relationship between implied and realized volatility. Realized 
volatility is calculated from the time series data of ECX EUA futures prices over the 
remaining life of the options written on these contracts. Three alternative specifications of 
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realized volatility are used.  
The first measure of realized volatility is squared daily returns, the most widely used 
definition in the literature. Returns are calculated over a one-day interval on a continuously 
compounded basis, as recommended by Campbell et al. (1997). This chapter follows 
Figlewski (2004) and Hull (2006) in assuming a mean daily return of zero. This approach is 
suitable given the small set of observations and the high probability that the sample mean is 
an imprecise estimate of the true population mean $. The expression for realized volatility 
estimated from daily settlement prices of the ECX EUA futures contracts is as follows: 
!!!!! ! !"!! !!!!!!!!!       (4) 
where n is the number of trading days left till expiration of the option.  
Since intraday information about the prices of carbon allowances is not available, I employ 
two extreme value volatility indicators which have been found useful in capturing the price 
evolution of the underlying asset in the absence of high-frequency data (Fleming, 1998; 
Bakanova, 2010). These are Parkinson’s (1980) and Rogers and Satchell’s (1991) volatility 
estimators. Parkinson (1980) demonstrates that an estimate based on the high and low 
prices for the day is superior in calculating volatility than simply squaring daily returns. He 
operates under the common assumption that returns follow a geometric Brownian motion 
and implicitly assumes that such motion is not characterized by a drift. Rogers and 
Satchell’s (1991) estimator includes opening and closing prices in addition to high/low 
prices to capture any jumps during non-trading times.  Rogers and Satchell (1991) relax the 
assumption of a driftless random walk assumed by Parkinson (1980).  
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Following Parkinson (1980), the second measure of realized volatility is defined as 
follows:  
!!! ! !!!"! !!"!!!!"!!! ! !" !"# !!!     (5)       
Rogers and Satchell’s (1991) variance estimator, and respectively my third measurement of 
realized volatility, is calculated as follows:  
!!! ! !" !!"!!!"#$! !" !!"!!!"#$%! ! !"! !"#!!"#$! !"! !"#!!"#$%!    (6) 
In annualizing the standard deviation, daily estimates are multiplied by the square root of 
252 trading days per year, following the convention in the derivatives market (Hull, 2006). 
In order to get the annualized volatility over the remaining n trading days until the 
expiration of the option for the extreme-value estimators, the following adjustment is 
made: 
!!!!! ! !"!! !!!!!!!!!   
where !!!!!  is the variance calculated by Equations 5 and 6.  
Theoretically, Rogers and Satchell’s definition of volatility should dominate Parkinson’s 
estimate because it relaxes the assumption of a driftless random walk and includes opening 
and closing prices in addition to high/low prices to capture any jumps during non-trading 
times. My expectation is that the third measurement of realized volatility will lead to the 
most accurate representation of the volatility dynamics and, therefore, that implied 
volatility will have higher forecasting power. The descriptive statistics of the three realized 
volatility time series are summarized in Table 2.1.  
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2.4.2. HISTORICAL VOLATILITY-BASED FORECASTS 
A common assumption in empirical finance is that conditional volatility follows a GARCH 
model. In this chapter I also choose to model historical volatility by estimating a GARCH 
(1,1) model in the following way:   
 
  rt = $ + et,        (7) 
where et~ N(0,!!!!) is a white noise, stationary process, and 
!!! ! !! ! !!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!        (8) 
where "0 >0,  "1, !1 %0 and "1+!1< 1. 
The non-negativity of all regression coefficients is a necessary condition to ensure a 
positive variance and the sum of "1+!1 (commonly known as a persistence factor) less than 
unity ensures the stationarity of the process (Brooks, 2008). To confirm that the selected 
model is appropriate for the log-return EUA time series, I test for the presence of GARCH 
effects over the time period covered by the analysis (January 2008 – December 2010) and I 
check for model misspecification. The ARCH-LM statistic of 138.9 is significant even at the 
1% level, confirming the presence of ARCH effects in the EUA log-returns. Both the ARCH 
and GARCH coefficients (0.09 and 0.88, respectively) are statistically significant and their sum 
adds up to 0.98, suggesting that shocks to volatility have a strong and persistent impact on the 
conditional variance of carbon prices4. Because the standard residuals do not exhibit a normal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 A test has been performed to confirm that the sum of the ARCH and GARCH effects is statistically different from unity 
i.e. that the shocks to volatility are not merely persistent but constant. The results reject the existence of an Integrated 
GARCH model.  
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conditional distribution, Bollerslev-Wooldridge heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard 
errors are estimated through a Quasi Maximum Likelihood method (QML). The Q-statistics 
and correlograms of the autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations demonstrate that the 
GARCH (1,1) standardized residuals are distributed independently, both linearly and non-
linearly (none of the Q-statistics for the standardized and squared standardized residuals are 
significant at the 1% level). These tests imply that a GARCH (1,1) model with robust standard 
errors is properly specified.  
It is worth noting that a standard GARCH (1, 1) model implicitly assumes symmetric volatility 
responses to bad and good news of equal magnitude. A leverage effect, whereby volatility 
responds more strongly to negative news, has been well-documented in the equity literature. 
Asymmetric models like the EGARCH allow good and bad news of equal size to impact 
conditional volatility differently. I confirm that such an asymmetric reaction exists in the EUA 
log-return series (estimating an EGARCH model, I find that the asymmetry coefficient of -
0.078 is statistically significant at the 1% level) but I still prefer to model historical volatility as 
a standard GARCH (1, 1) process. The relative out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of different 
volatility models has been examined in numerous studies. Awartani and Corradi (2005) find 
that while asymmetric GARCH models perform better than a simple GARCH (1, 1) in a one-
step ahead forecast, the former perform only marginally better in longer forecast horizons.  
Ederington and Guan (2005) report that out-of-sample GARCH (1, 1) and EGARCH forecasts 
are equally accurate. Nevertheless, s future improvement to the analysis presented in this 
chapter would be to supplement the symmetric GARCH (1, 1) forecasts with forecasts based on 
models which explicitly account for asymmetric responses in volatility.  
In terms of applying the GARCH (1, 1) model, estimation of a rolling GARCH on a 
recursive window of observations was impossible due to multiple violations of the non-
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negativity constraints noted above. Therefore, the GARCH parameters were estimated only 
thrice. The 257 daily observations from January 3, 2007 until December 31, 2007 were 
used to derive the parameters of the GARCH process used for forecasts in 2008. At the end 
of 2008, the GARCH model was re-estimated and parameters were extracted from the 
period from January 3, 2007 up until December 3, 2008, resulting in a total of 495 daily 
observations. Forecasts in 2010 were based on GARCH parameters estimated from the 474 
observations spanning the period January 2, 2008 – December 2, 2009. The GARCH 
parameters are reported in Table 2.2. The fairly stable GARCH coefficients derived from 
the three estimations suggest that there were no dramatic changes to the pattern of 
conditional volatility over the period under examination. 
Table 2.2 GARCH specifications 
The table reports the GARCH parameters used in forecasting over the sample period 02/01/2008 – 
08/12/2010. The 257 daily observations from 03/01/2007 until 31/12/2007 are used to derive the parameters 
of the GARCH process used for out-of-sample forecasts in 2008. At the end of 2008, the GARCH model is 
re-estimated and parameters are extracted from the period 03/01/2007 – 03/12/2008, for a total of 495 daily 
observations. Forecasts in 2010 are based on GARCH parameters estimated from the 474 observations 
spanning the period 02/01/2008-02/12/2009. The associated p-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
2008 GARCH forecasts 2009 GARCH forecasts 2010 GARCH forecasts 
Constant 0.1231 0.3117 0.262 
 (0.163) (0.004) (0.031) Alpha 0.1044 0.106 0.0991 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) Beta 0.8718 0.8414 0.8638 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Following Brooks (2008), on day t, forecasts about volatility m days ahead were derived 
from the formula: 
!!!!! ! !! ! !!! ! !!!!!!!! ! !!!     (9) 
where  !! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!is the unconditional variance of returns and !!! is the daily squared 
return on day t. Since this is a forecast for time t + m in the future, volatility realized over 
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the following m days is calculated as the average of the individual forecasts for the days 
included. All volatilities are annualized.  
2.4.3. IMPLIED VOLATILITY 
Due to the relative immaturity of the carbon derivatives market, there are still some days 
when options on the ICE ECX EUA futures contracts do not trade. As missing observations 
could potentially introduce bias in the analysis (Neely, 2004, 2009), the days with no 
traded observations were carefully examined, but no systematic difference was found 
between realized volatility on days with missing implied volatility and days when both 
volatilities were observable. All regression analysis assumes that the unobserved variables 
are randomly distributed and do not bias the estimates.   
As the information content of implied volatility depends upon model specification, two 
measures of implied volatility are employed in this chapter. The first is the implied 
volatility obtained from the Black (1976) model and the second is the implied volatility 
directly reported by the European Climate Exchange. The predictive power of implied 
volatility computed under these different approaches is then compared. 
According to the Black (1976) model, the prices of European call and put options on 
futures can be found using the following formulae: 
c = e $ rT[FN(d1) $ KN(d2)]     (10) 
                    p = e $ rT[KN( $ d2) $ FN( $ d1)]     (11) 
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where c (p) is the price of a call (put) option, K is the exercise price; T is the time until 
expiration  measured in years; r is the risk-free continuously compounded discount rate and 
F is the price of the underlying futures contract. In addition,  
!! ! !" ! ! ! !! ! !! !    and !! ! !! ! ! !  
All options with moneyness outside of the 0.5 – 1.5 range are removed as these 
observations could potentially be inaccurate and characterized by very low liquidity. The 
risk-free rates are the annualized Euro LIBOR rates, obtained from Thomson One Banker. 
Data from the last five trading days prior to option expiration is also discarded to prevent 
possible huge jumps in implied volatility that might distort the underlying relationships. 
The number of observations was reduced to 576 after non-trading days were removed from 
the sample.  
The implied volatility reported by the ECX is set through two surveys of market 
participants5. The first survey is conducted on a daily basis and inquires about participants’ 
views of the implied volatility of the at-the-money strike options for all traded futures 
contracts. The second survey is conducted every Wednesday and aims to reflect the market 
sentiment over the settlement window for futures contracts of various maturities. It models 
the at-the-money smile/skew by explicitly taking into account the market participants’ 
estimates of the 10%/25%/40%/50%/40%/25%/10% delta strikes. The resulting shape of 
the volatility smile for each maturity is maintained for a week, until the next survey, while 
the at-the-money volatility is collected on a daily basis and moves up and down with these 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 A description of the ECX methodology used in deriving implied volatility was obtained via personal communication 
with the London headquarters. 
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changes. There are a total of 582 observations for which ECX-implied volatility is 
available for carbon options traded over the period January 2, 2008 – December 8, 2010. 
Since the ECX-reported implied volatility directly presents the expectations of the market 
participants about future variance of returns, it should theoretically minimize model 
misspecification error. My hypothesis is that this model-free measure will have greater 
predictive power than the Black (1976) model.  
Preliminary analysis of the ECX and Black implied volatility time series points to a strong 
association between the two measurements. The correlation coefficient is 0.994, a finding 
which may be explained by the fact that market participants rely heavily on classical option 
pricing models like the Black (1976) model in estimating fair value.  The less than unity 
correlation between the two measures of implied volatility might stem from the fact that the 
ECX reports the traders’ assessment of the implied volatility of the at-the-money options, 
while estimates of Black implied volatility are obtained from nearest-the-money options.  
2.5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
2.5.1. PREDICTIVE POWER OF IMPLIED VOLATILITY 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to confirm the lack of unit root for all five 
volatility series (three series of realized volatility measures and two implied volatility 
series). In the absence of non-stationarity, the hypothesis that implied volatility contains 
information about ex-post realized volatility is tested by estimating Equation 1. The results 
are summarized in Table 2.3. The implied volatility reported by the ECX is used in 
deriving the results reported in Panel A, while the estimations in Panel B are based on the 
Black implied volatility.  
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Table 2.3 Efficiency and unbiasedness of option-implied volatility as a forecast of volatility 
The table reports the results of Equation 1. Realized volatility (RV) is calculated on a daily basis as the 
variance of returns realized over the days remaining until option expiry. Daily volatility is proxied by squared 
daily returns, Parkinson’s and Rogers and Satchell’s variance estimators. Newey-West standard errors are 
used in deriving the significance of the regression coefficients. P-values of the test !=0 are reported in 
parentheses.  
 
Intercept Implied volatility Adj. R-squared Obs.  
Panel A: Implied volatility is published by the ECX 
Squared Returns RV -2.946 0.797 48.3% 582 
 
(0.357) (0.000) 
  Parkinson RV -2.110 0.761 56.3% 582 
 
(0.337) (0.000) 
  Rogers and Satchell RV -3.687 0.793 54.3% 582 
 
(0.109) (0.000) 
  
     Panel B: Implied volatility is derived from the Black (1976) model 
Squared Returns RV -1.562 0.781 45.6% 576 
 
(0.619) (0.000) 
  Parkinson RV -1.19 0.756 54.3% 576 
 
(0.587) (0.000) 
  Rogers and Satchell RV -2.456 0.78 52% 576 
 
(0.267) (0.000) 
   
Panel A demonstrates that implied volatility is highly significant for all three measures of 
ex-post volatility. As anticipated, the adjusted R-squared is higher for the range-based 
estimators relative to squared returns and peaks at over 56% for Parkinson’s measure. In 
line with the rationality hypothesis of Canina and Figlewski (1993), the intercept of the 
regression equation is statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, the regression 
coefficient of implied volatility is consistently below one, with values between 0.76 – 0.8. 
The Wald test rejects the joint hypothesis that "=0 and !=1 for all three alternative 
definitions of realized volatility (F-statistics for the squared daily returns, Parkinson’s and 
Rogers and Satchell’s estimators are respectively 149.3, 247 and 281.2). This suggests that 
while highly informative, the ECX-reported implied volatility is a biased forecast of the 
volatility realized by the underlying futures over the remaining life of the option. 
The results reported in Panel B lead to qualitatively and quantitatively identical 
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conclusions, as expected given the high correlation between the two implied volatility 
measures. Implied volatility is a highly informative but biased forecast of future variance of 
returns, as evidenced by the failure to accept the joint hypothesis of "=0 and !=1 (F-
statistics for the squared daily returns and Parkinson’s and Rogers and Satchell’s estimators 
are respectively 124.7, 208.1 and 185.3). The high coefficient of determination suggests 
that despite being a biased forecast, Black implied volatility can explain a substantial 
portion of ex-post realized volatility – up to 54% when Parkinson’s estimator is used. 
To test for the time to maturity effect in the ability of implied volatility to predict ex-post 
realized volatility, Equation 2 is estimated.  Panel A of Table 2.4 presents the results using 
the ECX-reported estimate of implied volatility while Panel B uses volatility derived from 
the Black (1976) model. The significance of implied volatility over the individual periods 
identified by the dummy variables is established by testing the hypothesis that %i +&=0 for 
i=1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The (%i +& ) slope coefficients for all five periods are statistically 
different from zero for both the ECX and Black implied volatilities, regardless of which 
realized volatility measure is employed.  
An interesting observation from Table 2.4 is that the regression coefficients of the 
interactive terms D%i decline in value as the option maturity increases. This is very intuitive 
as the longer the remaining life of the option, the less information will be contained in the 
volatility implied by the option’s price. Conversely, the closer the option is to expiration 
and the less uncertainty there is the more important option implied volatility becomes in 
explaining future variance of returns. The Wald tests reject the joint hypothesis of 
insignificant intercept and implied volatility regression coefficient of unity (!=0, %i+&=1) 
for all five periods over which volatility is examined (F-statistics range from 5.8 to 68.9 for 
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Table 2.4 Time to maturity effect in the ability of implied volatility to predict ex-post realized volatility  
This table reports the results of Equation 2 over the period 02/01/2008 – 08/12/2010. Realized volatility (RV) is proxied by squared daily returns, Parkinson’s 
and Rogers and Satchell’s variance estimators. Di is a binary variable which takes on values of 1 when the remaining life until the option’s expiration falls within 
a certain range; and 0, otherwise. D1 equals 1 for options with 1 month or less till expiration; D2 – between 1 and 2 months until expiry; D3 – between 2 and 4 
months until expiry; D4 – between 4 and 6 months until expiry; and finally, D5 – between 6 and 9 months until expiry. Additionally, five interactive terms 
Di*!!"#!! are created by multiplying the binary variable Di by the implied volatility time series. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
Intercept D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D1!imp D2!imp D3!imp D4!imp D5!imp !imp Adj. R2 Obs. 
Panel A: Implied volatility is published by the ECX 
Squared 
Returns RV 
-16.82 -26.67 0.20 6.54 17.41 32.33 0.62 0.09 -0.10 -0.35 -0.69 1.07 61.8% 582 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.78) (0.61) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.78) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
Parkinson 
RV 
-22.75 6.85 13.74 17.50 23.96 32.90 -0.09 -0.23 -0.37 -0.50 -0.69 1.18 62.5% 582 
(0.00) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.39) (0.16) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
Rogers and 
Satchell RV 
-25.48 7.24 17.69 21.31 24.82 33.39 -0.08 -0.31 -0.46 -0.52 -0.70 1.24 60% 582 
(0.00) (0.16) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.46) (0.08) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
Panel B: Implied volatility is derived from the Black (1976) model 
Squared 
Returns RV 
-16.63 -30.50 0.31 6.77 17.65 32.09 0.82 0.11 -0.10 -0.36 -0.70 1.08 60.4% 576 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.97) (0.47) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.67) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
Parkinson 
RV 
-22.47 5.64 13.76 17.59 24.06 32.68 -0.01 -0.22 -0.38 -0.51 -0.70 1.19 61.2% 576 
(0.00) (0.27) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.95) (0.20) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
Rogers and 
Satchell RV 
-25.23 8.43 17.73 21.45 24.92 33.19 -0.05 -0.30 -0.46 -0.53 -0.71 1.25 58.1% 576 
(0.00) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.66) (0.10) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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both the ECX and Black implied volatilities).  
Based on the results from Tables 2.3 and 2.4, I conclude that implied volatility has high 
predictive power, despite the long maturity cycle of carbon options. Contrary to Fleming 
(1998) and Li (2002) who find that implied volatility tends to forecast shorter-term ex-post 
volatility only, I observe that for the carbon market implied volatility can be used as a 
forecast for horizons of up to one year ahead. Although most of the prior literature is 
focused on options with a maturity of one month, Li and Yang (2009) conduct a study on 
the Australian Stock Market where options also have a relatively long maturity cycle of 6 
months. In line with the findings in this chapter, they report that despite the longer 
maturity, implied volatility remains informative about future volatility. The coefficient of 
determination found by Li and Yang (2009), however, is about half the size of that reported 
in Table 2.3. A possible explanation of the higher R-squared obtained in the carbon 
analysis is that in the recessionary environment following the financial crisis and the on-
going European sovereign debt crisis, the carbon price has moved in a very narrow range 
around !12-15 per metric tonne, without dramatic jumps. Lack of variability in carbon 
price volatility over this period is likely to be the cause of the high coefficient of 
determination.  
The statistical significance of all the ("i +#) terms motivates a more detailed study of the 
forecasting power of implied volatility. As a next step, I examine whether implied volatility 
can be used as a predictor of future volatility over a fixed horizon, independent of the 
option expiration date, and if so, whether the forecast is efficient and unbiased.  The 
equation !!"#$%&"'!! ! ! ! !!!!"#$!%&!! ! !!!  is re-estimated such that !!"#$%&"'!!  is the 
volatility realized over the forecasting horizon = 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 2 months,…,9 
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months, respectively. Since the forecasting horizon is shorter than the remaining life of the 
option, the regression results should be interpreted as indicative of the short-run 
relationship between implied and realized volatility over different time horizons and the 
ability of implied volatility to predict changes in the future variance of returns over periods 
which do not coincide with the life of options. Table 2.5 presents the regression results.   
The forecasting accuracy of the ECX implied volatility measure (Panel A) is discussed 
first. The regression coefficient of implied volatility remains statistically significant under 
all three alternative measures of realized volatility for all forecasting horizons up to and 
including 8 months into the future. The significance of implied volatility ($%0) means that 
it is informative about ex-post realized volatility and investors are justified to use it as a 
forecast of volatility over short periods which do not coincide with the remaining life of the 
option. Numerically, the slope regression coefficients obtained when volatility is measured 
as squared daily returns are slightly lower than those of the extreme-value estimates.  This 
suggests that implied volatility becomes more important when range-based estimates are 
used to calculate realized volatility. Under all three alternative definitions of volatility, 
implied volatility becomes more biased when used as a forecast over longer periods, as 
evidenced by the steadily declining slope regression coefficients. The Wald test rejects the 
joint hypothesis that !"#$%&'$$=1 for all three alternative definitions of realized volatility 
over all forecasting horizons (F-statistics range from 89.26 to 121.92). This confirms that 
while investors are justified in using implied volatility as a forecast of price variance over 
short periods in the future, these forecasts are biased.  
The results confirm key conclusions from the literature that range-based volatility 
estimators are better than squared daily returns in capturing the underlying volatility  
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Table 2.5 Predictive power of implied volatility 
This table reports the results of the equation !!"#$%&"'!! ! ! ! ! !!"#$!%&!! ! !!! over multiple forecasting 
horizons from 1 day up to 9 months. Squared daily returns, Parkinson’s and Rogers and Satchell’s range-
based estimators are used to measure ex-post return variance. The time period is 02/01/2008 – 08/12/2010. 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are employed. P-values of the test 
$=0 are reported in brackets. Implied volatility (!imp) observations are limited to days on which the traded 
volume of options exceeds zero.  
 
Panel A: Implied volatility is published by the ECX 
 Squared Returns RV Parkinson RV Rogers and Satchell RV  
 Intercept &imp Adj. R2 Intercept &imp Adj. R2 Intercept &imp Adj. R2 Obs. 
1-day -13.31 0.92 11.8% -21.31 1.20 34.2% -25.20 1.28 36.6% 581 
 
(0.06) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
  1-week -14.08 1.06 30% -19.76 1.20 45.9% -23.09 1.27 48.5% 577 
 
(0.05) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
  1-month -11.82 1.03 40.2% -18.38 1.17 52.6% -21.57 1.23 55.6% 565 
 
(0.06) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
  2-months -9.29 0.97 40.4% -16.25 1.12 51.1% -19.85 1.19 53.9% 548 
 
(0.09) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
  3-months -5.88 0.90 37.4% -12.57 1.04 47.2% -16.13 1.11 49.5% 531 
 
(0.24) (0.00) 
 
(0.01) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
  4-months -0.45 0.78 30.5% -7.56 0.93 40.2% -11.35 1.00 43% 516 
 
(0.92) (0.00) 
 
(0.08) (0.00) 
 
(0.01) (0.00) 
  5-months 5.66 0.65 22.5% -1.87 0.81 31.8% -2.46 0.89 31.1% 495 
 
(0.20) (0.00) 
 
(0.66) (0.00) 
 
(0.58) (0.00) 
  6-months 10.96 0.55 16.3% 3.53 0.70 24.2% 0.38 0.76 26.3% 476 
 
(0.01) (0.00) 
 
(0.41) (0.00) 
 
(0.93) (0.00) 
  7-months 17.65 0.42 10.1% 10.73 0.56 16.4% 8.08 0.61 18.1% 455 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.02) (0.00) 
 
(0.09) (0.00) 
  8-months 25.93 0.26 3.2% 24.14 0.34 4.6% 16.39 0.45 8.2% 435 
 
(0.00) (0.04) 
 
(0.00) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.00) 
  9-months 40.45 -0.01 -0.2% 33.12 0.13 0.4% 31.44 0.16 0.7% 413 
 
(0.00) (0.94) 
 
(0.00) (0.42) 
 
(0.00) (0.33) 
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Table 2.5 Predictive power of implied volatility (continued)  
 
Panel B: Implied volatility is derived from the Black (1976) model 
 Squared Returns RV Parkinson RV Rogers and Satchell RV  
 Intercept &imp Adj. R2 Intercept &imp Adj. R2 Intercept &imp Adj. R2 Obs. 
1-day -13.99 0.96 12.2% -21.07 1.22 34.4% -25.06 1.30 37.2% 575 
 (0.05) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)   
1-week -15.32 1.11 31.1% -20.26 1.23 46.4% -23.43 1.30 48.8% 571 
 (0.03) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)   
1-month -11.84 1.05 39.8% -18.44 1.20 52.3% -21.53 1.26 55.2% 559 
 (0.07) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)   
2-months -7.05 0.94 37.1% -14.67 1.11 48.5% -18.48 1.18 51.5% 542 
 (0.20) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)   
3-months -3.27 0.86 33.6% -10.52 1.01 44% -14.15 1.09 46.4% 525 
 (0.49) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)   
4-months 2.15 0.74 26.6% -5.32 0.90 36.7% -9.10 0.97 39.5% 510 
 (0.62) (0.00)  (0.20) (0.00)  (0.03) (0.00)   
5-months 8.09 0.61 19.3% 0.33 0.78 28.5% -0.43 0.86 28.2% 490 
 (0.06) (0.00)  (0.94) (0.00)  (0.92) (0.00)   
6-months 13.27 0.51 13.5% 5.63 0.67 21.2% 2.49 0.73 23.3% 471 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.19) (0.00)  (0.57) (0.00)   
7-months 19.44 0.39 8.2% 12.41 0.53 14.2% 9.75 0.59 15.9% 451 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00)  (0.04) (0.00)   
8-months 28.08 0.22 2.1% 25.89 0.31 3.5% 18.54 0.41 6.5% 429 
 (0.00) (0.10)  (0.00) (0.04)  (0.01) (0.00)   
9-months 42.84 -0.06 -0.1% 35.47 0.08 0% 33.76 0.12 0.2 407 
 (0.00) (0.70)  (0.00) (0.61)  (0.00) (0.49)   
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process (Fleming, 1998; Bakanova, 2010).  Panel A of Table 2.5 shows that implied 
volatility has much more explanatory power (measured by adjusted R-squared) when 
realized volatility is proxied by either Parkinson’s or Rogers and Satchell’s extreme-value 
volatility estimators. Figure 2.1 graphically summarizes the forecasting performance of 
implied volatility in terms of reported adjusted R-squared values.   
Figure 2.1 Improvements in adjusted R-squared over various fixed horizon forecasts with ECX implied 
volatility as a predictor of realized volatility (RV) 
 
The findings on the forecasting accuracy of Black (1976) implied volatility are reported in 
Panel B of Table 2.5.  The same conclusion holds – implied volatility can be used as a 
forecast over short periods as well as horizons up to 8 months. The adjusted R-squared 
reaches its maximum value when Black implied volatility is used as a one-month-ahead 
forecast. The coefficient of determination for the Black implied volatility regressions is 
insignificantly lower than that reported for the ECX implied volatility. The maximum 
adjusted R-squared when using squared returns as a proxy for volatility is 39.8% compared 
to 40.4% when the ECX-reported volatility is used. For the Parkinson’s and Rogers and 
Satchell’s extreme-value volatility measures the coefficients of determination peak at 
-10.00% 
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52.3% and 55.2% respectively (versus 52.6% and 55.6% for the corresponding ECX 
implied volatility regressions).  
In assessing the impact of implied volatility measurement on the relationship between 
implied and realized volatility, the results do not offer support for the hypothesis that ECX-
reported volatility increases the explanatory power of implied volatility since it better 
captures the market participants’ expectations. In order to directly address the issue of 
which implied volatility specification provides a superior forecast, I employ the J-test for 
non-nested hypotheses proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981). In a J-test, the two 
competing model specifications are tested for robustness against each other by including 
the fitted values of one model in the regression for the other. A model is correctly specified 
if the added fitted values possess no explanatory power. As a robustness check, I examine 
the information criteria of the regression estimates and select the model with lower 
information criteria as a better specification. Table 2.6 presents the results.  
The J-test is conducted on significance level of 1%. Since I do not a priori know which 
model is the “true” model, I conduct two tests for each pair of implied volatilities. Thus, a 
model that uses, e.g. Black implied volatility will be unambiguously selected over the ECX 
volatility if and only if the former model is accepted and the latter model is rejected. If both 
models are either accepted or rejected in this test, the J-test cannot be relied on to select the 
best model. Out of 36 cases tested in Table 2.6 (three realized volatility specifications for 
each of the 12 maturities), I can conclude that the J-test clearly supports ECX implied 
volatility in 6 instances, where the model using Black volatility is rejected and ECX 
volatility is accepted at the same time. In only 3 of the cases I see such support for the 
Black volatility. In the remaining 27 cases I am unable to choose between these two  
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Table 2.6 Comparative performance of ECX-reported volatility and Black implied volatility as a forecast of future variance of returns 
This table reports the results of the Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) J-test and the model selection tests based on information criteria. The two competing 
models considered in the J-test are !!!"#$%&"'!! ! ! ! !!!!"#$%!!"#$!%!!! ! !!!!and !!!"#$%&"'!! ! ! ! !!!!"#!!"#$!%&!! ! !!!. The period under examination 
spans from January 2008 until December 2010.  
  
J-test ( at 1% significance) 1-day 1-week 
1-
month 
2-
months 
3-
months 
4-
months 
5-
months 
6-
months 
7-
months 
8-
months 
9-
months 
Until 
Expiry 
Squared 
returns 
Black IV Accept Accept Accept Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Accept Reject 
ECX IV Accept Accept Accept Accept Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Accept Reject 
Parkinson Black IV Accept Accept Accept Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Accept Accept Reject 
 
ECX IV Reject Reject Accept Accept Accept Reject Reject Reject Reject Accept Accept Accept 
Rogers and 
Satchell 
Black IV Accept Accept Accept Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Accept Reject 
ECX IV Accept Reject Accept Accept Accept Reject Reject Reject Reject Accept Accept Accept 
              Information Criteria 
            All inconclusive 
            
  Chapter 2 
!
45 
!
specifications of implied volatility using the J-test. The robustness tests based on the 
Schwarz and Akaike information criteria corroborate the conclusion that there is no 
statistically meaningful difference in the performance of ECX and Black volatility as a 
forecast, as in all 36 cases the comparison is inconclusive. Overall, I do not find evidence 
to support the hypothesis that the ECX volatility specification provides a better forecast 
than the Black (1976) estimate. This result implies that market participants’ perception of 
at-the-money implied volatility does not reflect any factors outside the classical pricing 
models such as the Black model.  
2.5.2. INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF IMPLIED VOLATILITY 
The results of the test for the informational efficiency of implied volatility against the 
GARCH-based forecast (Equation 3) are reported in Table 2.7. Panel A presents the results 
when ECX implied volatility is used and Panel B presents the results when implied 
volatility is calculated using the Black (1976) model.  
To ensure that the OLS analysis does not suffer from multicollinearity, Variance Inflation 
Factors are estimated. The figures, reported in the column next to adjusted R-squared, are 
well below 10 which is considered to be the threshold above which multicollinearity is 
present (Gujarati, 2004). The regression coefficient of implied volatility is statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level for all three alternative measures across forecasting 
horizons of up to and including 8 months. Historical volatility is also significant over 
forecasting horizons up to and including four months and loses its explanatory power for 
longer-term forecasts. This conclusion is in contrast with Li’s (2002) finding that 
historical-based forecasts outperform implied volatility predictions as the forecasting 
horizon increases. The difference may be attributable to Li’s use of high-frequency data 
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enabling a better modelling of the price volatility dynamics and greater forecasting power 
than predictions based on daily estimates.  
The GARCH forecast coefficient is considerably smaller than the implied volatility 
coefficient, suggesting that past behaviour is much less important and informative about 
future volatility. Nevertheless, the statistical significance of historical information-based 
forecasts found for short-term forecasting horizons implies that using implied volatility as a 
forecast is inefficient as information contained in recent volatility behaviour is not 
compounded in the option prices. The results from the efficiency tests against GARCH-
based forecasts reported here contrast with the results obtained by Martens and Zein (2004) 
who find that implied volatility forecasts generally incorporate the GARCH effects. The 
authors use a non-overlapping methodology and account for the long memory effect in 
their realized volatility time series, which may account for the difference in the results. 
Other papers which rely on overlapping sampling methodology, namely Blair et al. (2001) 
and Neely (2009), generally reach the same conclusions reported in this study.   
A direct comparison of the coefficients of determination obtained from these regressions 
and the rationality regressions in Panel A of Table 2.5 confirms the conclusion that for 
short forecasting horizons of up to four months ahead implied volatility is indeed an 
inefficient estimate of future volatility. Adjusted R-squared improves after the addition of 
historical volatility as an explanatory variable, reflecting the incremental information 
contained in past futures prices. This result is of importance to all market participants 
because, as highlighted in Section 2.1, volatility is a critical part of any risk-management 
process or trading strategy. These conclusions are also confirmed by the results of the 
regressions estimated using Black volatility as a proxy for the option-implied volatility 
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(Panel B of Table 2.7).  
Similar results, unreported here for the purpose of brevity, are obtained when using 
historical volatility estimated as the moving average volatility instead of the GARCH 
model. In this case, historical volatility remains significant for shorter horizons from 1 day 
to 2 months. This further contributes to the rejection of the information efficiency 
hypothesis for implied volatility on carbon markets.  
One possible explanation for the finding that historical volatility contains information 
which is not incorporated in implied volatility is that the carbon options market is not yet 
fully efficient. Due to the relative immaturity of the carbon market, historical price data is 
only available for a short period, which adds to investors’ difficulties in fairly pricing 
carbon derivatives. Moreover, the presence of regulatory uncertainty and government 
intervention might act to distort the implied volatility underlying carbon options. If 
investors continue to fear developments similar to the collapse of the EUA futures price to 
nearly zero in 2006 when government verified emissions were disclosed, it may be the case 
that in pricing options they incorporate expectations of high impact, low frequency events 
that failed to materialise during the sample period (Neely, 2004). This may explain why 
implied volatility exceeds ex-post realized volatility, regardless of which of the three 
proxies for volatility is used. As seen in Table 2.1, the average values of realized volatility 
for all three series are lower than the average values of implied volatility. This leads me to 
conclude that investors price in possible extreme events in the premium they pay for carbon 
options. 
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Table 2.7 Informational efficiency of implied volatility forecasts against GARCH-based forecasts 
This table reports the results of Equation 3 in which both implied volatility and GARCH-based forecasts are used as predictors of ex-post realized volatility over 
multiple forecasting horizons. GARCH parameters for the forecasts during the period 01 – 12/ 2008 were derived from the 2007 log-return series of the 
underlying ICE ECX EUA futures contracts.  GARCH parameters for the forecasts during the period 01-12/2009 were derived from the 2007 and 2008 log-return 
series of the underlying ICE ECX EUA. Implied volatility observations are limited to days on which the traded volume of options exceeds zero. The period under 
examination spans from 02/01/2008 until 08/12/2010. Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are employed. The 
corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses.  
Panel A: Implied volatility is published by the ECX 
 
 
Squared Returns RV Parkinson RV Roger and Satchell RV 
 
 
Inter-
cept 
!imp 
 
GARCH 
forecast 
Adj. 
R^2 
VIFs Inter-
cept 
!imp 
 
GARCH 
forecast 
Adj. 
R^2 
VIFs Inter-
cept 
!imp 
 
GARCH 
forecast 
Adj. 
R^2 
VIFs Obs. 
1-day -10.46 0.72 0.21 14.9% 1.789 -17.71 0.95 0.26 43% 1.760 -21.55 1.02 0.26 45.1% 1.829 581 
 
(0.06)  (0.00) (0.01) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   1-week -12.71 0.90 0.18 34% 1.521 -18.20 1.02 0.21 52.2% 2.101 -21.47 1.08 0.21 54.9% 2.226 577 
 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   1-month -13.15 0.92 0.17 43.2% 1.767 -19.84 1.06 0.19 56.3% 2.298 -23.10 1.12 0.20 59.5% 2.477 565 
 
0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   2-months -12.24 0.90 0.16 42.3% 1.740 -19.58 1.05 0.18 53.4% 2.155 -23.44 1.11 0.19 56.4% 2.301 548 
 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   3-months -10.01 0.85 0.17 38.8% 1.641 -17.15 0.99 0.19 48.9% 1.966 -20.97 1.05 0.20 51.3% 2.060 531 
 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   4-months -4.73 0.75 0.15 31.4% 1.463 -12.42 0.89 0.17 41.3% 1.711 -16.37 0.97 0.18 44.1% 1.796 516 
 
(0.33) (0.00) (0.02) 
  
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   5-months 3.42 0.64 0.08 22.6% 1.297 -5.06 0.79 0.11 32.1% 1.478 -3.46 0.88 0.03 30.9% 1.454 495 
 
(0.51) (0.00) (0.33) 
  
(0.29) (0.00) (0.14) 
  
(0.51) (0.00) (0.69) 
   6-months 11.33 0.55 -0.01 16.1% 1.197 2.86 0.70 0.02 24.1% 1.323 -0.25 0.76 0.02 26.2% 1.361 476 
 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.89) 
  
(0.59) (0.00) (0.80) 
  
(0.96) (0.00) (0.82) 
   7-months 19.10 0.43 -0.05 10% 1.116 11.18 0.56 -0.02 16.2% 1.199 8.66 0.62 -0.02 18.3% 1.223 455 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.63) 
  
(0.05) (0.00) (0.88) 
  
(0.13) (0.00) (0.85) 
   8-months 28.66 0.28 -0.10 3.2% 1.038 28.37 0.37 -0.16 4.9% 1.057 18.22 0.46 -0.07 8.1% 1.093 435 
 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.39) 
  
(0.00) (0.01) (0.23) 
  
(0.01) (0.00) (0.57) 
   9-months 42.76 0.01 -0.09 -0.2% 1.002 34.68 0.15 -0.06 0.3% 1.008 32.99 0.18 -0.06 0.6% 1.011 413 
 
(0.00) (0.94) (0.46) 
  
(0.00) (0.39) (0.62) 
  
(0.00) (0.31) (0.64) 
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Table 2.7 Informational efficiency of implied volatility forecasts against GARCH-based forecasts (Continued) 
  
Panel B: Implied volatility is calculated by the Black (1976) model 
 
 Squared Returns RV Parkinson RV Roger and Satchell RV  
 Inter-
cept 
!imp 
 
GARCH 
forecast 
Adj. 
R^2 
VIFs Inter-
cept 
!imp 
 
GARCH 
forecast 
Adj. 
R^2 
VIFs Inter-
cept 
!imp 
 
GARCH 
forecast 
Adj. 
R^2 
VIFs Obs. 
1-day -11.04 0.75 0.21 15.3% 1.185 -17.30 0.95 0.26 43.4% 1.774 -21.19 1.03 0.27 46.3% 1.868 575 
 
(0.05) (0.00) (0.01) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   1-week -13.80 0.94 0.19 35.5% 1.555 -18.58 1.04 0.21 52.9% 2.131 -21.68 1.10 0.22 55.5% 2.255 571 
 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   1-month -13.18 0.94 0.18 43.1% 1.783 -19.90 1.07 0.19 56.2% 2.293 -23.06 1.13 0.20 59.3% 2.467 559 
 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   2-months -10.26 0.86 0.18 39.3% 1.654 -18.20 1.02 0.19 51.1% 2.054 -22.29 1.10 0.21 54.4% 2.200 542 
 
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   3-months -7.85 0.80 0.19 35.5% 1.556 -15.53 0.96 0.20 46.1% 1.863 -19.45 1.02 0.21 48.6% 1.952 525 
 
(0.10) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   4-months -2.71 0.70 0.17 27.8% 1.391 -10.74 0.86 0.19 38.1% 1.622 -14.71 0.93 0.20 40.9% 1.699 510 
 
(0.58) (0.00) (0.02) 
  
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   5-months 5.35 0.60 0.09 19.4% 1.246 -3.35 0.76 0.12 28.9% 1.413 -1.73 0.85 0.04 28.1% 1.396 490 
 
(0.30) (0.00) (0.28) 
  
(0.49) (0.00) (0.12) 
  
(0.75) (0.00) (0.63) 
   6-months 13.27 0.51 0.00 13.3% 1.158 4.66 0.66 0.03 21.1% 1.273 1.52 0.73 0.03 23.2% 1.307 471 
 
(0.02) (0.00) (1.00) 
  
(0.39) (0.00) (0.74) 
  
(0.78) (0.00) (0.75) 
   7-months 20.55 0.39 -0.04 8.1% 1.093 12.57 0.53 -0.01 14% 1.168 10.03 0.59 -0.01 15.7% 1.191 451 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.73) 
  
(0.03) (0.00) (0.96) 
  
(0.09) (0.00) (0.93) 
   8-months 30.33 0.24 -0.08 2% 1.025 29.87 0.34 -0.15 3.8% 1.044 19.87 0.42 -0.05 6.3% 1.073 429 
 
(0.00) (0.08) (0.51) 
  
(0.00) (0.02) (0.29) 
  
(0.01) (0.00) (0.70) 
   9-months 44.69 -0.04 -0.08 -0.2% 1.003 36.56 0.10 -0.05 -0.2% 1.003 34.85 0.13 -0.05 0% 1.005 407 
 
(0.00) (0.81) (0.58) 
  
(0.00) (0.58) (0.75) 
  
(0.00) (0.47) (0.75) 
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2.5.3. DIRECTIONAL ACCURACY OF IMPLIED VOLATILITY FORECASTS 
Having established that implied volatility is informative about the future variance of 
returns, the issue then arises as to whether or not implied volatility actually represents a 
useful forecast, given its bias in overestimating realized volatility. While research has 
focused on the ability of implied volatility to predict future volatility, the usefulness of 
implied volatility forecasts in terms of correct hedging decisions and profitable speculative 
trades is not generally addressed in the literature on informational efficiency. To an options 
trader, for example, the direction of changes in volatility is often of greater significance 
than the actual size of the change. The results of the directional accuracy test are reported 
in Table 2.8. Again, implied volatility is examined as a forecast multiple steps ahead – 
ranging from 1 day to 9 months – and realized volatility is measured by the three 
alternative estimators used in the analysis so far.   
The results in Panel A demonstrate that implied volatility has some, although not 
exceptionally high (rate of correct forecasts is below 60% for all horizons), predictive 
power for future volatility changes for most forecasting horizons and all volatility measures 
employed. For all forecasting horizons of one month and above correct forecasts of 
volatility changes exceed 50% and all are statistically significant, except one-month ahead 
for the squared returns estimator. The highest percentage of correct predictions is achieved 
for the longest horizons (8 and 9 months), with the share of accurate predictions reaching 
58% for Rogers and Satchell’s volatility.  
The directional accuracy is also examined for the three individual years of the study (2008, 
2009 and 2010) and for the volatility increases and decreases, separately (Panel B of Table  
!"#
#
Table 2.8 Directional accuracy of implied volatility as a forecast of ex-post variance of returns 
This table reports the results of the directional accuracy tests on implied volatility as a predictor of realized volatility over multiple forecasting horizons. An increase 
in implied volatility is interpreted as a forecast of increase in ex-post variance of returns, and vice versa. Forecasts are compared to actual changes in the volatility 
over the following i periods where i=1 day, 1 week, 1 month… 9 months. Realized volatility (RV) is proxied by three alternative measures – squared daily returns, 
Parkinson’s and Rogers and Satchell’s estimators. The percentage of accurate forecasts is individually estimated for correct increases and decreases. The table reports 
the significance of the accuracy where *, **, and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Correct forecasts  
  
1-day 1-week 1-month 2-month 3-month 4-month 5-month 6-month 7-month 8-month 9-month 
Total forecasts 580 576 559 537 515 495 475 456 434 412 390 
Squared 
Returns RV  
Correct 
forecasts 
284 274 294 298* 289* 274* 263* 253* 240** 236* 216** 
48.97% 47.57% 52.59% 55.49% 56.12% 55.35% 55.37% 55.48% 55.30% 57.28% 55.38% 
Parkinson RV Correct 
forecasts 
273 289 307* 288** 285* 275* 270* 251** 236** 232* 223* 
47.07% 50.17% 54.92 53.63% 55.34% 55.56% 56.84% 55.04% 54.38% 56.31% 57.18% 
Rogers and 
Satchell RV 
Correct 
forecasts 
276 295 313* 298* 281** 281* 256** 251** 242* 239* 224* 
47.59% 51.22% 55.99% 55.49% 54.56% 56.77% 53.89% 55.04% 55.76% 58.01% 57.44% 
 
Panel B: Forecasts by year and direction 
2008 
 
1-day 1-week 1-month 2-months 3-month 4-month 5-month 6-month 7-months 8-month 9-month 
Sq
ua
re
d 
re
tu
rn
s 
Actual increases 126 107 116 146 179 198 230 235 226 212 228 
Correct forecasts 54.29% 40% 47.14% 60%** 74.29%* 82.86%* 95.71%* 100%* 94.29%* 88.57%* 97.14%* 
Actual decreases 112 131 122 92 59 40 8 3 12 26 10 
Correct forecasts 48.78% 62.20%** 53.66% 45.12% 30.49% 19.51% 4.88% 2.44% 8.54% 17.07% 6.10% 
Pa
rk
in
so
n Actual increases 74 87 87 81 77 77 72 70 70 72 80 
Correct forecasts 47.14% 52.86% 52.86% 58.57%*** 74.29%* 87.14%* 100%* 100%* 100.00%* 98.57%* 84.29%* 
Actual decreases 125 129 118 92 60 35 2 0 2 6 42 
Correct forecasts 50% 60.98%** 60.98%** 48.78% 30.49% 19.51% 2.44% 0.00% 0.00% 3.66% 25.61% 
R
og
er
s &
 
Sa
tc
he
ll 
Actual increases 117 113 114 145 172 187 238 237 216 201 197 
Correct forecasts 48.57% 57.14% 47.14% 62.86%** 71.43%* 82.86%* 100%* 100%* 90%* 84.29%* 84.29%* 
Actual decreases 121 125 124 93 66 51 0 1 22 37 41 
Correct forecasts 47.56% 56.10% 58.54%*** 54.88% 36.59% 29.27% 0.00% 1.22% 13.41% 23.17% 25.61% 
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Panel B (Continued) 
2009 
 
1-day 1-week 1-month 2-month 3-month 4-month 5-month 6-month 7-month 8-month 9-month 
Sq
ua
re
d 
re
tu
rn
s 
Actual increases 115 120 87 82 78 50 47 34 34 34 34 
Correct forecasts 48.24% 47.06% 40% 40% 37.65% 23.53% 18.82% 16.47% 16.47% 16.47% 16.47% 
Actual decreases 121 116 149 154 158 186 189 202 202 202 202 
Correct forecasts 50% 46.43% 66.96%* 69.64%* 67.86%* 82.14%* 83.93%* 89.29%* 89.29%* 89.29%* 89.29%* 
Pa
rk
in
so
n Actual increases 109 113 88 90 61 43 37 36 35 36 36 
Correct forecasts 37.65% 45.88% 40% 35.29% 23.53% 20% 18.82% 17.65% 16.47% 17.65% 17.65% 
Actual decreases 127 123 148 146 175 193 199 200 201 200 200 
Correct forecasts 45.54%* 51.79%* 66.07%* 60.71%* 73.21%* 85.71%* 88.39%* 88.39%* 88.39%* 88.39%* 88.39%* 
R
og
er
s &
 
Sa
tc
he
ll 
Actual increases 120 110 94 100 81 55 57 39 37 37 37 
Correct forecasts 43.53% 44.71% 45.88% 40% 25.88% 21.18% 21.18% 18.82% 18.82% 18.82% 18.82% 
Actual decreases 116 126 142 136 155 181 179 197 199 199 199 
Correct forecasts 43.75% 54.46% 65.18%* 59.82%** 64.29%* 80.36%* 79.46%* 86.61%* 88.39%* 88.39%* 88.39%* 
2010             
Sq
ua
re
d 
R
et
ur
ns
 Actual increases 123 110 82 43 30 28 3 0 0 0 0 
Correct forecasts 48.39% 40.66% 35.71% 24% 25.76% 21.82% 2.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Actual decreases 116 125 136 153 144 124 127 108 86 64 42 
Correct forecasts 46.38% 48.53% 61.9%* 78.76%* 87%* 83.52%* 97.59%* 100%* 100%* 100%* 100%* 
Pa
rk
in
so
n Actual increases 115 113 75 42 26 18 0 0 0 0 0 
Correct forecasts 48.39% 43.96% 33.33% 25.33% 24.24% 10.91% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Actual decreases 124 122 143 154 148 134 130 108 86 64 42 
Correct forecasts 51.45% 47.79% 66.67%* 79.65%* 90%* 86.81%* 100%* 100%* 100%* 100%* 100%* 
R
og
er
s &
 
Sa
tc
he
ll 
Actual increases 120 113 83 45 21 2 15 0 0 0 0 
Correct forecasts 51.61% 46.15% 42.86% 26.67% 21.21% 1.82% 11.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Actual decreases 119 122 135 151 153 150 115 108 86 64 42 
Correct forecasts 50% 50% 66.67%* 77.88%* 93%* 98.9%* 89.16%* 100%* 100%* 100%* 100%* 
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2.8). Overall, a trend of increasing volatility is reported over 2008, and over this year 
implied volatility is found to be more directionally accurate in predicting volatility 
increases than decreases. In fact, 100% accuracy is reported for predictions of ex-post 
volatility increases over several of the forecasting horizons across all three volatility 
measures used. Unlike 2008, both 2009 and 2010 were marked by a long-term trend of 
decreasing volatility. This steady decline in price volatility may be interpreted as a sign that 
the carbon market is becoming increasingly mature and less uncertain. In particular, during 
2009 and 2010 the European Commission confirmed details about the continuation of the 
EU ETS after 2012 and the emission caps for the third trading period. Alternatively, the 
decreasing volatility may be a consequence of the recessionary environment in Europe over 
the period. Declining industrial production reduced demand for emission allowances and 
pushed carbon prices down. For these two years, implied volatility was directionally more 
accurate in forecasting future volatility decreases rather than increases.  
Thus, the sample has included periods of both volatility increase and decline, and over the 
whole period, I find that implied volatility has a statistically significant power to predict 
future volatility changes, especially for longer horizons. 
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter investigates the forecasting accuracy of implied volatility in the rapidly 
developing carbon options market. The findings suggest that the implied volatility of 
carbon options is highly informative about the future volatility up to a year ahead. Implied 
volatility, obtained from direct surveys of ECX market participants, and Black implied 
volatility perform equally well as a forecast of future variance. The results do not support 
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the hypotheses of unbiasedness or efficiency. On the contrary, I find that historical 
volatility contains incremental information which is not contained in the implied volatility 
estimate, especially when forecasting volatility over shorter periods of time. This would 
imply that speculative opportunities for arbitrageurs exist in the carbon market and profits 
could be made by trading on a combination of historical price data and option implied 
volatility. The results also suggest that implied volatility is directionally accurate in 
predicting future volatility changes. This chapter has focused on short-term point forecasts, 
which are likely to be of particular importance to carbon traders and regulated emitters.  
The assessment of the impact of different measures of realized volatility on the relationship 
between implied and realized volatility confirms the view that range-based estimators 
increase the explanatory power of implied volatility since they better capture the 
underlying volatility dynamics. Rogers and Satchell’s estimator performs slightly better 
than Parkinson’s estimator due to the fact that it allows for jumps in the opening price of 
the carbon futures.  
In interpreting the results of the study, some caveats are necessary. First, despite the rapid 
growth of the carbon options market, its liquidity and size remain much smaller than other 
financial or commodity markets. The data set also coincides with the recent financial crisis. 
Lower levels of industrial production have reduced the demand for emission allowances 
and the restricted credit environment has led firms to monetize allowances to raise funds 
(World Bank, 2010). Much of the recent trading activity can therefore be attributed to 
short-term, time-specific circumstances, which may not reflect the longer term market 
fundamentals. Availability of longer data series in the future will allow an assessment of 
the impact of the global financial crisis on the results presented in this chapter.   
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CHAPTER 3 INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY IN THE CONTEXT OF A 
CHANGING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
On March 11th, 2011 a devastating earthquake caused a radiation leak at the Japanese 
nuclear plant Fukushima. In response to the nuclear reactor crisis in Japan, industrialized 
European nations immediately questioned the nuclear future of their economies. The 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel was the first political leader to commit to the 
suspension of multiple nuclear reactors in the country. Her announcement caused an 
instantaneous jump in carbon prices6. Speculation over the increased demand for coal in the 
face of future reductions in nuclear energy output gave rise to a significant increase in the 
price of carbon allowances. Such evidence from the market seems to suggest that market 
participants are able to accurately price in new information. The aim of this chapter is to 
empirically investigate if, and to what extent, the carbon market is efficient. An event study 
methodology is employed to examine if new information reaching the market affects the 
expected price of carbon futures contracts, thereby causing abnormally positive or negative 
returns.  
Examining the issue of informational efficiency is particularly important for the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme as this fairly new market is undergoing constant 
structural and institutional changes. These changes are driven by the continuous learning 
process of policy makers and their attempts to improve the existing structures, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2033960/carbon-price-spikes-japan-nuclear-crisis 
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administrative processes and regulation of the market (Koop and Tole, 2011). Some of the 
major transformations in the organizational set-up of the market have been the move away 
from individual National Allocation Plans (NAPs) to a centralized EU-wide emissions cap, 
and the implementation of the Linking Directive which connects the EU ETS with Kyoto 
projects. The ability of market participants to accurately form expectations about the future 
price dynamics in such a continuously evolving institutional framework is crucial for the 
effective functioning of the carbon market.  
The efficiency of the carbon market has already been investigated in several academic 
papers but the results are far from unanimous. Miclaus et al. (2008) examine whether 
carbon market participants incorporate new information about announcements related to 
Phase I and II National Allocation Plans and about releases of verified emissions data 
during the first three years of the scheme. No evidence of cumulative abnormal returns is 
found, leading the authors to conclude that market participants accordingly account for new 
information and accurately forecast future price movements as a consequence of these 
announcements. Examining the same set of announcements as Miclaus et al. (2008) but 
using a different carbon return-generating model, Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009) 
document statistically significant market reactions before and after the events. Such 
findings are inconsistent with the weak-form market efficiency hypothesis. 
Chevallier et al. (2009a) demonstrate that information disclosure by the European 
Commission (EC) has a considerable impact on carbon price formation. They examine the 
public release of verified emissions data for 2006 and document a reduction in the volatility 
of carbon prices after the event as misleading information and uncertainty are removed 
from the market. Employing high-frequency data, Rotfu! et al. (2009) construct a model of 
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expectation formation whereby market participants forecast the decision of the European 
Commission on the proposed Phase II National Allocation Plans. The authors find that new 
information is accurately incorporated in carbon prices but with a considerable delay, 
implying that the market is not fully informationally efficient yet. In a recent work, Lepone 
et al. (2011) highlight a high level of informational asymmetry and data leakage observed 
in the carbon market. They too, find no support for the weak-form efficiency hypothesis 
and report cumulative abnormal returns associated with these types of institutional 
announcements.  
This chapter contributes to the existing literature on the informational efficiency of the 
carbon market in several ways. First, it is the first comprehensive work to include 
announcements related to Phase I, II and III of the EU ETS and their impact on the prices 
of near maturity and near phase futures contracts across all three trading periods. Second, a 
considerable improvement over the existing literature is the addition of new informative 
events for analysis. Prior research has focused on a limited set of supply-related 
announcements which cover news about the individual National Allocation Plans and the 
annual releases of verified emissions data. In addition to these, this chapter includes 
demand-side announcements related to the scope of the scheme, the linkage with tradable 
Kyoto offsets, the eligibility of alternative carbon certificates for ETS compliance, and the 
United Nations’ Conference of Parties. Third, I examine the impact of macroeconomic 
conditions on the market responsiveness to these announcements. Lastly, while most 
studies so far have examined the impact of events on the variance of carbon returns, I 
examine option-implied volatility changes around multiple event days too.  
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An event study based on regression analysis is performed where carbon returns are 
modelled as a function of: 1) event dummies only, and 2) energy variables, the stock 
market and extreme weather in addition to the event dummies. With both specifications, 
significant price reactions are detected following announcements about the different 
aspects of the EU ETS institutional and organizational construct. Releases of verified 
emissions data are shown to have the strongest price impact. For the majority of the 
analysed events, the direction of the market response on the event day is as expected. 
Although price changes accurately reflect new information, market participants do not 
seem to be able to evaluate its implications for carbon prices across the different trading 
periods of the scheme. Therefore, I infer that the market is not fully informationally 
efficient yet. Evidence is found that the EU ETS has become less responsive to institutional 
disclosure following the start of the financial crisis. I confirm findings in prior literature 
that the variance of carbon returns remains unaffected by these announcements. At the 
same time, I document statistically significant changes in option implied volatility around 
scheduled events like the release of verified emissions data and the United Nations’ 
Conference of the Parties.  
Section 3.2.1 presents the institutional framework and administrative structure of the EU 
ETS, followed by a brief overview of the relevant research on the topic of carbon market 
efficiency in Section 3.2.2. Hypotheses are formulated in Section 3.3, the methodology and 
data are presented in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. These are followed by empirical 
results and conclusions.  
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3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.2.1. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EU ETS 
The EU ETS was designed to have separate trading periods. Phase I (2005-2007) was a 
trial period with the objective of kick-starting the market and setting up its institutions. 
Phase II (2008-2012) coincides with the Kyoto Protocol commitment period and requires 
EU member states to achieve an 8% emission reduction below their 1990 level. The 
European Commission has already guaranteed the continuation of the scheme until 2020 at 
least, although the Kyoto Protocol expires at the end of 2012.   
3.2.1.1. The National Allocation Plan (NAP) 
The National Allocation Plans of individual member states outline the overall amount of 
European Union Allowances (EUAs) available to covered companies during the first and 
second phase of the scheme. As briefly mentioned in Section 1.1 of the thesis, it is the 
responsibility of national governments to decide on the total emissions caps. Having a NAP 
approved is a multi-stage process. First, a draft plan needs to be published for public 
consultation before it is formally submitted to the EC. After the EC receives the draft plan, 
it has three months to assess it and announce a decision on whether to accept or reject it. If 
a NAP is rejected, revisions are carried out until a final version is finally approved. Only 
then, can governments allocate EUAs across covered installations.  Due to the complex 
nature of the process surrounding the formulation and acceptance of individual NAPs, there 
are very frequent unscheduled announcements by both the EC and the individual 
governments (Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2009; Lepone et al., 2011).  
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Different NAPs were in force during the two separate trading periods to date of the ETS. 
From 2005 to 2007 all EUAs were given away for free to covered entities even though 
member states were allowed to auction up to 5% of their allowances (Veith et al., 2009). 
As noted by Fankhauser (2011), the 2 billion carbon allowances which were given away 
constituted “a "30 billion transfer to Europe’s most carbon-intensive firms”. A maximum 
of 10% of the total EUAs is allowed to be auctioned during Phase II. Following severe 
criticism over the way in which allowances were distributed during the first two trading 
periods, the EC is replacing the 30 separate NAPs with a single EU-wide emissions cap in 
Phase III. The targeted emission reduction during the third trading period is 30% of the 
1990 benchmark levels and starting in 2013, the majority of EUAs are intended to be 
auctioned7.  
3.2.1.2. Verification 
Every year by the end of March regulated installations are required to submit to the EC an 
independently verified report of the amount of carbon emissions for the previous calendar 
year. Firms must then surrender an equivalent number of carbon allowances to match their 
actual emissions by the end of April. Failure to do so results in a monetary penalty ("40 per 
tonne of carbon during Phase I and "100 during Phase II) and the entity remains liable to 
cover the shortfall in the next year. Inter-temporal borrowing and banking of EUAs during 
a trading period is allowed so that a company which has emitted more than its cap can 
borrow allowances from the next year’s allocation. Banking between Phase I and II was not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"!European Commission, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/35> 
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allowed but the restriction was lifted between Phase II and III. The EC publicly discloses 
the verified emissions data in April/May each year.   
3.2.1.3. The Linking Directive  
In November 2004, the EU adopted the Linking Directive (EU Directive 2004/101/EC) 
which recognizes Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) 
carbon offsets for ETS compliance purposes. Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) are 
carbon offsets created under the CDM and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)8 - those 
created under the JI mechanism. Under the CDM, reductions of carbon in non-Annex B 
Kyoto countries (developing countries with no legally binding emissions reduction targets) 
can be rewarded with CERs. Annex B countries (industrialized countries with legally 
binding emissions reduction targets) can purchase these project-based offsets and use them 
towards their own carbon reduction targets. Member States have freedom to decide on the 
exact amount of offsets which covered facilities can use in lieu of EUAs. For example, 
Slovakia has completely forbidden the use of CERs and ERUs for ETS compliance in 
Phase II; the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy limited the use of offsets to 10% of 
overall allocations, while Poland and Spain decided on 25% (Convery and Redmond, 
2007). The treatment of CDM/JI carbon offsets for the third trading period of the EU ETS 
is still very uncertain.  
Due to the restrictions on the amount of offsets which can be used for compliance 
purposes, EUAs and CERs are not fully fungible although they both represent the right to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 ERUs have not been particularly popular compliance alternatives for covered entities - they represented a mere 0.01% of 
the total surrendered allowances at the 2008 annual compliance event (Trotignon and Leguet in Mansanet-Bataller et al., 
2010). Trading in ERUs attracted investor attention only in late 2010 (Koop and Tole, 2011). Thus, ERUs are ignored 
from the analysis and the study is limited to announcements about the ability of covered entities to use CERs for 
compliance purposes.  
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emit a tonne of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (Mansanet – Bataller et al., 2010). Their 
prices are, however, tightly linked due to the active participation of covered entities in the 
CDM market (Fankhauser, 2011). What is more, CERs are becoming an increasingly 
important price driver for the European carbon market (Koop and Tole, 2011). Using 
project-based offsets became a viable option for mandated facilities only after 2008, when 
the Kyoto Protocol’s International Transaction Log (ITL) was linked to the Community 
Independent Transaction Log (CITL) of the EU ETS and offsets could be electronically 
transferred thereafter. Therefore, during Phase II of the scheme EUA prices no longer 
reflect European supply and demand considerations only. From 2008 onwards, the carbon 
price captures the EU ETS market as well as the international CER market (Mansanet – 
Bataller et al., 2010; Koop and Tole, 2011). The availability of CERs, quoted at a discount 
to EUAs, has put a downward pressure on the price of EUAs (Convery and Redmond, 
2007).  
3.2.2. PREVIOUS STUDIES ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE EU ETS  
3.2.2.1. The impact of NAP announcements on carbon returns 
Several event studies have examined market responses following announcements made by 
the EC and national governments with regards to the National Allocation Plans. For 
example, Miclaus et al. (2008) investigate whether the December 2007 carbon futures price 
reflects new information about Phase I and II NAPs. Their study covers 42 NAP 
announcements over the period 22/04/2005 – 17/12/2007. Carbon returns are modelled 
according to an autoregressive GARCH process which is continuously recalibrated starting 
from 100 days before the beginning of the event window. The calibration window moves 
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one day forward for each announcement, providing a one-day ahead forecast of futures 
returns. Abnormal returns are estimated against the AR-GARCH forecast over an event 
window of 21 days: 10 days before and 10 days after the event day. 
Miclaus et al. (2008) find significant abnormal returns associated with only few of the 
announcements on the event day and no statistically significant cumulative abnormal 
returns. A possible explanation for the documented lack of significant market response is 
that the methodology chosen to forecast normal returns might introduce a bias. Since 
announcements in the carbon market occur with a high frequency and any two events take 
place within less than 100 days of each other, the calibration window of 100 days before 
the event window includes abnormal returns from any announcements that have taken 
place during that calibration period. A biased forecast of normal returns will lead to wrong 
estimates of abnormal returns and might cause the researchers to commit a Type II error by 
concluding that certain events did not bring about excess returns when, in fact, they did.  
In a later study, Rotfu! et al. (2009) focus only on the impact of NAP announcements by 
the EC and demonstrate that Phase II carbon futures prices are sensitive to apporvals of 
National Allocation Plans. Over the period 29/11/2006 – 26/10/2007 the authors identify 
27 plan acceptances, corresponding to 14 events dates9. Anticipated Phase II emissions 
caps are assumed to be proportional to the Phase I allowances granted to the respective 
country. The difference between EC-approved allocations and anticipated allocations is 
defined as news to the market. The amount of unanticipated allocations is used as an 
exogenous variable and regressed against carbon returns in order to identify excess returns 
around NAP acceptances. Returns are calculated around ten-minute intervals. Positive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Announcements about the allocation plans of several member states are often released on the same day. 
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excess returns following unanticipated decreases in the proposed NAPs and negative 
excess returns following unexpected over-allocations of EUAs are reported. New 
information is incorporated in prices with a lag of up to 6 hours, leading the authors to 
conclude that the market is not yet fully efficient.   
Similar to Miclaus et al. (2008), Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009) study the impact of 
Phase I and II NAP announcements on the nearest-to-expiry Phase I carbon futures prices. 
The 70 announcements identified over the period 25/10/2004 – 18/05/2007 are shown to 
have a significant impact on carbon returns. For the period 25/10/2004 – 30/11/2005, the 
European Carbon Index10 is used to proxy futures prices. For the remainder of the sample 
period, the authors employ the nearest-to-expiry futures contract quoted on the European 
Climate Exchange. Two event study methodologies are adopted – a regression analysis and 
a constant mean return model. In the regression framework, carbon returns are modelled as 
a function of coal, gas and oil returns. Event days are included as dummy variables. The 
second methodology – the constant mean return model - is adapted to take into account the 
high frequency of unscheduled information releases. A trimmed mean return model is 
estimated, whereby 10% of the highest and 10% of the lowest returns during the estimation 
period are removed. Estimation periods of 10, 20 and 30 days before the event window are 
used.  
Notifications of Additional Information and Approvals of Phase I NAPs are found to be 
associated with statistically significant positive abnormal returns. Announcements related 
to Phase II NAPs are shown to have a significant and negative impact on Phase I futures. 
Upon closer inspection of the event days the authors use, I identify several inconsistencies !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The European Carbon Index is an index of over-the-counter forward carbon price calculated by the European Energy 
Exchange. 
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and event misclassifications. Mansanet – Bataller and Pardo wrongly classify certain events 
(for example, UK Phase I NAP was actually rejected on the 22 Feb 2006, while the authors 
identify it as an acceptance). Also, they treat the rejection of a NAP as a Notification of 
Additional Information to the EC (as in the case of the UK NAP I rejection of April 12th, 
2005). Such misclassification could arguably yield misleading results. 
Lepone et al. (2011), replicating the methodology of Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009), 
examine the effect of Phase II NAP announcements on the prices of nearest-to-expiry as 
well as December 2008 EUA futures contracts over a more recent time period. Their study 
improves on earlier works by employing releases of information in the media (e.g. the 
Point Carbon news database) prior to official EC announcements. Over 170 NAP II 
announcements are documented during the period 01/02/2006 – 31/12/2008. Lepone et al. 
(2011) report contradictory results for the same events when the two different event study 
methodologies are employed. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis, significant 
negative abnormal returns are found for the nearest-to-expiry futures contracts around 
notifications of additional NAP II information, conditional approvals, amendment 
approvals and verification releases. With the truncated mean return model the authors 
obtain a significant positive excess return surrounding the days of the initial plan 
notifications only and significant negative excess returns surrounding all remaining NAP 
events. The authors create very narrow categories for NAP announcements which leads to 
few event days per category. This fine classification raises issues about the reliability of the 
t-statistics and the significance of the associated abnormal returns.  
3.2.2.2. The impact of verification events on carbon returns 
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Prior studies have highlighted the importance of annual verification events in addition to 
NAP announcements. For example, Chevallier et al. (2009a) document a shift in the risk 
attitudes of carbon market participants following the public release of verified emissions 
for 2006. The authors also document an implied volatility smile skewed to the right before 
the release of verified data which is consistent with an expectation of a carbon price 
decline. After the event, however, the smile is skewed to the left. The verification event 
revealed that the EU was net long in 2006, which would explain the expected decrease in 
the price before the event. Absolute risk aversion is extrapolated from the risk-neutral 
distribution of option prices and the historic distribution of ECX futures returns. The risk-
neutral probability distribution is derived from the Black-Scholes (1976) implied volatility 
of carbon options via a non-parametric kernel regression, while the historical distribution is 
approximated by the historical return distribution of the December 2008 and 2009 futures 
prices using a semi-parametric asymmetric GARCH model. The sample covers the period 
from 1 October 2006 up until 23 November 2007. The strong impact of the verification 
events on the carbon price dynamics is corroborated in Miclaus et al.(2008),  Mansanet – 
Bataller and Pardo (2009) and Lepone et al. (2011), all of whom report statistically 
significant abnormal returns associated with these events. 
3.2.2.3. The impact of NAP announcements and verification events on the volatility of 
carbon prices 
With regards to the impact of institutional announcements on the volatility of carbon 
prices, the findings are mixed. Chevallier et al. (2009a) find evidence that verification 
events impact investors’ beliefs by removing misleading information and uncertainty from 
the market. The authors demonstrate that both the volatility of futures contracts and the 
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option implied volatility substantially decline after the 2006 compliance event. Mansanet-
Bataller and Pardo (2009) and Lepone et al. (2011) evaluate the impact of announcements 
on the volatility of carbon returns with sign and Brown-Forsythe (1974) tests. No 
significant change in the variance of carbon returns is found following NAP 
announcements and verification events. The lack of change in volatility coupled with 
significant abnormal returns on days prior to the official releases of data is interpreted as 
information leakage in the market. I question this explanation because information leakage 
would increase volatility significantly prior to the actual event as investors act on the news. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the previous studies on the carbon market’s informational efficiency. 
In brief, the results are far from conclusive. Miclaus et al. (2008) find only limited evidence 
that NAP announcements affect the carbon price dynamics while Rotfu! et al. (2009), 
Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009) and Lepone et al. (2011) report the opposite. This 
leads the former to argue that the market is weakly efficient while the latter maintain the 
contrary. Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009) and Lepone et al. (2011) report that 
institutional announcements have no impact on the variance of futures returns while 
Chevallier et al. (2009a) document a reduction in volatility after the 2006 annual disclosure 
of verified emissions data. All that the authors unanimously agree on is the importance of 
verification events for the carbon price formation. The observed differences in results 
across studies may be partially due to differences in the employed methodologies. The 
authors differ in their definition of a newsworthy announcement, the time period under 
examination, the classification of events, and the carbon return-generating model. Further 
research in the area is certainly needed to reconcile the reported contradictory findings.  
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Table 3.1 Overview of past event studies on the EU ETS institutional disclosures and their impact on carbon prices 
 
Authors Type of events Dataset Number of events Methodology Results 
Miclaus et al. 
(2008) 
Phase I and II NAPs 
and Phase I VERs on 
Phase I (2007) futures 
22/04/2005 – 
17/12/2007 
42 NAPs 
3 VERs AR-GARCH model 
No statistically significant 
cumulative abnormal returns 
following NAP and verification 
events 
Rotfu! et al. 
(2009) 
(conditional) approvals 
of Phase II NAPs from 
the first time on 2008 
EUA futures 
29/11/2006 – 
26/10/2007 27 NAPs 
Model of expectations 
which uses OLS 
regression 
Positive (negative) abnormal 
returns following EC under- (over) 
allocations of NAPs with a lag of 6 
hours 
Mansanet - 
Bataller & Pardo 
(2009) 
Phase I and II NAPs 
and Phase I VERs on 
Phase I OTC forwards 
25/10/2004 – 
18/05/2007 
72 NAPs & 3 VERs (all) 
37 NAPs & 2 VERs 
( no events 3 days before) 
21 NAPs & 1 VER (no 
events 3 days before and 
after) 
OLS regression with 
dummies 
 
Truncated Constant 
Mean Return model 
1) NAP I and II announcements 
have had a significant impact on 
Phase I futures 
2) Verification events have led to 
abnormal returns  
3) No change in volatility 
following the events 
Lepone et al. 
(2011) 
Phase II NAPs & 
Phase I VERs on 
nearest-to-maturity 
EUA futures and Phase 
II futures (December 
2008 expiry) 
01/02/ 2006 – 
31/12/ 2008 
124 NAPs & 11 VERs (all) 
39 NAPs & 4 VERs  
(no events 3 days before) 
15 NAPs & 2 VERs (no 
events 3 days before and 
after) 
OLS regression with 
dummies  
 
Truncated Constant 
Mean Return model 
1) NAP II events lead to abnormal 
returns in Phase II futures and have 
no impact on Phase I futures 
2) No change in volatility 
following the NAP and verification 
events  
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3.2.2.4. A gap in the literature 
A shortcoming of the existing literature is the limited scope of the analysed 
announcements. Only events related to National Allocation Plans and releases of verified 
emissions data have been examined to date. Both of these event categories refer to the 
supply side of the carbon market – NAPs set the supply constraints and at the annual 
compliance events remaining supply in the market is revealed as the amount of verified 
emissions data is made public. Despite their seeming importance for carbon price 
development, no announcements related to the demand for carbon certificates has been 
analysed in the framework of an event study assessing the carbon market efficiency so far. 
There is also a gap with regard to the impact of announcements about the post-2012 supply 
of carbon certificates on Phase III futures. Some authors have focused on announcements 
strictly related to Phase I of the ETS (Chevallier et al., 2009a) while others examine 
announcements strictly related to Phase II (Rotfu!, 2009; Lepone et al., 2011). Mansanet-
Bataller and Pardo (2009) and Miclaus et al. (2008) offer a more comprehensive analysis 
by focusing on Phase I and II NAP announcements. No published study has featured the 
impact of Phase III announcements on Phase III futures contracts. The updated dataset used 
in this chapter allows me to assess the impact of the financial crisis on the sensitivity of 
such announcements, an issue which has not been examined earlier either.  
3.3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This section presents the categories of announcements used in the analysis and the testable 
hypotheses. Events which affect both the demand for and supply of carbon allowances are 
examined. The set of supply-related announcements discussed in prior literature is 
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expanded by including news about the centralized post-2012 emissions cap and the new 
allowance allocation rules. One point worth mentioning is that the publication of 
installation-level NAPs is not included in the analysis and the focus is only on the overall 
emissions caps of individual member states. The rationale is that once a country’s overall 
emission reduction target is set, allowance allocation across covered installations within the 
country has a much smaller, if any, impact on the carbon price. It is the EU-wide cap that 
determines the scarcity of carbon permits. The analysed demand-side events include 
announcements about the expansion of the ETS, the CITL-ITL linkage, the acceptability of 
CERs in lieu of EUAs for compliance, the United Nations’ Conference of the Parties and 
unilateral commitments by the UK and Germany. A detailed list of all categories and the 
number of announcements which have been identified within each category can be found in 
Table 3.2. Figure 3.1 graphically presents the variety of announcements examined. These 
broadly encompass the following: 
! Phase I NAP announcements (including Notifications of additional information to 
submitted NAPs and EC decision on the NAPs). Announcements regarding the first trading 
period are included in the analysis as Phase I was launched before all the allocation plans 
were approved. The Greek plan, for instance, was accepted by the EC 6 months after the 
official launch of the ETS, in June of 2005.  
! Phase II NAP announcements (including Information releases about Phase II NAPs 
before their formal submission to the EC – government publications outlining proposed 
allocation plans, disclosure of plans for public discussion before formal submission to the 
EC, NAP information leaked by EC or government representatives in industry newswires 
like Point Carbon; Initial notifications of plans to the EC whereby member states officially 
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submit their proposal to the EC; notifications of revision to the proposed plans; EC 
decisions)  
! Phase III announcements (including formal and informal proposals for reduction 
targets and changes in auctioning rules from 2013 onwards). 
! Verification events (releases of data for actual and verified emissions during the 
years from 2005 through to 2010) 
! Other non-NAP related news (including announcements about the scope of the 
ETS, the availability of CERs for compliance purposes, CITL-ITL linkage). These are all 
demand-side announcements.   
Announcements related to the scope of the EU ETS are classified in a separate group. 
Within the group, I examine the impact of increasing the scheme’s scope in terms of 
country coverage and sectoral coverage. The second trading period of the programme has 
already seen the addition of three new countries - Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland. 
Croatia has been contemplating emissions trading as well. Sectoral coverage will increase 
after the inclusion of the aviation industry, petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium in 
2013. The inclusion of the shipping, transportation and IT industries has been proposed, 
with no success as yet. The expanding scope of the EU ETS suggests that more market 
players will become involved in the market, boosting traded volumes and improving 
market liquidity. 
The important role which the Linking Directive has played for the European carbon market 
was explained in detail in Section 3.2.1.3. The growing use of CERs directly influences 
demand for EUAs as these project-based carbon offsets can be used as EUA substitutes for 
compliance purposes. Therefore, uncertainty about the availability of CERs induces 
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instability in the price of EUAs. I examine announcements related to the ability of covered 
entities to use CERs for compliance purposes and the limits on the acceptability of certain 
types of CDM projects. For the purposes of the analysis, I identify two types of news 
within the “Kyoto Offsets” category: CITL-ITL linkage announcements and news about 
the availability of CERs for EU ETS compliance as I expect different reactions to the two 
types of announcements.   
Announcements made by Germany and the United Kingdom about their targeted emissions 
reductions are included in a separate category. These two countries are the largest emitters 
of carbon under the EU ETS. During the pilot phase of the scheme 1,800 German 
installations received over 1.4 out of the total 6.4 billion metric tonnes of EUAs allocated 
across Europe. The UK came second, with a total of 1,000 installations which received 
slightly over 0.7 billion EUAs11. The assumption is that carbon developments in the UK 
and Germany, which represent a substantial share of total carbon allowances, might have a 
significant impact on the carbon price dynamics. The sample includes announcements 
about emissions reduction objectives, new national carbon legislation, and choices made 
when transposing the EU Linking Directive into national law.  
The annual meetings of the United Nation’s Conference of the Parties (COP) make up the 
last category of analysed events. COP is the governing body of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and acts as its ultimate decision-
making authority. After Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, the COP meetings 
coincide with the Meetings of Parties (MOP). These events indirectly affect demand for 
EUAs by deciding on the fate of the Kyoto Protocol and the project-based carbon offsets !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 European Commission, Emissions Trading Scheme Registries. Available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm!
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Figure 3.1 Types of announcements 
                   Source: Author       
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Table 3.2 Types of announcements 
This table lists all event categories and the number of events in each category. Column two reports the 
total number of identified events. Column three reports only the number of events with no same-day 
announcements, and column four – the number of events with no confounding influences on the previous 
or following day. 
Types of announcements Total  No same-day events 
No events 
on days 
+1 or -1 
NAP I: Notification of additional information  12 6 2 
NAP I: Notification of amendments  1 0 0 
NAP I: Acceptance by the EC  5 2 1 
NAP I: Rejection by the EC 3 1 1 
NAP II: Leaked information before formal submission to the 
EC 44 28 10 
NAP II: Notification of the plan to the EC  27 16 4 
NAP II: Notification of additional information  43 35 4 
NAP II: Notification of amended plan  16 8 2 
NAP II: Notification of additional information to amended plan  20 16 2 
NAP II: Acceptance by the EC*  27 13 7 
NAP II: Rejection by the EC 12 1 0 
NAP II: Withdrawal of a plan 2 1 0 
NAP II: Announcements after an official EC decision 8 6 3 
Phase III: Emissions caps  15 13 7 
Phase III: Auctioning rules 12 11 6 
Scope of the EU ETS  32 29 17 
CITL – ITL linkage  2 2 2 
CERs  8 7 5 
Other announcements: UK 8  7 5 
Other announcements: Germany 2  2 1 
COP/MOP meetings  6 6 4 
Verification 2005 6  1 1 
Verification 2006  1 0  0 
Verification 2007  1 1 1 
Verification 2008  4 4 1 
Verification 2009  1 1 1 
Verification 2010  1 0 0 
 Total 283  217 87 
*In the category “Acceptance”, I make no separation between conditional acceptances, acceptances of 
revised plans and acceptances from the first time 
**All OLS regressions results using the events from the third column are presented in Appendix 3B 
***All results presented in the main body of text use the events from the last column  
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created under its flexibility mechanisms. For instance, the dialogue about a post-2012 
international agreement began at COP 11/MOP 1 in Montreal, Canada. The meeting 
was a hallmark for the development of emissions trading since until then the 
continuation of the Kyoto Protocol after 2012 was uncertain and this impeded the 
trading of CERs. Identifying an exact event day for the annual COP meetings is very 
arbitrary as they last from 10 days up to two weeks. Due to the sheer length of the 
meetings, unofficial information about their outcomes might be released to the market 
as the meetings progress. As history has shown, however, participants at the meetings 
tend to reach an agreement at the last minute under the pressure of public scrutiny12. 
That is why the last day of the meetings is identified as the event day. I examine 
announcements related to the outcomes of the COP/MOP annual meetings over the 
period April 2005 – June 2011, for a total of 5 meetings.  
H1: Announcements which suggest increases (decreases) in the supply of EUAs in 
the system are expected to result in a negative (positive) price reaction. Similarly, 
announcements which suggest increases (decreases) in the demand for EUAs are 
expected to result in a positive (negative) price reaction. 
A priori, I anticipate that certain categories of announcements will be associated with 
positive event returns. These include notifications of amended allocation plans by 
national governments, plan rejections by the EC and announcements about the 
availability of CERs for compliance. Plans are rejected when the EC deems the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Just a few examples to illustrate: “ in Montreal, where it refused until the last minute to allow even an informal 
dialogue on post-2012 action” : http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/Pew%20Center_COP%2013%20Summary.pdf 
 “a last-minute gathering of 25 countries forged the text of the Copenhagen Accord” : 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/ipsblog/cgi-bin/wordpress/2011/04/looking-to-durban-lessons-from-copenhagen-and-
cancun/ 
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emission reduction targets proposed by Member States as insufficiently strict. An 
amended plan is then presented by the national government. Therefore, both of these 
announcement categories imply further reductions in the emission targets for EU 
Member States. The CER-related announcements examined in this chapter refer to the 
process of banning the use of certain gases for generating carbon offsets. This implies a 
lesser supply of CERs reaching the EU ETS market and hence higher EUA prices.  
Notifications of additional information to original or amended plans may not 
necessarily lead to a significant price reaction as these additions could be elaborations 
of proposed plans rather than revisions of the targeted emission reductions. NAP 
acceptances are not expected to have a significant impact on carbon prices either as all 
the information about the emissions caps contained in these plans is already known 
from the original notification to the EC, the additions to the plans, and any amendments 
or revisions requested by the EC. I expect leaked information prior to formal 
submission of a national plan to the EC as well as the formal submission of a plan to 
yield a substantial carbon price response. These two events reveal for the first time the 
level of reductions proposed by a particular country and as such aid in formulating 
expectations as to the overall level of allowances which might exist in the system. 
Depending on whether the proposed plans are viewed as restrictive or loose, the 
associated price reaction is expected to be, respectively, positive or negative.   
Announcements about post-2012 emissions caps, auctioning rules, and the expanding 
scope of the ETS are suggestive of future scarcity of allowances and are expected to 
have a positive effect on the price of carbon. On the other hand, the CITL-ITL linkage 
is seen as negative for the price of carbon, as regulated companies in Europe can now 
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“import” cheaper project-based substitutes for EUAs. The impact on the price of EUAs 
should be negative. With the advantage of hindsight, I now know that the COP/MOP 
meetings have not yet negotiated a legally binding post-Kyoto agreement. Hence, I 
expect announcements from the closing days of these annual conferences to result in 
carbon price declines.   
Hypothesis 1, as well as all other testable hypotheses described in Section 3.3, is based 
on the premise that the discussed announcements represent genuine news to the market. 
This implies that there is no information leakage and the market does not anticipate the 
announcements. It also implies that the announcements are important enough to 
investors to lead them to revise their expectations about the future carbon price. In 
short, these announcements are assumed to represent true signal rather than mere noise 
in the information flow of the carbon market. Violation of any of these assumptions 
would imply that estimates of event-day returns may be misstated. If announcements 
are expected by market participants, price reactions on the even day may be understated 
as information will already be reflected in the price. Also, if the news contains no 
economic value to investors, prices may not move in a significant manner at all.  
H2: Phase I announcements have no impact on Phase II or III futures prices while 
Phase II (III) announcements have an impact on both Phase II and Phase III 
futures prices 
Because there will be banking and borrowing of allowances between the second and 
third trading period of the scheme, the continuity of the Phase II futures prices is 
ensured. However, inter-temporal transfers of EUAs were forbidden between Phase I 
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and II which resulted in Phase I becoming “a self-contained market that is not related to 
future caps and political decisions regarding Kyoto” (Hintermann, 2010: p.44). 
Therefore, I do not expect any of the Phase II or III announcements to have an impact 
on Phase I futures prices. In contrast, these events will affect both Phase II and III 
futures prices. I also hypothesize that the impact on the shorter-term futures will be 
stronger. 
H3: The carbon price is less responsive to institutional announcements following the 
onset of the financial crisis  
I hypothesize that the reaction of the market to institutional disclosures is conditional 
upon the state of the overall economy. Specifically, during times of economic growth 
and expanding industrial production the market will be sensitive to announcements 
about its institutional and organizational framework. This is because covered entities 
and market participants alike are uncertain as to whether the market is net long or short 
on allowances. Since this information is revealed only at the annual verification events, 
announcements during the year will yield a price reaction as market participants update 
their expectations about the supply-demand balance of allowances. Similarly, during 
recessionary times the lower level of economic activity implies that regulated 
companies will be able to comfortably meet their targeted reductions without the need 
for abatement or purchase of additional allowances. When the market consensus is that 
of EUA surplus and there is no uncertainty, carbon prices will be less sensitive to 
institutional announcements.  
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H4: An increase in the variance of carbon returns estimated from the relevant13 
futures contract and the option implied volatility are expected after unscheduled 
institutional announcements. Decreases in both measures of volatility are expected 
after scheduled announcements.   
Among the events analysed in this chapter, only the United Nations’ COP/MOP 
meetings and the annual releases of verified emissions data are scheduled in advance. 
For the rest of the announcements there is no prior knowledge of when the information 
will be released. Market efficiency suggests that as new information is released to the 
market, prices should adjust to a new equilibrium (Fama, 1970). Pricing in the new 
information will temporarily lead to increases in the volatility of carbon returns when 
the event is unscheduled. An increase in volatility of carbon futures is consistent with 
the underlying assumption that this information is market-moving and leads market 
participants to act on it. If the event is scheduled in advance, volatility is expected to go 
up prior to the event day as market participant price in the potential outcome of the 
event. A reduction in volatility is anticipated after the event day, as uncertainty is 
removed from the market. I use two alternative measures of volatility: variance of 
returns and Black (1976) implied volatility.  
3.4. METHODOLOGY 
3.4.1. THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL ANNOUNCEMENTS ON CO2 RETURNS 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 By ‘relevant’ I mean consistent with Hypothesis 1. For example, announcements related to Phase II should not 
affect Phase I futures contracts and I do not expect increases in the volatility of returns estimated from these futures.  
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In order to measure the impact of different announcements on carbon returns, an event 
study technique is applied. If a market is efficient, new information will be reflected in 
asset prices as it becomes available (Fama, 1970). Therefore, the significance of an 
event can be assessed by observing the magnitude of the price changes around the time 
of the announcement. As seen in Table 3.1, much of the research on the carbon market 
so far has relied on the use of a constant mean return model as a benchmark against 
which abnormal returns are estimated. This model assumes that the asset’s returns are 
normally distributed with a time-invariant mean and variance (Brown and Warner, 
1985). The underlying premise is that future observations will be drawn from the same 
distribution. To address the high frequency of unscheduled information releases on the 
market, authors have adjusted the model by trimming the highest and lowest values of 
the mean carbon return over the estimation period (Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2009; 
Lepone et al., 2011). The disadvantage of the constant mean return model is that it does 
not control for changes in energy prices, extreme weather events and economic activity. 
Thus, abnormal return estimates may be overstated.   
The methodology implemented in this chapter is based on the standard OLS regression 
model. The events whose price effect I aim to measure are introduced in the regression 
equation via dummy variables and the associated event returns14 are modelled as the 
slope coefficients of these dummies (Binder, 1998). I decide in favour of this 
methodology as it allows me to control for changes in key carbon price drivers and to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 The term “event return” (Re) is used to designate a return above what would be anticipated on a non-event day, 
whereas the term “abnormal return” may be interpreted as a return above the normal return, holding the level of risk 
constant. Re is used in this case as no adjustments for changes in the risk factors have been made. To maintain 
consistency in the terminology used throughout the chapter, the term “event return” is used with regard to the results 
of the multivariate regressions in Section 3.6.2.2, even though they explicitly account for the impact of energy prices, 
stock prices and extreme weather.!
  Chapter 3 
!
81 
!
obtain more robust estimates of event returns. The empirical analysis is made up of two 
parts. I first examine the univariate behaviour of carbon prices around the events listed 
in Table 3.2. I then analyse the same price effects in the context of a multivariate 
analysis where carbon returns are presented as a function of economic indicators, 
energy costs and extreme weather. This multifactor model is the focus of the chapter. 
All regressions are estimated by applying Newey-West standard errors to prevent biases 
stemming from heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.   
3.4.1.1. Univariate Carbon Price Analysis 
Returns associated with the various types of events are calculated with the following 
regression:  
       !!"#$%&!! ! !! ! !!!!!!!!!! ! !!                             (1) 
where !!"#$%&!! is the continuously compounded rate of return for carbon futures on 
day t. Dj,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 on the event day and 0 otherwise for all j= 
1,2…,n sub-categories of events. The intercept !! represents the mean daily log-return 
of carbon during non-event days.  The regression coefficients of the event dummies !! 
are the calculated mean returns related to the specific events. In other words, they are 
the daily differences from the mean carbon returns over the non-event days.   
The model is estimated for the 1,595 trading days over the period 22/04/2005 – 
30/06/2011. The sample is broken down in two ways: 1) building on earlier work, I use 
the financial crisis to divide the sample, and 2) I use a structural test to detect breaks in 
the time series of the carbon returns. Two different methodologies are employed to 
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prevent arbitrary choices of subsamples and to provide a test of robustness for the 
results.  
Two breakpoint tests have been employed in the carbon literature to date: the unit root 
test of Lee and Strazicich (2003) and the Bai-Perron (1998, 2003) method (used by 
Alberola et al. (2008) and Chevallier (2011b), respectively). With the Lee and 
Strazicich (2003) test, it is up to the researcher to decide on the number of structural 
breaks in the model and according to this input, the algorithm decides on the most 
appropriate partition. Because the Bai-Perron model determines the optimal number of 
breaks endogenously, and thus the arbitrary selection associated with the Lee and 
Strazicich (2003) test is avoided, I prefer to follow the Bai-Perron methodology.  
The algorithm identifies m points of structural change in a time series which determine 
m+1 separate segments with a different underlying structure. The structural breaks are 
chosen to minimize the residual sum of squares across all the segments. The Bai-Perron 
method essentially optimizes the number of separate segments and every new segment 
is assessed against a Bayesian Information Criterion, the residual sum of squares and an 
F-test for the marginal break.  The test is conducted on the log-return time series of 
EUA futures contracts which have the nearest December expiration. A minimum of 44 
observations is set between the breaks, that is, each regime with unique underlying 
price dynamics is at least two months long (22 trading days are used as a proxy of a 
calendar month).  This is done to prevent the partitioning of the data into multiple short 
segments. 
3.4.1.2. Multivariate Carbon Price Analysis 
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A multifactor model can control for market-wide developments and exogenous 
influences on the carbon prices. I rely heavily on the existing literature in choosing 
fossil fuel prices, economic indicators and temperature as explanatory variables in the 
model. The prices of natural gas directly affect carbon prices as power plants switch to 
carbon-intensive coal-fired electricity generation when gas prices rise (Fezzi and Bunn, 
2009; Hintermann, 2010; Declercq et al., 2011). With gas futures prices largely derived 
from oil prices, oil is another key driver for carbon (Convery and Redmond, 2007; 
Bredin and Muckley, 2011). The stock market is pro-cyclical by its nature and therefore 
constitutes a good indicator of the expected health of the economy. Strong economic 
activity also translates into higher EUA prices as companies produce more and emit 
more carbon in order to meet the higher demand for their goods (Alberola et al., 2008, 
2009; Bredin and Muckley, 2011; Koop and Tole, 2011; Chevallier, 2011a). Therefore 
equity, as used in Equation 2, measures the anticipated level of future industrial 
production and the associated emissions levels. Extreme weather indirectly affects 
carbon prices through its impact on energy demand (Alberola et al., 2008; Fezzi and 
Bunn, 2009; Bredin and Muckley, 2011). In prior literature, weather has been modelled 
in different manners in order to capture its impact on the carbon price dynamics. Some 
of the alternative specifications include: extreme weather days measured against a pre-
specified temperature threshold (Fezzi and Bunn, 2009) or proxied by the 95% upper 
and lower quintiles from the temperature series (Alberola et al. 2007, 2008). Squared 
temperature (Gerlagh and Liski, 2012) and the magnitude of high deviations from 
seasonal mean temperatures (Alberola et al. 2007, 2008) are other weather variables 
used by researchers.  
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The multifactor regression model I use takes on the following form:  
!!"#$%&!! ! !! ! !!"#!!"#!! ! !!"#!!"#!! ! !!"#$%!!!"#$%&!! !!!"#$!!"#$!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!"#!!"#!! ! !!!!!!!!!! ! !!                                             (2) 
where !!"#$%&!!/!!"#!!!!!"#!!!!!"#$%&!! is the continuously compounded rate of return 
for carbon/oil/gas/stock market on day t. !!!" and !!"#$ are dummy variables which 
take on the values of 1 on extremely hot and cold days and 0 otherwise.  
The main assumption underlying OLS analysis is that the regressors are exogenous to 
the dependent variable. To prevent an endogeneity problem, I limit the use of mutually 
interactive regressors in Equation 2. For example, electricity is often quoted as a carbon 
price driver (Chevallier, 2009; Fezzi and Bunn, 2009). I capture its impact on carbon by 
using extreme weather events since it is through the demand for electricity that 
temperature affects EUA prices. Some researchers have used clean dark15 and spark16 
spreads as well as the fuel switching EUA price17 in addition to the absolute prices of 
fossil fuels as carbon price drivers (Alberola et al., 2008; Bonacina et al., 2009; Koop 
and Tole, 2011; Bredin and Muckley, 2011). In addition to my concerns about 
introducing such correlated variables in the analysis, I question the relevance of these 
variables as EUA price determinants altogether. For instance, a switch between energy 
generation sources may occur even though carbon price may be below its “switch” 
level, if energy demand is so high that both coal- and gas-fired units need to be running 
to meet the demand (Delarue and D’haelseleer, 2007). A problem with the use of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Clean dark spread is the difference between the price of electricity and the price of coal used to generate that 
electricity, corrected for the energy output of the coal plant (Tendances Carbone, 2011). 
16 Clean spark spread is calculated in the same manner but refers to a gas-fired power plant instead. 
17 The fuel switching price is the price of carbon which makes a plant indifferent between using gas- or coal-fired 
plants for generating electricity given a certain assumed efficiency of the plant.!
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spreads as carbon price drivers is that due to their different efficiencies, power plants 
will switch from coal- to gas-fired units at different EUA prices. The clean spreads used 
in most studies rely on assumptions about the average plant size and the average plant 
efficiency and grossly over-simplify the analysis by assuming homogenous plants 
across countries. 
3.4.2. THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL ANNOUNCEMENTS ON CO2 VOLATILITY 
Similar to earlier studies, a Brown-Forsythe (1974) robustness test for variance 
homogeneity and a non-parametric sign test are used to address the issue of whether the 
variance of carbon returns changes before and after the announcements. The Brown-
Forsythe (1974) procedure is based on the ANOVA statistics applied to absolute 
deviations from the corresponding median. To maintain comparability with earlier 
literature (Mansanet-Bataller, 2009; Lepone et al., 2011) I look at a 10-day estimation 
period and compare the variance of carbon returns 5 days before the announcement and 
the variance over the announcement day and the following 4 days. Confounding events 
are not likely to bias the results because the median as an estimate of central location in 
the Brown-Forsythe test is not affected by extreme values (Mansanet-Bataller and 
Pardo, 2009) 18. The sign test is constructed in a similar fashion. The advantage of such 
a non-parametric test is that it does not require normality in order to be properly 
specified.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 In a robustness test whose results are not reported here for purposes of brevity, I apply restrictive criteria and use 
only those announcements which have no other confounding events in the whole 10-day estimation window. The 
sample of events is substantially reduced but the results are quantitatively and qualitatively identical.  
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To test for changes in the option implied volatility before and after information 
releases, I estimate Black (1976) implied volatility as described in Section 2.4.3 of 
Chapter 2. Implied volatility is derived from options with the nearest December 
expiration. Only options with at least 10 days left until maturity on the event day are 
considered (Donders and Vorst, 1996). In addition, all options in which no trading takes 
place during the entire 10-day period around a given announcement are discarded from 
the sample. For example, during the second half of 2007, the near December expiration 
futures were effectively worthless and no trading in the options for these futures took 
place due to the restrictions on allowance bankability between Phase I and II. In 
addition, because options on the carbon futures contracts were launched in late October 
2006, I cannot assess the impact of NAP I announcements on the option implied 
volatility. Following earlier literature (Donders and Vorst, 1996; Donders et al., 2000; 
Kim, 2008), the following regression model is estimated: 
!!!! ! !!!!!!!!!!! ! !!!!                                             (3) 
where !!!! ! !!!!!"#$!%& ! !!!"#$!%& is the deviation of implied volatility !!!!!"#$!%&observed 
on day t for announcement i from the average implied volatility !!!"#$!%& for the same 
announcement over the entire 10-day period. !!!! is a binary variable equal to 1 for 
observations on day t and 0 otherwise. A statistically significant slope coefficient !! 
indicates a statistically meaningful change in implied volatility.  
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3.5. DATA  
3.5.1. ANNOUNCEMENT DATA 
The announcement data is manually collected from several sources. These include the 
official websites of the European Commission and the UNFCCC, the Community 
Independent Transaction Log, and lastly, the Point Carbon newswire. By using 
different sources, I am able to identify the earliest date at which new information 
reaches the market. Event days (t=0) are defined as those days on which news is 
released to the public. 283 announcements are identified over the period 22/04/2005 – 
30/06/2011. An announcement is retained in the final sample if all of the following 
conditions are met. First, there can be no same-day announcements which belong to 
different categories. For example, on December 15th 2006 the Netherlands notified the 
EC of additional information to their already submitted Phase II NAP while Italy 
submitted its plan for the first time. Because the impact of each announcement cannot 
be measured accurately, December 15th is not considered as an event day. The second 
criterion which I impose aims to improve the robustness of the event study results. 
Events which have other announcements on the previous or following day are removed 
in order to minimize confounding influences. This reduces the final sample to 87 
observations, as shown in Table 3.2. The announcements are classified into eight 
general categories and several subcategories are identified within each category. This 
finer sub-classification ensures that events with a potentially strong impact on carbon 
prices are not combined with events which may not necessarily yield abnormally 
positive or negative returns, thereby washing away the significance embedded in the 
former.  
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One caveat to the analysis is that because of the restrictive selection criteria and the 
high frequency of announcements, several important events are dropped from the 
sample. Some of these include: 1) the release of verified emissions data for 2006 is 
omitted because it coincides with the Austrian NAP II endorsement by the EC and the 
notification of additional information to the EC by Hungary, 2) on November 29th 2006 
the EC rejected 9 Phase II NAPs and accepted only one plan, 3) on January 15th 2007 
the withdrawal of the Cypriot NAP II coincided with the official notification of NAP II 
to the EC by Austria, and 4) on October 26th 2007 the EC approved the Phase II NAPs 
of Germany, Romania and Bulgaria, and also announced that it had come to an 
agreement with the countries in the European Economic Area on linking their 
respective emissions trading systems, an event falling under the category of 
announcements labelled “Scope of the EU ETS”.  
To ensure that the results don’t change materially after removing these events from the 
sample, all the event study regressions are also conducted with the larger set of 217 
events. The results of these regressions are arguably less robust because of the 
confounding influences of events which take place on consecutive days. Mainly for 
comparison with prior literature I report the results in Appendix 3B. In their event 
studies, both Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009) and Lepone et al. (2011) use all 
available events, without imposing any restrictive conditions in order to minimize 
biases.  
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3.5.2. CARBON RETURN-GENERATING MODEL 
Details of the explanatory variables used in Equation 2, their functional currencies and 
contract specifications can be found in Table 3.3 overleaf. The carbon price is based on 
EUA futures prices quoted on the European Climate Exchange (ECX). The oil price is 
based on the daily Brent Oil Front Month futures contract traded on the Intercontinental 
Commodities Exchange (ICE) platform. The natural gas price is based on the daily 
Month Ahead Forward contract also from the ICE. To transform all the price series in 
the same currency (Euro), exchange rate data from the European Central Bank is used. 
The Dow Jones Euro Stoxx index is used as a measure of the expected level of 
economic activity. The DJ EuroStoxx 600 index is chosen over the EuroStoxx 50 (used, 
for example, by Bonacina et al., 2009) because a broad-based stock market is more 
representative of anticipated growth prospects in the European economy.  
To account for the importance of weather as a price driver in the carbon market, I 
follow the methodology of Koop and Tole (2011). A European Temperature Index is 
estimated over the period 01/1985 – 12/2004 as the weighted average of temperatures 
measured in countries covered by the EU ETS. The weight given to a country in the 
composition of the index is proportional to that country’s population. Temperature 
deviations from the historic mean are calculated for any given month and days with 
extremely hot or cold weather are modelled as dummy variables in the regression. Data 
on the mean daily temperatures are taken directly from the European Climate 
Assessment Dataset (Klein Tank et al., 2010). Data on the population is reported by 
Eurostat and taken from Datastream. Details on the methodology used in constructing 
the temperature variables can be found in Appendix 3A.  
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Table 3.3 Description of the variables and data sources 
Variable Description 
EUA  ICE ECX EUA Futures ( Euro/ tonne of CO2) 
The price of carbon is measured as the December expiration EUA futures contracts.    
Source: European Climate Exchange  
Oil ICE Brent Crude Futures – North Sea (U.S. dollars/ barrel) 
Oil price is measured as the daily price of the month ahead Brent Crude futures 
negotiated on the Intercontinental Commodities Exchange (ICE). The Brent Crude 
futures contract with a North Sea hub is a deliverable contract based on EFP delivery 
with the option to settle in cash.  
Source: Intercontinental Commodities Exchange (ICE) 
Natural 
Gas 
ICE Natural Gas 1 Month Forward (UK Pence/100000 British Thermal Units) 
Natural gas is measured as the daily price of the 1 Month Forward contract from the 
Intercontinental Commodities Exchange (ICE).  The ICE Natural Gas contract is 
denominated in UK Pence per 100000 British Thermal Units.  
Source: Datastream  
Equity Economic activity is proxied by the performance of the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx index 
(DJ Euro Stoxx). Prices are denominated in euros.  
Source: Datastream 
Weather  European Climate Assessment & Dataset website, available at http://eca.knmi.nl/. See  
Appendix 3A for details.  
Events  PointCarbon; the official websites of the European Commission and the UNFCCC; 
The Community Independent Transaction Log 
 
3.6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.6.1. UNIVARIATE CARBON PRICE ANALYSIS 
Prior to any econometric analysis, I conduct a preliminary test to confirm that the 
selected event categories are in fact informative to the carbon market. The extent to 
which an announcement is value-relevant can be inferred by the magnitude of the price 
response it elicits. I anticipate that the events from Figure 3.1 will lead to large changes 
in carbon prices and traded volumes. Following Cutler et al. (1989) and Ryan and 
Taffler (2004), I identify the hundred days with the largest changes in prices and 
trading volumes of nearest-to-maturity carbon futures contracts. These days are then 
matched with the events of interest. Panel A in Table 3.4 demonstrates that 24% (19%)  
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Table 3.4 Announcement categories, price changes and trading volume increases  
This table describes the 100 largest changes in prices and trading volumes of nearest-to-expiry December 
EUA futures contracts over the period 22/04/2005 – 30/06/2011. A price change is measured as i) log-
return, and ii) absolute difference between the opening-to-closing settlement prices on any given day.      
Panel A. Proportion of significant changes in prices and volumes matched with announcements related to 
the institutional framework of the EU ETS.    
  Price Change Trading Volume 
Change   Log-returns Absolute price difference ( in !) 
All events* 24% 19% 11% 
*These are all events without any restrictions for the event day to have no other information event on the day before 
or after the data release 
 
Panel B. Overview of the announcement categories with a significant impact on the prices and trading 
activity of EUA futures. The number of announcements in each category is expressed as a percentage of 
all announcements resulting in one of the top 100 largest price changes or trading volume increases. 
 Event category 
Log-
return 
Change 
Absolute price 
difference (in !) 
Absolute 
Volume 
NAP I: Notification of additional information 4.17% 
  NAP I: Acceptance 8.33% 10.53% 
 NAP II: Leaked information before formal release 8.33% 15.79% 
 NAP II: Notification to the EC 8.33% 
 
9.09% 
NAP II: Notification of additional information 16.67% 21.05% 
 NAP II: Notification of amended plan 4.17% 
  NAP II: Additional information to amended plan 12.50% 
  NAP II: Acceptance 8.33% 
  NAP II: Rejection 
  
9.09% 
NAP II: Announcements after official EC decisions 
  
9.09% 
Phase III: Emissions caps 12.50% 
 
9.09% 
Phase III: Auctioning rules 
  
9.09% 
Scope 8.33% 21.05% 45.45% 
Verification 2005 4.17% 21.05% 
 Verification 2007 
 
5.26% 
 Verification 2008 4.17% 
  Other announcements: UK 
 
5.26% 
 CERs     9.09% 
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of the largest price changes (as measured by log-returns and absolute price differences) 
and 11% of the largest trading volume changes are associated with the announcements 
analysed in this chapter. This suggests that there is a strong link between market 
reactions and the disclosure of information related to the ETS institutional structure. 
Panel B shows the percentage of observed price changes and trading volume increases 
which can be attributed to each of the announcement categories. All of the 
announcement categories are represented which suggests that the categories are well-
specified and the announcements are important to the market.  
The two carbon price time series examined in this chapter are labelled “Interphase EUA 
futures” and “Intraphase EUA futures”.  The term Interphase futures refers to contracts 
traded in the current phase of the EU ETS with underlying contracts which call for the 
delivery of EUAs in the next phase of the scheme. Intraphase EUA futures, on the other 
hand, are the nearest-to-maturity contracts with December expiry. To illustrate, on 
February 22nd, 2006 (Phase I of the EU ETS), the corresponding interphase futures 
contract has a December 2008 expiry while the intraphase futures  contract has a 
December 2006 expiry.  Continuously compounded returns are used so that Rcarbon,t = 
ln(PEUA, t /PEUA,t-1 ) where PEUA, t is the settlement price of the EUA futures contract 
negotiated on the European Climate Exchange at time t. Trading of EUA futures 
contracts on the European Climate Exchange started on April 22nd, 2005 which marks 
the first day of the sample in this chapter. The dataset covers the period 22/04/2005 – 
30/06/2011. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test confirms the lack of a unit root for the 
intra- and interphase EUA futures at the conventional test sizes.    
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3.6.1.1. The financial crisis and its impact on the carbon price dynamics 
Putting a finger on the exact date when the financial crisis began has proven difficult 
for both academics and practitioners. Some trace its onset to the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy in September 2008, while others argue it started much earlier in January 
2007. I follow prior work in the carbon literature (Mansanet – Bataller et al., 2010; 
Chevallier, 2011c) in identifying the start of the financial crisis as the first reduction in 
interest rates by the U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on August 
17th, 2007. The dataset is then divided into pre- and full-crisis subsets, covering the 
periods 22/04/2005 – 16/08/2007 and 17/08/2007 – 30/06/2011 respectively. The price 
effect of the events from Table 3.2 is examined during the two subsamples on 
intraphase as well as interphase EUA futures.  
A. Pre-crisis subsample (22/04/2005 – 16/08/2007) 
Figure 3.2 graphically presents the price development of intra- and interphase EUA 
futures contracts over the period. Futures are rolled over a month before their expiration 
date. A dichotomy between the two price series is observed following the disclosure of 
verified emissions for 2005 which took place in mid-May, 2006. The price decline of 
Phase II futures is quickly followed by a recovery, while the prices of Phase I futures 
trend towards zero until the end of the pre-crisis dataset. This results from the fact that 
banking and borrowing of carbon allowances were forbidden between Phase I and II of 
the ETS.  
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Figure 3.2 Pre-crisis subsample  
The figure shows the price development of near maturity and near phase EUA futures contracts over the 
period 22/04/2005 – 16/08/2007. 
 
The results of Equation 1 for the pre-crisis subsample are reported in the first five 
columns of Table 3.5. In terms of announcements related to Phase I NAPs, several 
observations need to be made. At the time these announcements were made, Phase II 
futures were quoted on the ECX but there was still no trading in them. Although the 
impact of all three NAP I announcements on interphase futures shows up as statistically 
significant, the results carry no economic meaning19. The notification of additional 
information regarding an already submitted plan has a statistically significant positive 
impact on the returns of intraphase EUA futures contracts. This reflects the bullish 
sentiment of investors and implies that the proposed changes to the plan are viewed as 
restrictive by the majority of market participants. The acceptance of Phase I NAPs 
(which refers to the acceptance of the Greek plan on June 20th, 2005) also has a 
statistically significant positive impact on the returns of intraphase EUA futures !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Quoted Settlement Prices (QSPs) are used by the European Climate Exchange to interpolate QSPs for those 
contract months for which no quoted prices are received from market participants of for which no bid or offer quotes 
are made. The QSP is estimated as an average of quoted prices for specific contract months provided daily by market 
participants and is determined by a designated Market Supervision Official at his discretion. A description of the 
methodology for determining Unofficial Settlement Prices is obtained via personal communication with the 
headquarters of the ECX. 
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contracts. As hypothesized, NAP rejection is associated with statistically meaningful 
positive event returns for Phase I EUA futures. This category of announcement is 
represented by the rejection of the British plan by the EC on February 22nd, 2006. It 
was the plan’s second rejection, even though the Court of First Instance had already 
ruled in favour of the UK and against the EC’s original restrictive decision not to allow 
the UK an increase in allowances. Further reductions in the proposed NAP imply a 
greater scarcity of EUAs in the future, hence the positive market response following the 
announcement.  
By the time NAP II announcements started to be released, trading in Phase II futures 
had also started. Information releases before a formal submission to the EC are found to 
have no impact on interphase futures and a significant negative impact on intraphase 
futures (which is distinguishable from zero only at the 10% level). As expected, formal 
notifications of Phase II NAPs to the EC do not affect Phase I futures but significantly 
affect the price of Phase II futures. The event return is negative, suggesting that the 
proposed NAPs II are seen by the market as too generous. Notifications of additional 
information about the original plans submitted to the EC have no statistically 
significant impact. It is possible that the proposed changes are immaterial relative to the 
total number of allowances or that the additional information refers to elaborations of 
the original plan and that no changes in the terms of projected reductions are discussed.   
Notifications of additional information to amended Phase II plans have no impact on 
the development of Phase I EUA futures prices. The impact on Phase II futures is, 
however, both significant and negative. This confirms yet again that the proposed 
changes are viewed as insufficient to sustain the scarcity of EUAs during the second 
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trading period of the scheme. The acceptance of Phase II NAPs does not elicit a 
significant market reaction from either the intra- or the interphase EUA futures 
contracts, which suggests that all information has been assimilated in the prices. Being 
already familiar with  the additional information and amendments made to the initial 
plans, it would seem that market participants expected the EC to eventually accept the 
NAPs and so no surprise takes place.  
As for non-NAP announcements during the pre-crisis period, information releases 
about the ETS expansion are found to elicit positive market responses in both carbon 
price series. This most likely suggests that market participants factor in future increases 
in demand for EUAs, as well as better functionality, and improved depth and liquidity 
of the carbon market. Since all the scope announcements are related to proposed 
expansions of the scheme in Phase II, the statistically significant event return of 
intraphase futures is inconsistent with the ban on inter-temporal transferability of 
allowances between the first two trading periods of the EU ETS. The COP/MOP event 
has a significant negative impact on both EUA futures. The reason for the negative 
reaction following the 2006 meeting in Nairobi, Kenya most likely reflects the market’s 
disappointment with the inability of international leaders to reach a legally binding 
agreement about the long-term future of the carbon market in a post-Kyoto world.  
The disclosure of verified emissions for 2005 is found to have caused significant 
positive event returns for both intra- and interphase EUA futures contracts. In fact, the 
release of the emissions data is the event which has brought about the largest event 
returns: "ver05= 0.4940 (0.1865) for Phase I (II) EUA futures. Information about the 
2005 verified emissions was scheduled to be disclosed publicly on the platform of the 
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Table 3.5 Univariate analysis: before and during the financial crisis 
The table reports the regression results of Equation 1. The sample is split into pre-crisis (22/04/2005 - 16/08/2007) and full-crisis (17/08/2007 - 30/06/2011) 
subsamples. The dependent variable is: 1) log-return of nearest-to-expiry EUA futures contracts, 2) near-phase EUA futures. Robust Newey-West HAC standard 
errors are used. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Event return is denoted as Re and non-event return – as Rne. 
  
 Pre-crisis subsample Full-crisis subsample 
Event  Intraphase futures Re Interphase futures Re Intraphase futures Re   Interphase futures Re 
Intercept (Rne) -0.0093 (-3.77) 0.0000 (-0.01) -0.0012 (-0.91) -0.0005 (-0.65) 
NAP I: Notification of additional information  0.0407* (11.46) 0.0311* † (10.88)     
NAP I: Acceptance  0.0777* (31.55) 0.0672* † (51.09)     
NAP I: Rejection  0.0075** (3.03) -0.0186* † (-14.13)     
NAP II: Leaked info before formal submission -0.0206*** (-1.8) -0.0166 (-1.57) 0.0160* (12.47) 0.0139* (19.56) 
NAP II: Notification to the EC  -0.0004 (-0.07) -0.0040*** (-1.87) -0.0294* (-22.94) -0.0302* (-42.43) 
NAP II: Notification of additional information  0.0080 (0.25) -0.0071 (-0.7) 0.0012 (0.91) 0.0061* (8.64) 
 NAP II: Notification of amended plan     0.0101* (3.11) 0.0065* (3.59) 
NAP II: Additional information to amended plan -0.0401 (-0.39) -0.0136* (-4.96)     
NAP II: Acceptance -0.0154 (-0.75) 0.0058 (0.5) -0.0202 (-0.93) 0.0004 (0.14) 
EC announcement after its formal decision     -0.0143 (-1.26) -0.0142 (-1.61) 
Phase III: Emissions caps     0.0140 (1.58) 0.0119 (1.53) 
Phase III: Auctioning rules     0.0181* (2.64) 0.0153* (2.71) 
Scope 0.0409* (3.62) 0.0152** (2.34) 0.0013 (0.11) -0.0079 (-1.44) 
Verification 2005 0.4940* (200.72) 0.1865* (141.9)     
Verification 2007     0.0404* (31.52) 0.0396* (55.73) 
Verification 2008     0.0404* (31.55) 0.0241* (33.85) 
Verification 2009     0.0212* (16.58) 0.0182* (25.63) 
Other announcements: UK      -0.0036 (-0.36) 0.0007 (0.09) 
Other announcements: Germany      0.0192* (14.99) 0.0171* (23.99) 
CITL – ITL linkage     0.0150 (1.6) 0.0168** (2.08) 
CERs     0.0042 (1.38) 0.0010 (0.35) 
COP/MOP -0.0094* (-3.82) -0.0131* (-9.93) -0.0010 (-0.33) -0.0013 (-0.53) 
R-squared 11.95%  7.63%  0.79%  1.84%  
Adjusted R-squared 10.29%  5.89%  -0.94%  0.14%  
*, **, *** refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
† indicates that although a price is quoted on the ECX, trading in these futures hasn’t started yet 
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Community International Transactions Log (CITL) on May 15th 2006. On April 24th 
2006 the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and France reported fewer emissions than 
expected in the first year of emissions trading. Three weeks ahead of the scheduled 
release date, market participants already knew that, contrary to expectations of 
shortages, there were excess EUAs in the system. The carbon price collapsed 
immediately. Because other announcements also took place on the day on which 
verified emissions data for 2005 was leaked, this event had to be removed from the 
dataset. Carbon prices temporarily increased following the official data release as it 
became clear that the oversupply of allowances was smaller than anticipated. Therefore, 
the seemingly contradictory positive market reaction on May 15th is a reversal of the 
initial overreaction to the expected excess EUAs (Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2009). 
Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009) report event returns of 51.11% on the day of 
official verified emissions data release. While such event return in the intraphase 
futures contract appears to be justifiable, the reaction observed in Phase II futures 
suggests that market participants are not able to accurately assess the implications of 
inter-temporal banking and borrowing of allowances. Because allowances from Phase I 
cannot be banked into Phase II, the price of futures contracts with expiry in 2008 
should be unaffected by the 2005 verified emissions disclosure.  
B. Full-crisis subsample (17/08/2007 – 30/06/2011) 
Figure 3.3 depicts the price development of intra- and interphase EUA futures contracts 
over the full-crisis period. A short-lived rally in early 2008 was quickly replaced by a 
steady price decline against the backdrop of a growing sovereign debt crisis in Europe. 
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2009 and 2010 were marked by fairly stable EUA prices, within the narrow range of 
!12-15 per tonne of CO2. 
Figure 3.3 Full-crisis subsample  
The figure shows the price development of near maturity and near phase EUA futures contracts over the 
period 17/08/2007 – 30/06/2011. 
 
 
The results of Equation 1 for the full-crisis subsample are reported in the last four 
columns of Table 3.5. The first thing to note is the low explanatory power of the model 
after the onset of the financial crisis: the coefficient of determination is 0.79% (1.84%) 
for the intra-(inter) phase EUA futures and the adjusted R-squared is in fact negative 
for the intraphase futures20. This finding is in sharp contrast to the pre-crisis results 
where the adjusted R-squared is 10.29% (5.89%), respectively. The decline in the 
coefficients of determination implies that less of the variation in carbon prices can be 
attributed to institutional announcements. This result confirms Hypothesis 3 that 
following the onset of the financial crisis the carbon market has become less responsive 
to announcements regarding its institutional set-up. As noted in Section 2.6, sluggish 
industrial production left many covered companies with excess allowances. Covered !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Similarly low R-squared and negative adjusted R-squared are reported in Lepone et al. (2011) as well: adjusted R-
squared in the event study regression with oil, gas and event dummies for intraphase EUA futures contracts over the 
period 01/02/2006 – 31/12/2008  is -0.013012.  
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companies realized that they will face no real shortages and no internal abatement will 
have to take place in order for reduction targets to be met. Due to the availability of 
banking between Phase II and III of the ETS, the common view was that the carbon 
market would be net long overall even in the post-2012 period as the excess allowances 
are transferred into Phase III21. In the context of known excess of EUAs in the system, 
investors appear to be more likely to dismiss announcements about changes in the 
policy and the ETS institutional set-up.  
Information releases prior to a plan’s official submission to the EC have a positive and 
significant impact on both intra- and interphase futures contracts. Interestingly, before 
the financial crisis, leaked information was shown to negatively affect carbon prices. 
This differentiated reaction to informal data releases may be due to the different 
economic context of the announcements. Against the background of the spiralling 
financial crisis and the evident willingness of certain national leaders to temporarily put 
climate action on hold22, early announcements about Phase II NAPs seem to have been 
welcomed by the market. At least, it was seen that the scheme would continue to 
function and would not be shut down due to economic difficulties. As expected, the 
impact on longer maturity EUA futures (!=0.0139) is smaller than the impact on 
futures with a shorter time to expiry (!=0.016).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Carbon Trade Watch, “EU Emissions Trading System: failing at the third attempt.” This study shows that there are 
some 970 million excess allowances from the second trading period of the ETS which can be transferred into the 
third phase. This means that polluters “need to take no action domestically until 2017.” Available at: 
http://www.carbontradewatch.org/downloads/publications/ETS_briefing_april2011.pdf!
22 For instance, the Polish prime minister was keen to ease the pledged reduction commitments as these were seen to 
stall economic growth in already financially challenged countries. As noted by Christopher Booker in his book The 
Real Global Warming Disaster (2010), “ At the meeting in Posnan in December which was meant to plan the 
successor of Kyoto, the Italians and the Poles were now threatening to veto the Copenhagen proposals on the 
grounds that the economic crisis made them unaffordable”. 
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The actual notification of a NAP II to the EC is associated with a negative market 
reaction (regression coefficients of -0.0294 and -0.0302 for intra- and interphase EUAs, 
respectively). This infers that market players considered the proposed NAPs inflated 
and corrected the high expectations they had built up following the leaked information. 
The stronger reaction of the interphase futures suggests a concern for the longer-term 
viability of the ETS as excess allowance in Phase II can be transferred into Phase III of 
the scheme. 
As expected, additions and amendments of the originally submitted plans are associated 
with positive event returns as downward revisions of EUA allocations are factored into 
the carbon price.  Notifications of amended NAPs II have a statistically significant and 
positive coefficient on both intra- and interphase EUA futures contracts (0.0101 and 
0.0065, accordingly). Announcements after the formal decision of the EC on a NAP II 
did not meaningfully affect carbon prices. As information about all the changes and 
reviews of the original plans is incorporated into the prices by the time the EC makes a 
formal announcement, it is no surprise that the actual acceptance of the Phase II NAPs 
is not a market-moving event. This result differs from the findings of Rotfu" et al. 
(2009) who conclude that plan acceptances lead to abnormal reactions. The difference 
may be due to the fact that Rotfu" et al. (2009) employ high-frequency data and also 
use Phase I allocated allowances as a proxy for expected Phase II reduction targets. The 
authors do not account for the fact that investors have updated their expectations 
following notifications of additional information and amendments to the plan. 
I find a positive yet insignificant impact of announcements related to post-2012 
emission reduction targets on the carbon price development. News in this category 
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include the conditional agreement of the EU to a 20-30% target for the Copenhagen 
accord; the downward EC revision of the 2013 ETS emissions cap by 2.4%; the MEPs’ 
vote to urge European leaders to agree to a legally-binding goal to cut emissions 30 per 
cent of 1990 levels. Announcements related to the scope of the ETS also yield positive 
but insignificant market reactions. At the same time, news related to the adoption of 
new auctioning rules during the post-2012 trading period are found to have a significant 
positive impact on both intra- and interphase EUA futures.  
With regards to the impact of verification events on the carbon price dynamics, all three 
events (2007, 2008 and 2009 emissions data releases) are found to cause positive event 
returns for both EUA futures prices. In fact, the disclosure of emissions during 2007 
and 2008 are the two events with the greatest impact on carbon prices: "VER’07=0.0404 
(0.0396) and "VER’08= 0.0404 (0.0241) for the intra-(inter) phase EUA futures. The 
positive market responses indicate that the market expected a larger excess of EUAs 
than was the case in reality.  
The category of events labelled “Other announcements: UK” is not found to lead to 
significant event returns for carbon prices. On the other hand, the German 
announcement that their targeted emission cut was to be increased to 55% by 2030 and 
70% by 2040 creates statistically significant positive event returns in both carbon price 
series (the regression coefficients for “Other announcements: Germany” are 0.0192 and 
0.0171 for the Phase II and III EUA futures, respectively).  These results confirm that, 
as a key player in the EU ETS, Germany’s carbon policy affects the price dynamics of 
EUAs.  
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Announcements about carbon offsets generated under the Kyoto Clean Development 
Mechanism and their usability for ETS compliance purposes do not meaningfully affect 
the price of carbon during the times of the financial crisis. I don’t find this illogical as 
in the environment of known EUA oversupply due to lower industrial production, 
covered entities will comfortably meet their targets even without seeking EUA 
substitutes for compliance purposes.  
And, lastly, COP/MOP events have a negative yet insignificant impact on EUA futures 
prices. A possible explanation for the insignificant results is that the outcomes of the 
meetings and the failure to agree on a Kyoto successor were largely anticipated by the 
market. The carbon market sentiment surveys conducted by the International Emissions 
Trading Association (IETA) in 2009, 2010 and 201123 support this view. IETA reports 
that in 2009 only 52% of the respondents believed that a legally-binding post-Kyoto 
agreement would not be reached at COP 15 and would be postponed until COP 16. In 
2010 60% believed that an agreement would be delayed until later in the following 
year. In 2011 the number of survey respondents who believed the agreement would be 
postponed yet again had grown to 79.2%.  
In brief, the results from the pre-crisis and full-crisis univariate analysis suggest that 
investors respond to market-sensitive information as it becomes available but the 
magnitude of the market reactions tends to be fairly small (save for the verification 
events). As per Hypothesis 1, announcements suggestive of increase (decrease) in EUA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 IETA 4th Carbon Market Sentiment Survey: http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/sustainability/assets/ieta-
reporting.pdf 
IETA 5th Carbon Market Sentiment Survey: http://www.pwc.co.uk/en_UK/uk/assets/pdf/ieta-2010-survey.pdf 
IETA 6th Carbon Market Sentiment Survey: 
http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/ieta_6th_ghg_market_sentiment_survey.pdf 
!
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supply (demand) tend to be associated with negative event returns while 
announcements suggestive of decrease (increase) in EUA supply (demand) tend to be 
associated with positive event returns. The reported market reactions, however, reveal 
that on many occasions investors have failed to account for the different rules on inter-
temporal allowance transferability across trading periods. As a result, abnormal 
reactions are reported when there should be none. The observed investor behaviour is 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 2. Lastly, the results lend support to the view that market 
responsiveness to institutional announcements has declined following the onset of the 
financial crisis (Hypothesis 3), as evidenced by the significant decrease in carbon 
variance attributed to such announcements during the full-crisis subsample.   
As a final note, before proceeding with the structural break tests, it is perhaps worth 
highlighting that developments in the carbon market seem to be bearing a striking 
resemblance to the decline in activity experienced by the United States’ SO2 trading 
scheme (the so-called Acid Rain Program).  After a decade of successful sulphur 
trading, the price of SO2 permits began to fall (Chan et al., 2012). Low-sulphur coal, oil 
and natural gas had all dropped in price, facilitating reduction of sulphur emissions in 
excess of what had been foreseen by regulatory authorities. Because allowances in the 
SO2 market were mostly given away for free, as in the EU ETS, excess allowances 
flooded the market pushing sulphur prices down and distorting the incentives of 
companies to further abate internally. Regulatory uncertainty caused by the potential 
implementation of pollution control requirements at the firm-level exerted further 
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downward pressure on the already depressed prices24 (Burtraw and Szambelan, 2009). 
The inflexibility of the scheme in adapting reduction targets by removing the excess 
allowances kept the marginal cost of compliance artificially low. The EU ETS seems to 
be on the same path – over-allocation of allowances in Phase I was followed by excess 
allowances caused by lower-than-expected industrial production in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. On-going regulatory uncertainty about the continuation of the scheme, 
the reduction targets and the rules about allocating EUAs exacerbate the situation. The 
obvious question is whether the decline of the sulphur market will be followed by a 
similar decline in the EU ETS because regulatory authorities have not learned from the 
mistakes of the former.  
3.6.1.2. Structural break test 
Building on the work of Chevallier (2011b), I employ the Bai-Perron (1998, 2003) 
methodology in order to identify structural breaks in the price series of EUA futures 
contracts. A combination of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and the residual 
sum of squares (RSS) is employed to determine the optimal number of breaks in the 
data. As seen in Table 3.6, the BIC is minimized for two breaks and the RSS shows 
little improvement after the second break. Therefore, two points of structural change 
are used in the time series which correspond to the following dates: December 27th, 
2006 and June 22nd, 2007. The three regimes suggested by the Bai-Perron methodology 
are: 25/04/2005 – 26/12/2006; 27/12/2006 – 21/06/2007 and, finally, 22/06/2007 – 
30/06/2011. These subsamples relate closely to the pre-crisis/full-crisis split used in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 These new regulatory pollution controls were eventually approved. The Clean Air Interstate Rule of 2005 
(www.epa.gov/cair) and the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule of 2011 (www.epa.gov/airtransport ) both include 
installation-level requirements on the allowable level of sulphur emissions.         
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Section 3.6.1.1. The first two subsamples span the pre-crisis times and the third 
subsample almost overlaps with the onset of the financial crisis.  
Unfortunately, the structural breaks identified in this chapter cannot be directly 
compared to those of Alberola et al. (2008) and Chevallier (2011b). The former employ 
a different methodology altogether and cover a much smaller time span. The latter uses 
22 as the minimum number of observations per segment and examines only a subset of 
the data covered in this chapter. Nevertheless, it is useful to note the breaks they 
identify.  Over the period 01/07/2005 – 30/04/2007, Alberola et al. (2008) find breaks 
on April 25th 2006 and May 15th 2006 when the Lee and Strazicich test with two breaks 
is run. October 2006 is reported as a break when the same test is run for one structural 
break in the time series. Employing the Bai-Perron algorithm, Chevallier (2011b) 
detects three breaks over the period 09/03/2007 – 31/03/2009. These are May 28th 
2007, December 30th 2008 and February 11th 2009.  
Table 3.6 Bai-Perron RSS and BIC output (Univariate analysis) 
Number of breaks 0 1 2 3 4 5 
RSS 3.72 3.69 3.60 3.59 3.56 3.54 
BIC -5102.69 -5100.59 -5123.54 -5114.26 -5112.94 -5103.81 
*RSS = Residual Sum of Squares; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion 
**BIC is minimized for two breaks and RSS shows little improvement after the second break. 
A. Subsample 1 (22/04/2005 – 26/12/2006) 
The period from 22 April 2005 until 26 December 2006 is a subset of the pre-crisis 
time period which was examined in Part A of Section 3.6.1.1. Therefore, the findings in 
this section are expected to be quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the findings for 
the pre-crisis subsample. Results of the univariate regression model for all Bai-Perron 
subsamples are reported in Table 3.7. To keep the size of this chapter manageable, I 
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only briefly note the results where they are identical with the pre-crisis subsample and 
focus on the differences between the results found in Tables 3.5 and 3.7.  
Similar to the pre-crisis subsample, notifications of additional information to Phase I 
NAPs and the official EC endorsement of these plans are found to have a significant 
and positive impact on the prices of EUA futures contracts. Leaked information about 
Phase II NAPs meaningfully affects only the prices of Phase I futures.  
Unlike the pre-crisis subsample, an insignificant negative market reaction is 
documented after official notifications of Phase II NAPs to the EC and a significant 
negative reaction after additions are made to these plans. The difference between the 
pre-crisis and the Bai-Perron subsamples in the events included as notifications of 
additional information is that the former has two extra announcements due to its greater 
length. These are the additions made by the Romanian and Danish governments to their 
originally submitted plans. The fact that after their removal from the carbon time series 
the event category gains statistical significance suggests that these two announcements 
did not produce any event returns and washed away the event returns associated with 
the remainder of the notifications.  
The rest of the findings are identical to the pre-crisis ones - announcements about the 
expansion of the EU ETS lead to significant increases in EUA prices, the disclosure of 
verified emissions for 2005 is associated with positive event returns, and lastly, the 
inability of COP/MOP participants to agree on a legally binding, international post-
2012 climate policy is reflected in the negative event returns following the 2006 annual 
meeting in Kenya. 
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B. Subsample 2 (27/12/2006 – 21/06/2007) 
The short time period which this subsample covers (125 trading days) raises issues 
about the reliability of the test statistics. Despite the poor fit of the regression (adjusted 
R-squared is negative for both sets of regression equations at -0.49% for the intraphase 
EUA futures and -2.13% for the interphase ones) I briefly mention the price effects of 
announcements within this time period. The Bulgarian council’s approval of the Phase 
II NAP (“Leaked information prior to formal submission to the EC”) does not have a 
statistically significant impact on the carbon price over the period. Notifications of 
additional information to original proposals seem to have a contradictory impact on the 
prices of nearest-to-maturity and near phase EUA futures contracts. At the same time 
additions to an already revised plan (in this subsample, the announcement refers to the 
Lithuanian revised plan) are associated with negative event returns in both futures price 
series. All in all, the market does not seem to view the suggested additions as enough to 
prop up the carbon price. The lack of commitment in member states covered by the 
ETS, as reflected in the insufficient proposed changes, appears to be undermining not 
only the short-term prices but also the long-term prospects of the market. Lastly, the 
formal acceptance of a second Phase NAP by the EC is shown to be the only event 
associated with a statistically significant positive price effect.  
C. Subsample 3 (22/06/2007 – 30/06/2011) 
Because this subsample almost perfectly overlaps with the full-crisis sample period 
analysed in Part B of Section 3.6.1.1 (the latter is less than two months shorter), the 
results in the last four columns of Table 3.7 are nearly identical to the ones presented in  
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Table 3.7 Univariate analysis: Bai-Perron structural breaks   
This table reports the regression results of Equation 1. The sample is split into three subsamples - (22/04/2005 - 26/12/2006), (27/12/2006 - 21/06/2007) and 
(22/06/2007 - 30/06/2011) according to the Bai-Perron algorithm. The dependent variable is: 1) log-return of nearest-to-expiry EUA futures contracts, 2) near-
phase EUA futures. Robust Newey-West HAC standard errors are used. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Event return is denoted as Re 
and non-event return – as Rne. 
Event  
Subsample 1 Subsample 2 Subsample 3 
Intraphase Re Interphase Re Intraphase Re Interphase Re Intraphase Re Interphase Re 
Intercept (Rne) -0.0032 (-1.57) -0.0003 (-0.18) -0.0312* (-3.71) 0.0014 (0.48) -0.0013 (-1) -0.0005 (-0.73) 
NAP I: Additional info 0.0346* (10.6) 0.0314*† (10.48)         
NAP I: Acceptance  0.0715* (35.31) 0.0674*† (42.7)         
NAP I: Rejection  0.0013 (0.67) -0.0183*† (-11.6)         
NAP II: Leaked info  -0.0257** (-2.03) -0.0184 (-1.57) -0.0063 (-0.75) -0.0020 (-0.68) 0.0161* (12.34) 0.0140* (19.93) 
NAP II: Notification to EC  -0.0065 (-1.08) -0.0037 (-1.62)     -0.0292* (-22.38) -0.0301* (-43.01) 
NAP II: Additional info  -0.0177* (-8.79) -0.0092* (-5.83) -0.0260* (-3.1) 0.0136* (4.76) 0.0384 (1.45) -0.0101 (-0.87) 
 NAP II:  Amended plan         0.0103* (3.14) 0.0066* (3.62) 
NAP II: Additional info to 
amended plan     -0.1630* (-19.42) -0.0184* (-6.43) 0.0966* (74.01) -0.0097* (-13.91) 
NAP II: Acceptance     0.0312* (3.71) 0.0287* (10.05) -0.0253 (-1.47) -0.0017 (-0.47) 
EC announcement after its 
formal decision         -0.0141 (-1.24) -0.0142 (-1.6) 
Phase III:  Caps         0.0142 (1.6) 0.0120 (1.54) 
Phase III: Auctioning rules         0.0182* (2.66) 0.0154* (2.72) 
Scope 0.0348* (3.1) 0.0155** (2.35)     0.0014 (0.12) -0.0079 (-1.43) 
Verification 2005 0.4879* (242.2) 0.1868* (118.3)         
Verification 2007         0.0405* (31.02) 0.0397* (56.65) 
Verification 2008         0.0405* (31.05) 0.0241* (34.44) 
Verification 2009         0.0214* (16.37) 0.0183* (26.09) 
Other: UK         -0.0035 (-0.34) 0.0007 (0.1) 
Other: Germany          0.0193* (14.82) 0.0171* (24.43) 
CITL – ITL linkage         0.0151 (1.61) 0.0169** (2.09) 
CERs         0.0044 (1.43) 0.0010 (0.36) 
COP/MOP -0.0155* (-7.7) -0.0128* (-8.1)     -0.0008 (-0.28) -0.0013 (-0.51) 
R-squared 27.51%  9.88%  2.75%  1.16%  1.57%  1.83%  
Adjusted R-squared 25.95%  7.94%  -0.49%  -2.13%  -0.17%  0.09%  
*, **, *** refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
† indicates that although a price is quoted on the ECX, trading in these futures hasn’t started yet 
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Table 3.5. It is worth noting that partitioning the dataset into subsamples according to the 
Bai-Perron algorithm seems to be somewhat better in terms of overall model performance 
than dividing the data into pre-crisis and full-crisis subsamples. To illustrate, the adjusted 
R-squared of the pre-crisis subsample is 10.29% (5.89%) for intra-(inter) phase futures 
and it goes up to 27.51% (9.88%) for the Bai-Perron Subsample 1. A change in the 
adjusted R-squared from -0.94% (0.14%) for the full-crisis sample to -0.17% (0.09%) for 
the Bai-Perron Subsample 3 is observed. While the coefficients of determination are not 
directly comparable due to the different lengths of the periods, they point to differences 
in performance.    
3.6.2. MULTIVARIATE CARBON PRICE ANALYSIS 
Explanatory variables used in OLS-based studies of the carbon market vary across 
researchers. The motivation behind the choice of variables for Equation 2 has already 
been discussed in Section 3.4.1.2 and the descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 
3.8 below. With largest standard deviations and maximum-minimum ranges, gas and 
intraphase EUA futures appear to be the most volatile. None of the variables is normally 
distributed.  
In Section 3.4.1.2 it was also discussed that, in order to prevent endogeneity problems 
with the regression analysis, I have chosen regressors which are not highly correlated. 
Table 3.9 presents the correlation matrices in price levels and log-returns. The 
correlations between log-returns (Panel B) are much lower than the correlations between 
prices (Panel A). None of the correlations are so high as to suggest that multicollinearity 
or endogeneity biases are introduced in the model.  
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Table 3.8 Descriptive statistics  
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the log-returns for the ICE Natural Gas 1 Month forward 
contracts, the near-month ICE Brent Crude Oil futures contracts, DJ EuroStoxx600,  intra- and interphase 
ECX EUA futures contracts over the period 22/04/2005 - 30/06/2011.  
  Gas Oil Equity Intraphase EUAs  
Interphase 
EUAs  
 Mean  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 Maximum  0.48  0.14  0.10  0.48  0.19 
 Minimum -0.26 -0.12 -0.08 -0.45 -0.29 
 Std. Dev.  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.05  0.03 
 Skewness  2.61 -0.1 -0.01 -0.19 -0.9 
 Kurtosis  22.64  6.47  10.15  28.90  18.06 
 Jarque-Bera  26971.60  789.37  3391.29  44436.95  15249.67 
 Observations  1568  1568  1594  1589  1590 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.9 Correlation analysis  
This table represents a cross-correlation analysis in price levels (Panel A) and in log returns (Panel B). The 
dataset covers the period 22/04/2005 – 30/06/2011.   
Panel A: Correlation matrix in price terms  
  Gas Oil Equity 
Intraphase 
EUAs 
Interphase 
EUAs 
Gas  1.00  0.33  0.11  0.54  0.46 
Oil   1.00  0.14  0.32  0.43 
Equity    1.00 -0.31  0.29 
Intraphase EUAs     1.00  0.56 
Interphase EUAs      1.00 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix in log returns  
  Gas Oil Equity Intraphase EUAs Interphase EUAs 
Gas  1.00  0.09  0.06  0.13  0.14 
Oil   1.00  0.32  0.13  0.20 
Equity    1.00  0.10  0.15 
Intraphase EUAs     1.00  0.55 
Interphase EUAs      1.00 
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3.6.2.1. The financial crisis and its impact on the carbon price dynamics 
A. Pre-crisis multivariate model 
The results of Equation 2 for both the pre-crisis and full-crisis subsamples are reported in 
Table 3.10. Looking at the pre-crisis time period first, it appears that changes in energy 
prices, stock prices and extreme weather explain a considerable portion of the variability 
in carbon prices. Adjusted R-squared for the intraphase (interphase) EUA futures 
regression increases from 10.29% (5.89%) to 13.06% (8.50%) compared to the univariate 
regressions. The model performance is in line Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009) who, 
modelling carbon returns as a function of oil, gas and coal, report adjusted R-squared of 
17.78% for intraphase futures over a period nearly overlapping with the pre-crisis 
subsample (25/10/2004 – 15/05/2007).  
Before the start of the crisis, carbon is found to trade on its fundamentals – the energy 
complex and extreme weather. Oil appears to be the most important driver of carbon 
prices. The regression coefficients of oil are numerically much larger than the ones for 
gas: 0.41(0.23) for intraphase (interphase) EUA futures relative to 0.13 (0.06) for gas. 
The relationship between the two energy variables and carbon is such that oil and gas 
price increases are associated with increases in EUA prices. Equity and carbon prices do 
not seem to be related, as demonstrated by the insignificant slope coefficients of the DJ 
EuroStoxx index. This finding is in line with Bonacina et al. (2009) who argue that 
before the financial crisis carbon allowances behaved like commodities rather than 
financial assets. A non-linear relationship between weather and the price of carbon is 
documented whereby extremely hot and cold days lead to positive abnormal returns 
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(!hot= 0.0125, !cold= 0.0143). Naturally, the significance of extreme temperatures is only 
limited to the near expiry contracts.  
Similar to the results from the univariate pre-crisis analysis in Part A of Section 3.6.1.1, 
notifications of additional information to trial period NAPs and the plans’ acceptances or 
rejections by the EC are associated with positive event returns for Phase I futures 
contracts. As already discussed, Phase II futures were not traded at the time when NAP I 
announcements were made and the regression coefficients for these events do not reflect 
investors’ beliefs. Leaked information prior to the formal submission of Phase II NAPs 
leads to statistically significant price declines in the intraphase EUA futures, suggesting 
that market participants consider the proposed emissions targets to be insufficient to 
sustain the carbon price. The observed reaction is, however, inconsistent with the ban on 
allowance transferability between the first two phases.  
 
Notifications to the EC and additional information to the originally proposed Phase II 
NAPs seem to have no meaningful impact on the price development of EUA futures 
contracts. However, notifications of additional information to amended plans have a 
significant negative impact on the prices of Phase II EUA futures. The formal acceptance 
of NAPs II by the EC does not affect the prices of inter- or intraphase EUA futures 
contracts as, following all the amendments and corrections, all necessary information is 
already incorporated in the prices of carbon instruments.        
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, news about the expansion of the EU ETS have led to positive 
event returns in the price series of Phase I futures only and have had no statistically 
significant impact on the Phase II EUA futures prices. The announcements themselves  
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Table 3.10 Multivariate analysis: before and during the financial crisis  
The table reports the regression results of Equation 1. The sample is split into pre-crisis (22/04/2005 - 16/08/2007) and full-crisis (17/08/2007 - 30/06/2011) 
subsamples. The dependent variable is: 1) log-return of nearest-to-expiry EUA futures contracts, 2) near-phase EUA futures. Robust Newey-West HAC standard 
errors are used. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Event return is denoted as Re and non-event return – as Rne. 
Event  Pre-crisis subsample Full-crisis subsample Intraphase Re Interphase Re Intraphase Re Interphase Re 
Intercept (Rne) -0.0100* (-3.84) -0.0004 (-0.27) -0.0012 (-0.88) -0.0005 (-0.71) 
Oil 0.4123* (3.13) 0.2331*  (3.54) 0.1658* (3.66) 0.1570* (5.09) 
Gas 0.1307* (3.8) 0.0644*  (3.67) 0.1114* (2.68) 0.0752* (3.53) 
Equity -0.1809 (-0.55) -0.0368 (-0.25) 0.3067* (4.66) 0.2060* (4.39) 
Cold 0.0143* (2.39) 0.0067 (0.92) -0.0114*** (-1.97) -0.0113** (-2.32) 
Hot 0.0125* (2.63) 0.0023 (0.56) 0.0031 (0.62) 0.0052 (1.03) 
NAP I: Notification of additional information  0.0483* (10.7) 0.0353* † (18.28)     
NAP I: Acceptance  0.0646* (13.5) 0.0647* † (15.97)     
NAP I: Rejection  0.0200* (4.05) -0.0124* † (-5.24)     
NAP II: Leaked info before formal submission  -0.0231** (-2.02) -0.0169 (-1.56) 0.0156* (11.22) 0.0129* (12.88) 
NAP II: Notification to the EC  0.0063 (1) -0.0003 (-0.14) 0.0045 (0.86) -0.0048 (-1.55) 
NAP II: Notification of additional information  0.0022 (0.08) -0.0102 (-0.8) -0.0027 (-1.31) 0.0031** (2.5) 
NAP II: Notification of amended plan      0.0084* (3.79) 0.0054* (4.85) 
NAP II: Additional information to amended plan  -0.0419 (-0.42) -0.0142* (-6.95)     
NAP II: Acceptance  -0.0222 (-1.35) 0.0022 (0.22) -0.0207 (-0.78) 0.0002 (0.05) 
EC announcement after its formal decision      -0.0113 (-1.56) -0.0114** (-2.04) 
Phase III: Emissions caps      0.0114*** (1.83) 0.0094*** (1.68) 
Phase III: Auctioning rules      0.0185* (3.05) 0.0148* (2.83) 
Scope   0.0367* (4.14) 0.0131 (1.66) 0.0042 (0.36) -0.0060 (-1.2) 
Verification 2005  0.4956* (76.58) 0.1887* (65.69)     
Verification 2007      0.0291* (14.31) 0.0304* (23.88) 
Verification 2008      0.0309* (8.62) 0.0183* (10.19) 
Verification 2009      0.0148* (8.84) 0.0132* (13.02) 
Other announcements: UK      0.0034 (0.78) 0.0064*** (1.69) 
Other announcements: Germany      0.0142* (6.21) 0.0136* (12.46) 
CITL – ITL linkage      -0.0062 (-0.25) 0.0027 (0.15) 
CERs      0.0031 (0.85) -0.0005 (-0.18) 
COP/MOP  -0.0011 (-0.24) -0.0082* (-3.48) 0.0041 (0.65) 0.0024 (0.45) 
R-squared 15.44%  11.01%  6.38%  12.70%  
Adjusted R-squared 13.06%  8.50%  4.23%  10.70%  
*, **, *** refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
† indicates that although a price is quoted on the ECX, trading in these futures hasn’t started yet 
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include the presentation of the EC’s plan to include aviation; the EU environment 
ministers’ announcements of support for the plans to include aviation in the ETS; the 
signing of climate co-operation agreement between the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair 
and California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger whereby California committed to 
investigating the possibility of linking to the ETS. As these announcements relate to 
proposed changes for Phase II and III, the observed event reaction in Phase I futures is 
inconsistent with the ban on allowances banking between the first and second trading 
periods.   
Similar to the results from Section 3.6.1.1, the COP/MOP event negatively surprises 
market participants (statistically significant regression coefficient of -0.008 for Phase II 
EUA futures contracts). Once again, a positive impact is found of the disclosure of 2005 
verified emissions data on the prices of both Phase I and II EUA futures contracts. A 
detailed explanation of the seemingly contradictory positive price effect following the 
information release of May 15th 2006 was offered in Part A of Section 3.6.1.1.  
B. Full-crisis multivariate model 
The results of Equation 2 for the full-crisis subsample are reported in the last four 
columns of Table 3.10. A meaningful improvement in the performance of the multifactor 
full-crisis regressions over the univariate analysis (Table 3.5) is reported. After the 
inclusion of oil, gas, equity and extreme weather as explanatory variables adjusted R-
squared increases from -0.94% (0.14%) to 4.23% (10.70%) for the intra- (inter) phase 
EUA futures regression. Oil and gas remain statistically significant at the 1% level for 
both carbon price series. During the crisis, the association between equity and carbon 
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prices also gains statistical significance. The slope coefficient of the DJ EuroStoxx index 
is even greater numerically than the coefficients of oil and gas, implying that changes in 
the expected level of economic activity explain a larger part of the carbon price variation 
than the energy price drivers. Bonacina et al. (2009) similarly demonstrate that in the 
aftermath of the crisis, carbon prices have become more strongly correlated with the 
prices of equity, as proxied by the DJ Euro STOXX 50. Declercq et al. (2011) confirm 
that carbon behaves like a financial asset after the crisis. The explanation given for this 
phenomenon is that in times of tight credit conditions and cash deficiencies in the balance 
sheets of many firms, regulated entities choose to monetize their allowances rather than 
bank them for a future period (Bonacina et al., 2009). As for the role of weather in 
explaining carbon returns variation, extremely hot days are found to be statistically 
insignificant. Extremely cold days, on the other hand, are associated with a significantly 
negative return. This contradicts the economic logic that unusually cold weather increases 
demand for energy and thus indirectly leads to carbon price jumps. The results, however, 
are not significant at the preferred 99% confidence interval.  
Looking at NAP II announcements, leaked information has a positive and significant 
impact on both intra- and interphase carbon prices (0.0156 and 0.0129, respectively). The 
event relates to the leaked information about Estonia’s national cap revision. The rumour 
that it would submit a downwardly revised emissions plan and drop the threats of further 
court hearings in an attempt to end the long dispute over its allocation plan was greeted 
by market participants as good news. The notion that EU member states which are 
unhappy with their allocations can, at will, sue the EC and challenge its authority in 
regulating the ETS undermines confidence in the market altogether. Estonia dropping the 
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case and revising its cap down to 14.3mt per year of CO2 emissions seem to have 
strengthened a little the shaky confidence in the cap-and-trade scheme.  
While notifications of Phase II NAPs create no event returns in the EUA futures, 
notifications of additional information to the already submitted plans positively affect 
interphase futures. Similarly, the submission of amended plans and downward revisions 
in the proposed emissions caps for Estonia and Bulgaria have a significant positive 
impact on both carbon price series. Since there is bankability between Phase II and III of 
the ETS, both nearest-to-expiry and interphase futures are affected alike by these events. 
In line with the results elsewhere, the actual acceptance of the Phase II NAPs creates no 
event returns.  
Developments in the NAP process after the EC formal decisions have a negative impact 
on the interphase EUA price dynamics. The results refer to Estonia’s attempt to get 2.3 
million extra EUAs, Latvia’s claim for more Phase II EUAs and Italy’s attempt to 
renegotiate its emissions cap.  It is only natural that claims of individual member states 
after the EC final decision would create uncertainty in the market and exert downward 
pressure on carbon prices.   
As hypothesized, news about the tightening of the post-2012 emissions caps and the 
increasing portion of EUAs being auctioned rather given for free are good news for the 
market and are associated with positive event returns for both the intra- and interphase 
EUA futures contracts. At the same time, announcements about the scope of the EU ETS 
don’t seem to meaningfully affect carbon prices. Before the crisis, the scope-related 
announcements had a modest but statistically significant positive event return on the price 
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of EUA futures. In terms of the annual verification events, as in Table 3.5, positive price 
effects are found for the 2007, 2008 and 2009 data releases.  
The events categorized as “Other announcements: UK” are found to lead to positive 
event returns for interphase EUA futures contracts. The announcements included the 
proposed strengthening of the British Climate Change Bill; the commitment to an 80% 
cut in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2050, up from the previous goal of a 
60% reduction; the goal to reduce emissions by 34% from 1990 levels by 2020, and 50% 
below 1990 levels by 2025; the refusal to bank emission savings from Phase II on to 
Phase III. These are all viewed by the market participants as good news for the carbon 
market, as evidenced by the significant slope coefficient. Similarly, the announcement by 
Germany that the country will aim to cut its emissions by 55% by 2030 and by 70% by 
2040 creates statistically significant positive event returns in both EUA price series which 
I examine (regression coefficients for “Other announcements: Germany” are 0.0142 and 
0.0136  for the intra- and interphase EUA futures, respectively) .  These results confirm 
the view that due to the size of EUAs allocated to them, the UK and Germany affect the 
carbon price dynamics via the climate policies they adopt.  
After the onset of the crisis, announcements related to the linkage of the EU ETS to the 
Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism, and news about the quantities and types 
of CERs which can be used for compliance purposes don’t seem to play a role in the 
carbon price dynamics. The reason might be that during the financial crisis and the 
following periods of global recession, firms realize they will be net long allowances and 
underreact to news about the possibility of using alternative carbon offsets for 
compliance. Similar reasoning can be offered about the insignificance of the COP/MOP 
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events. With the low expectations of participants, when no consensus is reached there are 
no surprises.  
All in all, the majority of the event returns found with the univariate analysis in Section 
3.6.1.1 are robust to the addition of energy prices, economic activity and extreme weather 
to the model.    
3.6.2.2. The multifactor model with structural breaks  
In this portion of the analysis, the Bai-Perron test is re-estimated for the multivariate 
carbon price analysis. The dataset is divided at such times where the underlying 
relationship between carbon, gas, oil, equity and extreme weather changes. The results of 
the Bai-Perron test with a minimum of 44 trading days per segment are reported in Table 
3.11 below. The BIC is minimized for two breaks and the RSS shows little improvement 
after the second break. The two points of structural change correspond to the following 
dates: December 18th, 2006 and April 5th, 2007. The three subsamples are therefore: 
22/04/2005 – 17/12/2006; 18/12/2006 – 04/04/2007 and 05/04/2007 – 30/06/2011. Again, 
the identified subsamples relate closely to the pre-crisis/ full-crisis division used earlier.  
 
Table 3.11 Bai-Perron RSS and BIC output (Multivariate analysis) 
Number of breaks 0 1 2 3 4 5 
RSS 3.54 3.49 3.36 3.30 3.22 3.19 
BIC -5054.87 -5040.97 -5061.14 -5055.58 -5055.39 -5032.52 
*RSS = Residual Sum of Squares; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion 
**BIC is minimized for two breaks and RSS shows little improvement after the second break. 
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A. Subsample 1 (22/04/2005 – 17/12/2006) 
The results of Equation 2 for all three Bai-Perron subsamples are reported in Table 3.12. 
In Subsample 1, oil and natural gas are found to be important drivers of carbon while the 
relationship between equity and carbon is insignificant. Extremely hot and cold days 
elicit strong market reactions, confirming the view that higher demand for energy during 
days of extreme weather affects the price dynamics of carbon. For brevity, I only mention 
the results where they differ from the ones of the pre-crisis subsample reported in Part A 
of Section 3.6.2.1.    
Leaked information prior to formal submission of plans to the EC has led to 
statistically significant price declines for both intra- and interphase futures prices. 
This suggests that the information released to the public raised doubt about the 
sustainability of the carbon price. Submission of Phase II plans to the EC is not 
associated with significant event returns. Unlike the pre-crisis sample (see Table 
3.10) where no event returns are reported, in this subsample the notification of 
additional information to an already submitted NAP II has led to negative event 
returns for both intra-and interphase EUA futures contracts. (-0.0186 for Phase I 
futures and -0.0108 for Phase II futures). The notification examined in this 
subsample is the one made by France in October 2006 while two additional 
notifications are covered by the longer pre-crisis sample – the one by Romania in 
April 2007 and by Denmark in July 2007. The rest of the findings are identical to the 
results presented in Table 3.10.   
B. Subsample 2 (18/12/2006 – 04/04/2007)  
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This subsample covers the period before the onset of the financial crisis. The extreme 
weather variables are removed from the regression because over the period, there are no 
observations characterized by extreme temperatures. Oil and gas enter the regression with 
statistically significant and positive slope coefficients as suggested by economic theory. 
The DJ EuroStoxx index has no meaningful association with the carbon price. The two 
events covered in this fairly short subsample refer to the leaked information that 
Bulgaria’s council of ministers approved a draft national allocation plan for the second 
phase of the EU ETS and also the Romanian notification of additional information to 
their already submitted NAP II. The former has a negative impact on the Phase I futures, 
which is inconsistent with ban of allowance transferability, while the latter has a positive 
impact on the Phase II futures.  
C. Subsample 3 (05/04/2007 – 30/06/2011) 
This subsample starts 3 months before the crisis and covers the full-crisis period. The 
regression results are presented in the last four columns of Table 3.12. With regression 
coefficients of 0.1615 and 0.161 for intra- and interphase futures, oil is found to be 
among the most important factors driving carbon prices. Similar to the results in Table 
3.10, equity and carbon prices exhibit a significant positive relationship after the onset of 
the financial crisis. Gas is also found to be statistically significant for both nearest-to-
maturity and near phase EUA contracts. Contrary to economic logic, however, its sign is 
negative even though it has been consistently positive in the periods leading up to the 
financial crisis. The significant negative regression coefficient of extremely cold weather 
is also counterintuitive. These results seem to suggest that there is no stable relationship 
between the market and its fundamentals.  
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Table 3.12 Multivariate analysis: Bai-Perron structural breaks  
This table reports the regression results of Equation 1. The sample is split into three subsamples - (22/04/2005 - 17/12/2006), (18/12/2006 - 04/04/2007) and 
(05/04/2007 - 30/06/2011) according to the Bai-Perron algorithm. The dependent variable is: 1) log-return of nearest-to-expiry EUA futures contracts, 2) near-
phase EUA futures. Robust Newey-West HAC standard errors are used. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Event return is denoted as Re 
and non-event return – as Rne. 
Event Subsample 1 Subsample 2 Subsample 3 Intraphase Re Interphase Re Intraphase Re Interphase Re Intraphase Re Interphase Re 
Intercept (Rne) -0.0042 (-1.8) -0.0008 (-0.46) -0.0208** (-2.03) 0.0013 (0.35) -0.0031** (-2.16) -0.0002 (-0.34) 
Oil 0.3638* (3.4) 0.2447* (3.13) 1.0817*** (1.98) 0.1289 (0.7) 0.1615* (3.35) 0.1610* (5.27) 
Gas 0.0713* (3.55) 0.0405** (2.3) 0.6641* (3.25) 0.3127* (3.39) -0.0166* (-4.17) -0.0140* (-4.57) 
Equity 0.1762 (0.46) -0.2729*** (-1.35) -1.3246 (-1.63) 0.3334 (1.1) 0.1658** (2.15) 0.1169*** (2.1) 
Cold 0.0088** (1.88) 0.0067 (0.86)     -0.0069 (-1.23) -0.0097*** (-2.08) 
Hot 0.0087** (2.05) 0.0054 (1.46)     0.0026 (0.49) 0.0029 (0.53) 
NAP I: Additional info 0.0411* (11.04) 0.0363*† (15.49)         
NAP I: Acceptance 0.0636* (13.3) 0.0603*† (16.27)         
NAP I: Rejection  0.0086** (2.27) -0.0103*† (-3.53)         
NAP II: Leaked info -0.0258*** (-1.93) -0.0205*** (-1.7) -0.0272* (-2.84) -0.0051 (-1.37) 0.0149* (9.8) 0.0107* (12.43) 
NAP II: Notification to EC  -0.0004 (-0.07) -0.0001 (-0.03)     -0.0127* (-3.69) -0.0176* (-6.94) 
NAP II: Additional info -0.0186* (-6.58) -0.0108* (-5.8) -0.0081 (-0.55) 0.0275* (5.07) 0.0378 (1.32) -0.0124 (-1.23) 
NAP II: Amended plan         0.0094* (3.56) 0.0042* (3.32) 
NAP II: Additional Info to 
amended plan  
       -0.0456 (-0.44) -0.0131* (-5.28) 
NAP II: Acceptance         -0.0198 (-1.27) 0.0024 (0.45) 
After EC formal decision          -0.0095 (-1.14) -0.0116** (-1.9) 
Phase III: Emissions caps         0.0137** (2.24) 0.0095*** (1.73) 
Phase III: Auctioning rules         0.0183* (2.71) 0.0133** (2.39) 
Scope  0.0331* (3.81) 0.0131 (1.59)     0.0062 (0.52) -0.0060 (-1.16) 
Verification 2005  0.4961* (64.65) 0.1870* (47.45)         
Verification 2007           0.0349* (17.05) 0.0325* (25.06) 
Verification 2008           0.0431* (20.52) 0.0251* (24.33) 
Verification 2009           0.0178* (9.09) 0.0134* (11.76) 
Other: UK         0.0036 (0.45) 0.0051 (0.9) 
Other: Germany          0.0214* (15.2) 0.0170* (24.22) 
CITL – ITL linkage          0.0189* (2.55) 0.0185* (2.85) 
CERs          0.0042 (1.46) -0.0015 (-0.58) 
COP/MOP  -0.0065 (-1.45) -0.0073** (-2.53)     0.0030 (0.68) 0.0001 (0.02) 
R-squared 31.76%  12.88%  19.02%  23.82%  3.00%  8.13%  
Adjusted R-squared 29.40%  9.86%  13.06%  18.22%  0.87%  6.12%  
*, **, *** refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively      
 † indicates that although a price is quoted on the ECX, trading in these futures hasn’t started yet 
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Such inconsistent responses to key price drivers like fuel prices and weather have been 
documented elsewhere in the carbon literature and interpreted as market inefficiency 
(Hintermann, 2010). The idea that price drivers change in response to the changing 
institutional context of the EU ETS has also been advanced in several studies (among 
others Alberola et al., 2008). Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010) and Koop and Tole 
(2011) demonstrate that the differing context of the individual trading periods alters the 
causal links between electricity, carbon and gas prices and factors such as weather or 
equity valuations.  
As for the event returns associated with the various types of announcements, they are 
almost identical to the results reported in Table 3.10 so no further discussion of the 
results is needed. Similar to the univariate carbon price analysis from Section 3.6.1, I 
report that partitioning the dataset into subsamples according to the Bai-Perron algorithm 
produces somewhat better results than dividing the data into pre-crisis and full-crisis 
subsamples. To illustrate, the adjusted R-squared of the pre-crisis subsample is 13.06% 
(8.50%) for intra-(inter) phase futures and it goes up to 31.76% (12.88%) for the Bai-
Perron Subsample 1 and to 19.02% (23.82%) for Subsample 2. A decline in the adjusted 
R-squared from 4.23% (10.70%) for the full-crisis subsample to 0.87% (6.12%) for the 
Bai-Perron Subsample 3 is observed. Due to the different structural breaks identified by 
the Bai-Perron method in the univariate and multivariate analysis, a direct comparison of 
the subsamples is not possible. It is worth noting, however, that OLS regressions in the 
multivariate Bai-Perron framework produce a much higher coefficient of determination 
compared to the univariate ones.  
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In terms of changes in the market sensitivity to announcements before and during the 
crisis, I confirm that the market has become less responsive following the start of the 
financial crisis. A quick look at Subsample 1, which is before the onset of the crisis, and 
Subsample 3, which covers the period of the crisis, shows a reduction in the coefficient of 
variation – from 29.40% (9.86%) for the intra-(inter) phase EUA futures in Subsample 1 
to 0.87% (6.12%) for the futures in Subsample 3. The decline in adjusted R-squared 
demonstrates that announcements about the institutional framework of the EU ETS 
explain substantially less of the variance in carbon returns after the onset of the financial 
crisis.   
A caveat to the analysis concerns the role played by expectations in the development of 
the hypotheses and the estimation of returns associated with institutional announcements. 
As mentioned in Section 3.3, estimates are conditioned on the assumption that all 
announcements identified in this chapter represent genuine news to the market. Because 
of their unscheduled nature, the announcements are highly unpredictable (at least with 
regards to timing).  Nevertheless, the developments and announcements in the market 
mostly take place as a structured process. For instance, as pointed out in Section 3.2.1.1, 
getting a NAP approved is a process which involves multiple steps known in advance – 
draft proposals, submission to the EC, negotiations between the national government and 
the EC, followed by the formal EC decision. While the exact timing of each step of this 
process may not be anticipated by the market, it is plausible that some expectations about 
the end decisions (i.e. allocations to individual member states) are already embedded in 
the price of carbon.    
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This implies that many of the announcements examined in this chapter may not constitute 
a genuine shock to the market. Intermediate announcements (i.e. additions to submitted 
plans, amended plans, etc.) can therefore be interpreted as mostly noise which reveals 
little incremental information after the original submissions of the plans – which would 
explain the very small coefficients associated with most announcements in the OLS 
regressions. By the same token, news about MPs support of aviation’s inclusion in the 
EU ETS, Senate approval of the same, and similar announcements are mostly noise, as 
the signal (an expanding EU ETS) is already expected by the market,  albeit with an 
uncertain timing. This might explain why, for most of the events analyzed in this chapter, 
the event returns are fairly small in magnitude (mostly around 1% and in a few cases up 
to 2%, with only the verification events producing more substantial price reactions). 
3.6.3. THE IMPACT OF ANNOUNCEMENTS ON VOLATILITY 
This section reports the findings on the impact of institutional announcements on the 
volatility of carbon returns. The results of the Brown-Forsythe and sign tests are 
presented in Table 3.13 below. Panel A and B document the influence of announcements 
on the variance of intraphase and interphase carbon futures prices, respectively. Focusing 
on the Brown-Forsythe (1974) test for intraphase EUA futures contracts, the null 
hypothesis of variance homogeneity is never rejected for the majority of event categories 
at the 5% significance level.  Only for two sub-categories of NAP II events (notifications 
of additional information and notifications of additional information to amended plans) 
do I find that the null hypothesis is rejected in 25% and 50% of the time, respectively. 
The former are shown to lead to a lower variance after the announcements and the latter 
to a higher variance. With regards to the impact of announcements on the volatility of 
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interphase carbon returns, the null hypothesis is rejected 25% of the time following a 
Notification of a Phase II NAP to the EC. The one-tailed test demonstrates that 
Acceptances of Phase II NAPs also lead to a variance increase in 14.29% of all cases in 
that sub-category.  For the rest of the announcements, there is no statistically significant 
change in the variance of returns.  
The results from the sign test unanimously suggest that the volatility of carbon returns 
has remained unchanged following the announcements release for both intra- and 
interphase futures contracts. The p-values for all two-tailed and one-tailed tests are 
greater than the 5% significance level at which the test has been performed. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis of equal volatility before and after announcements is not rejected. 
I proceed to examine the influence of the announcements on the volatility embedded in 
carbon options. To formally test whether the observed changes in implied volatility are 
statistically significant, I estimate Equation 3 and report the results in Table 3.14. The 
results in Panel A are aggregated across broad event categories while Panel B reports the 
results for each sub-category of events. Save for the annual compliance events and the 
COP/MOP meetings, all analysed events are unscheduled. Looking at the aggregates first 
(Panel A), implied volatility on any given day does not seem to differ significantly from 
the average implied volatility over the 10-day period around unscheduled events. 
Announcements related to the EU ETS scope are the only exception, where significant 
deviations from the averages are found for days -5,-4 and +1. The dummy coefficients 
reveal declines in volatility prior to the event and an increase after the event. Albeit 
insignificant, the remainder of the dummy variables suggest a rise in volatility after an 
announcement related to the expansion of the ETS is made.  
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For verification events, implied volatility is not significantly different from its mean for 
days -2 to +1. Implied volatility before day -2 is significantly higher than the observed 
average, and volatility after day +1 is statistically significantly lower as uncertainty is 
removed from the market following data publication. These findings are consistent with 
those of Chevallier et al. (2008) who also document a reduction of volatility following 
the release of the 2006 verified emissions data. Implied volatility changes in a similar 
fashion around COP/MOP meetings but the size of the coefficients is substantially 
smaller, implying that changes in volatility are much smaller relative to changes around 
the annual verification events. This result may be due to the fact that United Nation’s 
meetings last much longer and information may be gradually incorporated in the prices, 
precluding dramatic changes in volatility. The conclusions are qualitatively identical 
when sub-categories of events are analysed (Panel B of Table 3.14) rather than the 
general classification discussed so far. 
In brief, both the Brown-Forsythe and the sign tests demonstrate that announcements 
related to the institutional set-up of the scheme have an insignificant impact on the 
variance of carbon returns. This result is in line with earlier studies (Mansanet-Bataller 
and Pardo, 2009; Lepone et al., 2011) which find that NAP events and annual disclosures 
of verified emissions have no impact on carbon volatility.  Additionally, I demonstrate 
that announcements about Phase III caps, CER availability, CITL-ITL linkage, ETS 
scope, and COP/MOP meetings do not impact the variance of carbon returns either. 
Lepone et al. (2011) attribute the lack of a change in variance of returns to information 
leakage prior to public releases. They argue that “a select group of employees and firm 
level auditors are apt to information regarding caps […] increasing the likelihood of 
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information leakage and insider trading” (Lepone et al., 2011: p.71). While I do not aim 
to disprove earlier research, I am suspicious of claims about such en masse insider 
trading particularly before unscheduled events.  
I propose one possible explanation that on the event days market participants revise their 
assessment of EUA prices but that this re-assessment may not be large enough to induce 
statistically significant changes in volatility. Alternatively, the reported lack of changes in 
volatility before and after institutional announcements is also consistent with the notion 
that much of the information flooding the market (and therefore, many of the 
announcements examined in this chapter) constitutes noise and not news. In short, news 
would seem to be no news at all, under this explanation. It would appear that the critical 
price driver and major source of news for the market is the annual verification events. 
The verification process is central to the development of the carbon market because it 
simultaneously reveals the remaining supply of emissions allowances and, therefore, the 
potential future demand for these. These are associated with statistically significant event 
returns, and these are the largest in magnitude of all the examined announcements, and 
they also lead to meaningful changes in option implied volatility, which suggests that 
these events alter the participants’ perception of the market risk.    
To sum up, with the Brown-Forsythe and sign tests I confirm earlier findings in the 
literature that the announcements have no impact on the variability of carbon returns. By 
using option implied volatility though, I demonstrate that following verification events 
and COP/MOP meetings the implied volatility embedded in carbon option decreases. 
This suggests a lower overall level of uncertainty in the market and confirms the 
importance of these events for market players.    
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Table 3.13 Changes in the variance of carbon returns  
This table reports the results of a Brown-Forsythe (1974) robustness test for equality of variances and a sign test. The null hypothesis is that the variance during 
the 5 days preceding the announcement day is equal to the variance in the period comprised of the event day and the following 4 days. Three alternative 
hypothesis specifications are testes: !!"#$%" ! !!"#$% ,!!"#$%" ! !!"#$% and !!"#$%" ! !!"#$% . For the Brown-Forsythe test, the number of times in which the null 
hypothesis is rejected is reported in percentage. For the sign test, the corresponding p-values are reported. Only events for which there are no confounding 
influences on the preceding or following day are used.  
Panel A: Nearest-to-expiry futures contracts (Intraphase EUA futures) 
 Number 
of events 
Brown-Forsythe test Sign test 
 !! ! !! !! ! !! !! ! !! !! ! !! !! ! !! !! ! !! 
NAP I: Acceptance by the EC 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.500 1.000 
NAP I: Rejection by the EC 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.500 1.000 
NAP II: Leaked information before formal 
submission to the EC 10 0% 0% 0% 0.754 0.828 0.377 
NAP II: Notification of a plan to the EC 4 0% 0% 0% 0.625 0.938 0.313 
NAP II: Additional information 4 25% 25%  0.625 0.938 0.313 
NAP II: Amended plan 2 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.750 0.750 
NAP II: Additional information to amended plan 2 50% 0% 50% 1.000 0.750 0.750 
NAP II: Acceptance by the EC 7 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.656 0.656 
NAP II: Announcements after the EC decision 3 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.500 0.875 
Phase III: Emissions caps 7 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.500 0.773 
Phase III: Auctioning rules 6 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.656 0.656 
Scope of the EU ETS 17 0% 0% 5.88% 0.629 0.315 0.834 
Verification 2005 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.500 1.000 
Verification 2007 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.500 1.000 
Verification 2008 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 1.000 0.500 
Verification 2009 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 1.000 0.500 
Other announcements: UK 5 0% 0% 0% 0.375 0.969 0.188 
Other announcements: Germany 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 1.000 0.500 
CITL-ITL linkage 2 0% 0% 0% 0.500 1.000 0.250 
CERs 5 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.813 0.500 
COP/MOP meetings 4 0% 0% 0% 0.125 1.000 0.063 
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Panel B: Near phase futures contracts (Interphase EUA futures)  
 
 Number 
of events 
Brown-Forsythe test Sign test 
 !! ! !! !! ! !! !! ! !! !! ! !! !! ! !! !! ! !! 
NAP I: Acceptance by the EC 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.500 1.000 
NAP I: Rejection by the EC 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.500 1.000 
NAP II: Leaked information before formal 
submission to the EC 10 0% 10% 0% 0.344 0.945 0.172 
NAP II: Notification of a plan to the EC 4 25% 0% 25% 0.625 0.938 0.313 
NAP II: Additional information 4 0% 0% 0% 0.125 1.000 0.063 
NAP II: Amended plan 2 0% 0% 0% 0.500 1.000 0.250 
NAP II: Additional information to amended plan 2 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.750 0.750 
NAP II: Acceptance by the EC 7 0% 0% 14.29% 1.000 0.773 0.500 
NAP II: Announcements after the EC decision 3 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.500 0.875 
Phase III: Emissions caps 7 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.500 0.773 
Phase III: Auctioning rules 6 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.656 0.656 
Scope of the EU ETS 17 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.686 0.500 
Verification 2005 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.500 1.000 
Verification 2007 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.500 1.000 
Verification 2008 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 1.000 0.500 
Verification 2009 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 1.000 0.500 
Other announcements: UK 5 0% 0% 0% 0.375 0.969 0.188 
Other announcements: Germany 1 0% 0% 0% 1.000 1.000 0.500 
CITL-ITL linkage 2 0% 0% 0% 0.500 1.000 0.250 
CERs 5 0% 0% 0% 1.000 0.813 0.500 
COP/MOP meetings 4 0% 0% 0% 0.125 1.000 0.063 
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Table 3.14 Changes in option implied volatility  
This table reports the results of Equation 3. Robust standard errors are used. The corresponding t-statistics are reported below the regression coefficients. *, **, 
*** refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Panel A: Aggregate event categories 
 
 
D-5 D-4 D-3 D-2 D-1 D0 D+1 D+2 D+3 D+4 R^2 
NAP II announcements -0.9920 -0.9210 -1.5621 0.3706 0.7016 0.8464 0.2436 1.4448 0.2050 -0.3369 
4.21% 
-0.64 -0.59 -1.10 0.43 0.92 1.15 0.29 0.92 0.24 -0.63  
Phase III 
announcements 
0.2886 0.1427 0.0432 0.0566 -0.2176 -0.0998 -0.1410 0.0507 -0.1190 -0.0045 1.04% 
0.47 0.26 0.11 0.24 -0.95 -0.41 -0.35 0.14 -0.35 -0.01  
Scope of the EU ETS  -0.9440** -1.1371*** -0.6975 -0.1182 0.1427 0.5470 1.2680** 0.4944 0.3779 0.0668 
15.64% 
-2.36 -1.72 -1.58 -0.21 0.40 1.23 2.27 1.13 0.77 0.13  
Verification events 0.5841 4.0916*** 2.1222** 1.4589 0.7815 0.8374 -0.6376 -2.4575** -3.3221** -3.4585* 
64.22% 
1.24 1.74 2.63 1.28 0.81 0.63 -1.20 -2.82 -2.18 -2.89  
Other announcements: 
UK and Germany 
-0.2087 -0.1184 -0.0848 -0.0009 -0.1268 0.3064 -0.5899 0.5096** -0.1122 0.4258 10.32% 
-1.03 -0.55 -0.38 -0.01 -0.26 0.99 -0.89 2.28 -0.31 0.42  
Kyoto offsets -0.4338 -0.2295 -0.0449 0.1717 0.2083 0.1344 0.0694 -0.0097 -0.1782 0.3124 
8.73% 
-1.02 -0.68 -0.21 0.8 1.41 0.82 0.42 -0.02 -0.6 0.96  
COP/MOP meetings 0.1483 -0.0150 0.3617* 0.4217* 0.4683** 0.1183 -0.0917 -0.4483** -0.4883** -0.4750** 
56.17% 
0.33 -0.05 25.98 3.81 2.23 1.02 -0.83 -2.39 -2.52 -2.49  
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Panel B: Sub-categories of events 
 
D-5 D-4 D-3 D-2 D-1 D0 D+1 D+2 D+3 D+4 R^2 
NAP II: Leaked 
information 
-0.3207* -0.3787* -0.1987* 0.2927 0.7565 0.6863 0.0882 -0.2994 -0.3268 -0.2994 32.91% 
-4.06 -13.64 -34.26 0.60 0.76 0.82 0.30 -0.46 -0.46 -0.41  
NAP II: Notification 
to the EC 
-4.1636 -4.2043 -7.6943 2.3892 2.8673 2.7859 2.7635 2.9751 2.8429 -0.5617 2150% 
-0.50 -0.51 -1.25 0.63 0.79 0.76 0.75 0.82 0.78 -0.77  
NAP II: Additional 
information 
2.5469 3.0291** 2.9192** 2.0525 1.6832 1.6344 -3.3595 -3.4694 -3.4694 -3.5670 64.73% 
1.75 3.12 2.70 1.05 0.73 0.69 -1.27 -1.37 -1.37 -1.47  
NAP II: Additional 
info to amended plan 
0.3072*** 0.2888*** 0.3102*** 0.3316 0.1790* 0.1556 0.0671 -0.2350 -0.4851*** -0.9193** 81.32% 
1.93 2.05 1.91 1.81 5.78 1.22 1.72 -0.89 -1.84 -2.90  
NAP II: Acceptance -1.1145 -1.2808*** -1.5738* -0.1898 -0.4233 -0.5408* 0.8295 1.1560* 1.2781*** 1.8594*** 
72.90% 
-0.99 -2.20 -8.30 -0.21 -1.43 -6.98 0.81 8.34 2.14 2.03  
NAP II: After official 
decisions 
-1.7728 -1.5876 -1.1706 -2.1593 -0.8694 0.1275 -0.0190 6.2574 0.3024 0.8914 28.37% 
-0.86 -0.80 -0.53 -1.09 -1.31 0.39 -0.06 0.91 0.38 0.90  
Phase III: Emissions 
caps 
0.0135 0.1028 0.0853 -0.0267 0.0169 0.0885 0.0167 -0.1673 -0.2449 0.1152 0.58% 
0.01 0.14 0.14 -0.07 0.07 0.34 0.02 -0.27 -0.49 0.16  
Phase III: Auctioning 0.6095 0.1894 -0.0060 0.1538 -0.4912 -0.3195 -0.3249 0.3051 0.0280 -0.1441 
6.01% 
0.73 0.21 -0.01 0.59 -1.20 -0.71 -0.72 0.82 0.06 -0.26  
Scope of the EU ETS -0.9440** -1.1371*** -0.6975 -0.1182 0.1427 0.5470 1.2680** 0.4944 0.3779 0.0668 15.64% 
-2.36 -1.72 -1.58 -0.21 0.40 1.23 2.27 1.13 0.77 0.13  
Verification events 0.5841 4.0916*** 2.1222** 1.4589 0.7815 0.8374 -0.6376 -2.4575** -3.3221** -3.4585* 
64.22% 
1.24 1.74 2.63 1.28 0.81 0.63 -1.20 -2.82 -2.18 -2.89  
Other 
announcements: UK 
-0.2504 -0.1482 -0.0604 0.0826 0.0992 0.4546 -0.6398 0.4934*** -0.0901 0.0591 9.32% 
-0.98 -0.54 -0.21 0.81 0.18 1.29 -0.75 1.72 -0.19 0.05  
CITL-ITL linkage 0.0278 0.0339 -0.0729 0.2383 0.4611 0.4184 0.3116 -0.5673 -0.7413 -0.1096 
12.84% 
0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.43 1.36 0.78 0.51 -0.36 -0.69 -0.56  
CERs -0.6184*** -0.3349 -0.0337 0.1450 0.1071 0.0207 -0.0274 0.2134 0.0470 0.4811 26.59% 
-1.96 -1.44 -0.22 0.56 0.67 0.16 -0.26 1.01 0.30 1.10  
COP/MOP meetings 0.1483 -0.0150 0.3617* 0.4217* 0.4683** 0.1183 -0.0917 -0.4483** -0.4883** -0.4750** 56.17% 
0.33 -0.05 25.98 3.81 2.23 1.02 -0.83 -2.39 -2.52 -2.49  
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3.7. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents the results of an event study conducted in order to detect significant 
price reactions following announcements related to different aspects of the EU ETS 
institutional design. A significant, albeit small in magnitude, market response was 
documented after multiple demand- and supply-side announcements, suggesting that they 
are in fact important for the carbon price dynamics. 
The observed market reactions on the event days are, in their majority, in line with the 
initial expectation that announcements which suggest increases (decreases) in the supply of 
EUAs result in a negative (positive) price reaction while announcements which suggest 
increases (decreases) in the demand for EUAs result in a positive (negative) price reaction. 
All NAP I announcements are shown to have elicited a positive price reaction, suggesting 
that market participants saw these as good news events. As for Phase II NAPs, information 
releases before formal submission to the EC, submission to the EC, and additions to 
original and amended plans vary in sign and significance across the different time periods 
which are examined. Amendments of the original allocation plans are associated with 
positive event returns as the downward revisions of EUA allocations are factored into 
carbon prices. Contrary to Rotfu! et al. (2009), NAP acceptances are not found to impact 
the carbon price dynamics. Announcements after the formal decisions of the EC do not 
meaningfully affect carbon prices either. All annual compliance events are shown to cause 
significant positive reactions, suggesting that the market may tend to overestimate the 
expected excess of EUAs in the system. As in Miclaus et al. (2008), verification events are 
found to have had the strongest impact on the carbon price formation.  
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Positive and mostly significant event returns are observed following announcements related 
to post-2012 emissions reduction targets, changes to the auctioning rules and the expanding 
scope of the ETS. Despite the importance of Kyoto offsets for the EUA market, 
announcements related to the CITL-ITL linkage and the CERs availability for compliance 
purposes have not resulted in significant event returns. The importance of Germany as a 
key player in the ETS is confirmed. COP/MOP events are associated with negative market 
responses as market participants factor in the inability of the international leaders to agree 
on a Kyoto successor.  
In brief, investors are found to react to information about the institutional set-up of the EU 
ETS but they inaccurately assess the impact of the announcements on the prices of futures 
contracts with expirations in different trading periods of the scheme. Announcements 
related to Phase II and III are found to affect the prices of futures contracts expiring in both 
of these phases, which is in line with the transferability of allowances between these two 
periods. Contrary to expectations, however, these announcements also impact Phase I 
prices. In addition, some of the Phase I events impact Phase II futures (e.g. the verification 
event of 2005 results in significant event returns for the 2008 futures contract).  This is 
inconsistent with the ban on inter-temporal banking and borrowing and leads me to believe 
that the market is not fully efficient yet.  
The impact of the event dummies is found to be robust to the inclusion of explanatory 
variables to the univariate model. The multifactor model is shown to perform substantially 
better than the univariate one as fuel prices, the stock market and extreme weather explain 
a considerable part of the variability in carbon prices. However, no stable relationship is 
found between the carbon market and its fundamentals. It would appear that in the 
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recessionary environment following the onset of the financial crisis, the presence of excess 
EUAs has led to a disconnect between the carbon market and its key price drivers. 
Evidence is also found to support the hypothesis that the carbon market has become less 
responsive to institutional disclosure following the start of the financial crisis. The poor 
explanatory power of the event dummies in the full-crisis subsamples (in both the 
univariate and multivariate regressions) is interpreted as a confirmation of the view that in 
the context of decreased industrial production and known EUA oversupply, announcements 
about the institutional framework of the scheme are less important to market participants.  
Lastly, contrary to my expectations, I find no proof that the variance of returns increases 
following institutional announcements. Both the Brown-Forsythe and the sign test confirm 
earlier findings in the literature (Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2009; Lepone et al., 2011) 
that institutional announcements have no impact on the variability of carbon returns. The 
examination of changes in option implied volatility, however, supports the hypothesis that 
uncertainty increases before scheduled events and decreases afterwards. The significant 
changes in implied volatility around the annual release of verified emissions data and the 
COP/MOP meetings confirm the importance of these events for the market players. 
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APPENDIX 3A CONSTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN WEATHER INDEX 
In constructing the average temperature on an aggregate EU-wide level, I use daily mean 
temperatures in only those European countries which are covered by the ETS. The 
underlying logic is that extreme weather in these countries leads to excess demand for 
electricity, which in turn affects the carbon price. When the EU ETS was launched in 2005, 
all 15 countries which were then EU members were covered by the scheme. Cyprus and 
Malta began trading during Phase II of the ETS. Having been accepted to the EU in 2007, 
Bulgaria and Romania also joined the carbon market in its second trading period. During 
Phase II, three additional non-EU countries also linked up with the scheme. These were 
Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. Since the sample covers the period from April 2005 
until June 2011, I limit the analysis of the average European temperature to these countries 
which have been covered by the scheme since its very beginning in 2005. Therefore, I 
disregard climatic data from Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, Malta, Norway, Liechtenstein and 
Iceland.  
In addition, countries with little or no meteorological historical data were omitted from the 
sample. These included the Czech Republic (with mean daily temperature available from 1 
station only), Belgium (0 stations), Hungary (0 stations), Luxembourg (1 station), Poland 
(2 stations), Slovakia (2 stations), Finland (3 stations) and Latvia (3 stations). Individual 
stations with large gaps in the data were removed from the countries remaining in the 
sample. 9 stations were removed from the Spanish sample, 6 were removed from the 
German data set, 2 from the Dutch data and 1 from Slovenian data. Only the stations with 
over 25% of missing observations were removed from the samples. All data is taken from 
the official European Climate Assessment & Dataset website, available at 
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http://eca.knmi.nl/. Average historical monthly temperatures are calculated over the period 
01/01/1985 – 31/12/ 2004.  
An average monthly temperature is calculated for every country over the time period from 
January 1, 1985 through to December 31, 2004. The average monthly T°i, mm/yy is calculated 
where i is the country i = [Austria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden], mm/yy annotates the specific 
month in a given year. For example, the average 1986 January temperature in France is 
found as the arithmetic average of all the daily mean temperatures recorded in France over 
the specific time period January 1 – 31, 1986. A European Temperature Index is then 
created as the weighted mean of the constituent countries, where the weight given to each 
country corresponds to its population. The average EU monthly T°mm/yy is found as the 
weighted average of all the countries included in the dataset. The weight given to each 
country is proportional to its population. Therefore,      
!"!!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!!! ! !"#$%&'(")!!"!!"#$%&'(") 
The average EU monthly T° over the entire period 1985 – 2004 is found by averaging the 
monthly estimates of the specific years. For example,  
!"!!!!! ! !"!!!!!!!!!!!"  
Daily temperature deviations around the European mean are calculated for all months over 
the period April 22, 2005 – June 31, 2011. Positive deviations (extremely hot weather 
compared to the past 20 years) and negative deviations (extremely cold weather) are 
examined separately. Two extreme weather dummy variables are created. The variable 
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“Cold” captures winter days on which the temperature is three standard deviations lower 
than the 20-year average for that month. For the purposes of this chapter, winter is defined 
to include the months of December, January and February. The variable “Hot” captures at 
summer days on which the temperature is three standard deviations higher than the 20-year 
average for that month. Summer here is defined to include the months of June, July and 
August. Extremely hot and cold events are examined separately in order to capture an 
asymmetric response, if any, in the prices of carbon. The “Cold” and “Hot” variables are 
binary dummy variables which take on values of 1 for days with extreme weather and 0 
otherwise. 77 extreme weather events are identified over the sample period – 54 extremely 
hot days and 23 extremely cold days.  
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APPENDIX 3B REGRESSIONS WITH NO SAME-DAY EVENTS ONLY 
Table 3.15 Univariate analysis: before and during the financial crisis  
Only events with no same-day announcements are used for the analysis. The table reports the regression 
results of Equation 1. The sample is split into pre-crisis (22/04/2005 - 16/08/2007) and full-crisis (17/08/2007 
- 30/06/2011) subsamples. The dependent variable is: 1) log-return of nearest-to-expiry EUA futures 
contracts, 2) near-phase EUA futures. Robust Newey-West HAC standard errors are used.  
 Events 
Pre-crisis subsample Full-crisis subsample 
Intraphase 
Re 
Interphase 
Re 
Intraphase 
Re 
Interphase 
Re 
Intercept (Rne) -0.0070* 0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0003 
NAP I: Notification of additional information 0.0260* 0.0192*†   
NAP I: Acceptance 0.0618* 0.0531*†   
NAP I: Rejection 0.0052** -0.0195*†   
NAP II: Leaked info before formal submission  0.0012 -0.0044 0.0157* 0.0137* 
NAP II: Notification to the EC 0.0099 0.0061 -0.0296* -0.0304* 
NAP II: Notification of additional information -0.0198** -0.0088** 0.0009 0.0060* 
NAP II: Notification of amended plan 0.0316 -0.0059 0.0076* 0.0039 
NAP II: Additional information to amended plan -0.0418*** -0.0056 -0.0267 0.0041 
NAP II: Acceptance -0.0192 0.0196** -0.0204 -0.0040 
NAP II: Rejection   -0.0032* -0.0064* 
EC announcement after its formal decision -0.1396* -0.0009 -0.0063 -0.0063 
NAP II: Withdrawal of a plan -0.0262* -0.0633*   
Phase III: Emissions caps 0.0644*** -0.0133 0.0090 0.0088 
Phase III: Auctioning rules   0.0145* 0.0132* 
Scope -0.0110 0.0011 -0.0056 -0.0112** 
Verification 2005 -0.0101 -0.0398   
Verification 2007   0.0401* 0.0395* 
Verification 2008   -0.0003 -0.0118 
Verification 2009   0.0210* 0.0180* 
Other announcements: UK   -0.0022 -0.0013 
Other announcements: Germany   -0.0028 -0.0042 
CITL – ITL linkage   0.0147 0.0167** 
CERs   0.0007 -0.0008 
COP/MOP -0.0024 -0.0045 -0.0013 -0.0019 
R-squared 4.06% 4.93% 0.82% 2.15% 
Adjusted R-squared 1.57% 2.46% -1.12% 0.24% 
 
*, **, *** refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
† indicates that although a price is quoted on the ECX, trading in these futures hasn’t started yet 
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Table 3.16 Univariate analysis: Bai-Perron structural breaks.  
This table reports the regression results of Equation 1. Only events with no same-day announcements are used 
for the analysis. The sample is split into three subsamples - (22/04/2005 - 26/12/2006), (27/12/2006 - 
21/06/2007) and (22/06/2007 - 30/06/2011) according to the Bai-Perron algorithm. The dependent variable is: 
1) log-return of nearest-to-expiry EUA futures contracts, 2) near-phase EUA futures. Robust Newey-West 
HAC standard errors are used.  
 Events 
Subsample 1 Subsample 2 Subsample 3 
Intraphase 
Re 
Interphase 
Re 
Intraphase 
Re  
Interphase 
Re 
Intraphase 
Re 
Interphase 
Re 
Intercept (Rne) -0.0018 0.0006 -0.0339* 0.0025 -0.0008 -0.0003 
NAP I: Additional information 0.0209* 0.0195*†     
NAP I: Acceptance  0.0567* 0.0533*†     
NAP I: Rejection  0.0000 -0.0192*†     
NAP II: Leaked information   -0.0019 -0.0047 0.0029 0.0020 0.0156* 0.0137* 
NAP II: Notification to the EC  0.0002 0.0047 0.0664 0.0154 -0.0298* -0.0304* 
NAP II: Additional information  -0.0135 -0.0043 -0.0069 -0.0119 -0.0035 -0.0178*** 
NAP II: Amended plan  -0.0204* -0.0093* 0.0703*** -0.0066 0.0075** 0.0039 
NAP II: Additional Information 
to amended plan    -0.0190 -0.0048 -0.0306 -0.0042 
NAP II: Acceptance    0.0114 0.0269* -0.0250*** -0.0046 
NAP II: Withdrawal of a plan  -0.0313* -0.0631*  -0.0025 -0.0033* -0.0064* 
EC announcement after its 
formal decision    -0.1127*  -0.0065 -0.0063 
Phase III: Emissions caps    0.0914** -0.0149 0.0089 0.0088 
Phase III: Auctioning rules      0.0143* 0.0132* 
Scope  0.0124 0.0015 -0.0837 -0.0010 -0.0057 -0.0112** 
Verification 2005  -0.0152 -0.0396     
Verification 2007        0.0399* 0.0395* 
Verification 2008      -0.0005 -0.0118 
Verification 2009       0.0208* 0.0180* 
Other announcements: UK      -0.0023 -0.0013 
Other announcements: Germany      -0.0030 -0.0042 
CITL – ITL linkage      0.0146 0.0166** 
CERs      0.0006 -0.0008 
COP/MOP  -0.0075 -0.0042   -0.0014 -0.0019 
R-squared 1.73% 4.98% 8.37% 6.93% 1.07% 2.27% 
Adjusted R-squared -0.86% 2.47% 1.20% -0.35% -0.78% 0.44% 
 
*, **, *** refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
† indicates that although a price is quoted on the ECX, trading in these futures hasn’t started yet 
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Table 3.17 Multivariate analysis: before and during the financial crisis.  
The table reports the regression results of Equation 1. Only events with no same-day announcements are used 
for the analysis. The sample is split into pre-crisis (22/04/2005 - 16/08/2007) and full-crisis (17/08/2007 - 
30/06/2011) subsamples. The dependent variable is: 1) log-return of nearest-to-expiry EUA futures contracts, 
2) near-phase EUA futures. Robust Newey-West HAC standard errors are used. 
Events 
Pre-crisis subsample Full-crisis subsample 
Intraphase 
Re  
Interphase 
Re  
Intraphase 
Re  
Interphase 
Re 
Intercept (Rne) -0.0074* 0.0007 0.0055 -0.0003 
Oil 0.3835* 0.1889** 0.3331*** 0.1555* 
Gas 0.1396* 0.0661* 0.2168** 0.0770* 
Equity -0.2714 -0.1051 -0.1675 0.2066* 
Cold 0.0119** 0.0060 -0.0182*** -0.0109** 
Hot 0.0089*** 0.0011 -0.0031 0.0053 
NAP I: Notification of additional information 0.0274* 0.0199*†   
NAP I: Acceptance 0.0509* 0.0494*†   
NAP I: Rejection 0.0178* -0.0136*†   
NAP II: Leaked information before formal 
submission to the EC -0.0006 -0.0048 0.0078 0.0128* 
NAP II: Notification to the EC 0.0039 0.0035 -0.0038 -0.0049 
NAP II: Notification of additional information -0.0188** -0.0081*** 0.0005 0.0030** 
NAP II: Notification of amended plan 0.0362 -0.0035 0.0067 0.0046* 
NAP II: Notification of additional information 
to amended plan -0.0394*** -0.0045 -0.0474 0.0013 
NAP II: Acceptance -0.0258 0.0164** -0.0293 -0.0041 
NAP II: Rejection   -0.0093*** -0.0070* 
EC announcement after its formal decision -0.1376* -0.0004 -0.0101 -0.0056 
NAP II: Withdrawal of a plan -0.0307* -0.0655*   
Phase III: Emissions caps 0.0704** -0.0104 -0.0008 0.0067 
Phase III: Auctioning rules   0.0066 0.0123* 
Scope -0.0112 0.0010 -0.0130 -0.0098** 
Verification 2005 -0.0079 -0.0387   
Verification 2007   0.0194** 0.0303* 
Verification 2008   -0.0039 -0.0092 
Verification 2009     0.0136* 0.0131* 
Other announcements: UK   -0.0019 0.0040 
Other announcements: Germany   -0.0101 -0.0064 
CITL – ITL linkage   -0.0272 0.0022 
CERs   -0.0082 -0.0014 
COP/MOP -0.0041 -0.0054 -0.0021 0.0033 
R-squared 7.30% 7.62% 0.44% 12.98% 
Adjusted R-squared 4.00% 4.34% -2.06% 10.80% 
 
*, **, *** refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
† indicates that although a price is quoted on the ECX, trading in these futures hasn’t started yet 
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Table 3.18 Multivariate analysis: Bai-Perron structural breaks.  
This table reports the regression results of Equation 1. Only events with no same-day announcements are used 
for the analysis. The sample is split into three subsamples - (22/04/2005 - 17/12/2006), (18/12/2006 - 
04/04/2007) and (05/04/2007 - 30/06/2011) according to the Bai-Perron algorithm. The dependent variable is: 
1) log-return of nearest-to-expiry EUA futures contracts, 2) near-phase EUA futures. Robust Newey-West 
HAC standard errors are used. 
  
Events 
Subsample 1         Subsample 2  Subsample 3 
Intraphase 
Re  
Interphase 
Re  
Intraphase 
Re  
Interphase 
Re  
Intraphase 
Re 
Interphase 
Re 
Intercept (Rne) -0.0022 0.0004 -0.0257*** 0.0017 -0.0020*** 0.0000 
Oil 0.2627* 0.1953** 1.2107** 0.1397 0.1643* 0.1602* 
Gas 0.0903* 0.0478* 0.7056* 0.2865* 0.1005** 0.0726* 
Equity -0.0871 -0.3901** -0.8380 0.3522 0.2867* 0.2141* 
Cold 0.0080*** 0.0059   -0.0099 -0.0112** 
Hot 0.0064 0.0040   0.0011 0.0022 
NAP I: Additional information  0.0218* 0.0203*†     
NAP I: Acceptance 0.0494* 0.0472*†     
NAP I: Rejection  0.0078** -0.0112*†     
NAP II: Leaked information -0.0032 -0.0062 0.0076 0.0056 0.0163* 0.0123* 
NAP II: Notification to the EC -0.0035 0.0029 0.0396 0.0162 0.0034 -0.0050*** 
NAP II: Additional information -0.0117 -0.0029 -0.0134 -0.0107 -0.0287 -0.0097 
NAP II: Amended plan -0.0127* -0.0035 0.0753 0.0029 0.0095* 0.0042* 
NAP II: Additional information 
to amended plan   -0.0130 0.0033 -0.0405 -0.0027 
NAP II: Acceptance   -0.0125 0.0200*** -0.0334*** -0.0002 
NAP II: Rejection     -0.0028** -0.0073* 
NAP II: Withdrawal  -0.0340* -0.0662*     
EC announcement after its 
formal decision     -0.0290 -0.0057 
Phase III: Emissions caps   0.1056** -0.0074 0.0081 0.0067 
Phase III: Auctioning rules     0.0151* 0.0122* 
Scope 0.0140 0.0010 -0.0416 0.0031 -0.0046 -0.0095** 
Verification 2005  -0.0134 -0.0389     
Verification 2007       0.0304* 0.0298* 
Verification 2008     0.0037 -0.0094 
Verification 2009       0.0159* 0.0125* 
Other announcements: UK     0.0054 0.0038 
Other announcements: Germany     -0.0050 -0.0067 
CITL – ITL linkage     -0.0032 0.0026 
CERs     0.0013 -0.0018 
COP/MOP -0.0087* -0.0042   0.0054 0.0031 
R-squared 4.51% 7.70% 28.79% 28.14% 5.84% 12.20% 
Adjusted R-squared 0.71% 4.03% 16.16% 15.40% 3.68% 10.19% 
 
*, **, *** refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
† indicates that although a price is quoted on the ECX, trading in these futures hasn’t started yet 
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CHAPTER 4 DOES CO2 EMISSIONS PERFORMANCE MATTER? 
EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
“…What is a concern from social perspective is not 
always a concern from financial perspective.” 
(Galema et al., 2008) 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Investors are becoming increasingly concerned with the non-financial aspects of a 
company’s behaviour, such as the impact of its operations and products on the 
environment. Investment management companies have launched funds with environmental 
remits in response to the growing demand for ethical and green businesses. There are so-
called dark green funds, such as Kames Capital Ethical Equity, which do not invest in 
companies whose activities are judged to be environmentally unsound or are “in energy 
intensive industries which are not tackling the issue of climate change”25. Europe’s 
commercial banks have also recognized the problem of climate change and have introduced 
policies to exert pressure on polluters which emit high levels of carbon into the 
atmosphere. HSBC, Standard Chartered, BNP Paribas and Credit Agricole have adopted 
new standards for the financing of coal-fired power plants, whereby dirty plants with 
emissions intensities above a certain threshold will not qualify for financing (Financial 
Times, 2011). Companies themselves have begun to implement measures to reduce their 
carbon footprint - from energy consumption savings to procurement of electricity for the 
firm’s own energy use from renewable sources. Some firms, National Grid being one !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Kames Capital Ethical Equity Fund,  <http://www.kamescapital.com/ethicalequity.aspx?taxID=252> 
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example26, even offer monetary rewards to executives and environmental managers for 
successful achievement of internally set up emissions reduction targets. As awareness of 
climate change has seemingly gained momentum in society at large, one could argue that 
the carbon performance of companies should become a standard component of investment 
analysis.  
The objective of this chapter is to assess whether the carbon performance of companies 
constitutes a source of value-relevant information for the financial market. I seek to answer 
a simple question - do firm-specific carbon emissions data convey valuable information to 
investors? My focus is the relationship between carbon emissions and stock performance 
for German and British publicly-traded companies regulated under the EU ETS. The 
change in financial performance is assessed through the stock price response upon the 
scheduled release of mandated emissions information.  I also test whether the data released 
at the annual verification events play a more important role for carbon-intensive companies 
such as electricity producers.  
In addition, the success of the ETS from a social perspective is considered. I evaluate the 
environmental effectiveness of the scheme by examining whether companies tend to de-
carbonize their operations following negative price reactions after the publication of their 
actual emissions. This issue is particularly relevant, especially in light of developments in 
the U.S. sulphur market which was briefly discussed in Section 3.6.1.1.B. Although the 
sulphur trading scheme was largely seen as a success from a financial perspective (the 
market was liquid and trading was active), regulatory authorities deemed the emissions 
reductions it achieved as insufficient to remedy the targeted environmental problem. As a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Carbon Disclosure Project, <www.cdproject.net> 
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consequence, regulatory standards governing sulphur emissions at a firm-level were 
introduced27, which led to a rapid decline in emissions trading and the de-facto demise of 
the scheme (Chan et al., 2012).   
As carbon emissions represent one dimension of the firm’s environmental performance, the 
contribution of this chapter is two-fold. It adds to the growing literature on the relationship 
between the environmental and financial performance of firms and it also adds to the scant 
firm-level analysis of the carbon market. I use a unique set of manually-collected data on 
the carbon performance of firms and document the impact of verified emissions publication 
on their returns in an event study framework. In addition, a panel data analysis is 
performed in order to identify the determinants of the observed market reactions on the 
event day.  By focusing on publicly-traded firms with various activities, I am able to 
document the impact of the ETS across industries. Since all covered companies are affected 
simultaneously by the publication of the emissions reports, event clustering is present in the 
data set. To prevent misstatements of the impact on the stock prices, a Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions (SUR) methodology is employed and event days are parameterised with 
dummy variables.  
Significant market reactions to the verified emissions data disclosures are found in only 
one out of the six verification events over the period 2005 -2011 which suggests that 
investors do not perceive carbon performance as important enough to be priced into firm 
valuations yet. The level of freely allocated allowances and actual emissions during the 
year are shown to be insignificant in explaining the observed stock price responses. I find 
some support for the hypothesis that the emissions reports lead to a stronger market !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 See footnote 24 in Section 3.6.1.1.B 
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reaction in companies with high carbon-intensive activities. No statistically significant 
proof is found that the market reacts differently towards environmental leaders and 
laggards upon disclosure of their carbon emissions data. Corporate carbon performance 
does not seem to be affected by the publication of emissions reports either. I conclude that, 
as it stands today, the EU ETS is not meeting the socially desirable objective of promoting 
the transition to a low-carbon economy. 
The relevant literature review is discussed in Section 4.2. The testable hypotheses are 
formulated in Section 4.3. The methodology is discussed in Section 4.4, followed by 
sample selection and data collection issues in Section 4.5. Discussion of the results and 
conclusions follow.  
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION  
There is a growing body of research on the relevance of corporate environmental 
performance for firm valuation. Some authors focus on short-term indicators of financial 
performance like changes in stock prices upon public provision of environmental data 
(Shane and Spicer, 1983; Khanna et al., 1998). Others link environmental disclosure and 
long-term financial performance by studying changes in the cost of equity capital (Clarkson 
et al., 2010; Plumlee et al., 2010). While the exact nature of the relationship between 
financial and environmental performance remains a bone of contention for academics, there 
is some evidence that integrating environmental information in the valuation process can 
positively impact investment returns. For example, eco-efficient stocks are found to 
outperform their less eco-efficient counterparts by 2 - 8% on an annualized basis, even 
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after adjusting for market risk, industry specifics and investment style (Derwall et al., 
2004). Also, there is a growing consensus on the increasing importance of environmental 
accounting disclosures (Blacconiere and Patten, 1994; Hamilton, 1995).  
Much of the recent research has focused on the value-relevance of voluntary environmental 
reporting. In spirit, however, this chapter is closer to studies which examine the impact of 
legislatively mandated environmental reports. Examples of such reports are the pollution-
level studies conducted by the Council of Economic Priorities (analysed by Shane and 
Spicer, 1983) and the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) reports (researched by Hamilton, 
1995; Konar and Cohen, 1997; Khanna et al., 1998). Hamilton (1995) examines the 
effectiveness of TRI reports as a regulatory tool. The author documents significant 
abnormal returns equivalent to an average loss in market value of $4.1 million on the day 
of the initial TRI data release in June 1989. Firms with a higher level of emissions, greater 
number of released pollutants and a larger workforce are found more likely to receive 
media coverage. For these firms, the abnormal losses are $6.2 million on the event day. 
With regards to the determinants of abnormal returns, Hamilton finds that investors 
respond to the number of pollutants released by a company (whereby, for an additional 
chemical, the market value of companies drops by an additional $230,000) rather than the 
actual levels of reported emissions. Unfortunately, Hamilton (1995) makes no correction 
for the cross-correlation between the residuals which is likely to arise due to the fact that 
TRI reports for several firms are published on the same day.  
Konar and Cohen (1997) focus on the effectiveness of TRI reports in altering corporate 
environmental behaviour. Firms which experience negative abnormal returns following the 
initial release of data in 1989 are found to subsequently reduce their emissions by more 
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than their competitors. Of the 40 firms whose market value declined in 1989, 32 firms 
(80%) had lower emissions than their competitors in 1992. Again, no correction for the 
cross-correlations in the data is made. Khanna et al. (1998) examine the impact of 6 
consecutive report publications on 91 publicly-traded U.S. firms in the chemical industry 
over the period 1989 – 1994. Negative price reactions are documented following 
deterioration of a company’s environmental performance relative to its own past 
performance or relative to competitors. The authors find firm size and R&D to be 
important determinants of the observed abnormal returns. No statistically significant 
reduction is found in the levels of waste generated by companies, thereby questioning the 
environmental effectiveness of the TRI. A shortcoming of the analysis is the use of 
absolute emissions rather than emissions intensity in the evaluation of environmental 
performance.  
4.2.2. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EU ETS COMPLIANCE 
To my knowledge, there is yet no published paper which examines the relationship 
between carbon emissions data and financial performance through the perspective of short-
term stock price reactions following repeat ETS report publications. Recent research has 
predominantly attempted to quantify the economic impact of the scheme on covered 
companies by analysing changes in their profitability. Since the onset of the cap-and-trade 
programme, there have been persistent debates about its consequences on firm 
competitiveness. Many worry that the unilateral nature of the scheme will undermine the 
competitiveness of European industries and lead to market share losses to their non-
regulated foreign counterparts. There are concerns that the net loser from the ETS will be 
firms in highly energy-intensive industries; firms with strong international competition 
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(and thus lesser ability to pass-through carbon costs to customers) and finally, firms which 
are not able to abate internally at a low cost (Oberndorfer and Rennings, 2007; Smale et al., 
2006). All of these issues have been examined extensively (Quirion and Demailly, 2006; 
Smale et al., 2006; Oberndorfer and Rennings, 2007; Alexeeva-Talebi and Anger, 2007; 
Anger and Oberndorfer, 2008; Grubb et al., 2009).  
Some of the studies are conducted at a sectoral level - for the European electricity industry 
(Neuhoff et al., 2006) for the cement (Quirion and Demailly, 2006) and for the iron and 
steel sectors (Demailly and Quirion, 2008). Only a modest negative impact on the 
competitiveness of these sectors is documented relative to a business-as-usual scenario (for 
a literature review of simulation-based studies, see Oberndorfer and Rennings, 2007). With 
regards to the impact of carbon regulation at the firm-level, in a study of 419 ETS-covered 
public and private German companies, Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) find no evidence that 
the different levels of freely allocated EUAs to verified emissions have affected firm 
profitability and employment. They attribute the results to generous allocations of 
allowances during Phase I and resulting weak compliance buying. Grubb et al. (2009) find 
evidence to the contrary and report that the impact of emissions trading on profitability 
depends on the relative allocation of grandfathered allowances. For 2,101 European firms 
over the period 2005-2008, Abrell et al. (2011) document a strong correlation between the 
amount of allowance allocations and the reduction effort. Companies which have received 
excess EUAs are shown to undertake less internal abatement relative to companies which 
received less allowances than their needs.  
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4.2.3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CO2 PRICES AND STOCK PRICES 
Several studies report a significant relationship between carbon prices and the stock prices 
of ETS-covered companies, particularly for power companies (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et 
al., 2009; Bushnell et al., 2009). While the scheme has had a limited impact on the cost 
structure of power companies because of generous free EUA allocations, electricity 
companies have overcompensated for the opportunity cost of carbon by raising electricity 
prices more than proportionately and earning regulatory rents (Smale et al., 2006; Bushnell 
et al., 2009). Because energy producers operate in generally isolated domestic markets, it 
makes it relatively easy for them to pass on the carbon costs to their customers. While there 
is no consensus over the exact role the electricity market structure plays in determining the 
degree of cost pass-through (Sijm et al., 2006; Smale et al., 2006; Zachmann and von 
Hirschhausen, 2008) there is strong evidence of electricity price increases to incorporate 
the price of carbon (Zachmann and von Hirschhausen, 2008; Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et 
al., 2009). For energy-intensive companies, this means that in addition to the direct costs of 
buying allowances and/or reducing their carbon footprint, they also have the indirect costs 
of higher electricity bills (Hoffmann, 2007). 
Oberndorfer (2009) models the returns of an equally-weighted portfolio made up of the 11 
largest publicly-traded European electricity producers as a function of the broad market, 
carbon, electricity and fuel prices. The author emphasizes the importance of using oil and 
gas as explanatory variables because of their dual role as price drivers for both energy 
stocks and carbon allowances. A time- and country-specific statistically significant positive 
association between the returns of power companies and carbon is reported. Veith et al. 
(2009) examine 22 large European electricity producers, not all of which are regulated by 
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the ETS, and confirm Oberndorfer’s (2009) conclusion that stock prices have been 
positively associated with carbon prices during Phase I. The returns of power companies 
are modelled as a function of the market portfolio and carbon only but the findings are 
shown to be robust to the addition of oil, gas, the electricity market structure and its 
regulatory framework as independent variables. However, the estimated positive 
correlation between the prices of power companies and carbon breaks down when the 
proportion of fossil electricity generation is accounted for.   
Lastly, Bushnell et al. (2009) relate the returns of carbon certificates and ETS-covered 
companies in an event study. The stock prices of 90 companies across various industries 
are examined following the sharp drop of the carbon price on April 25th, 2006 when 
information was leaked prior to the first official disclosure of emissions data by the EC. A 
statistically significant positive link between carbon prices and stock prices of covered 
entities is reported for both carbon-intensive companies as well as energy-intensive 
companies with little exposure to international trade. Abnormal returns are estimated as 
parameterized dummy coefficients in an ordinary least squares framework. The return-
generating model, however, employs the broad market as the only source of priced risk, 
possibly producing abnormal return estimates which may be driven by an omitted risk 
factor. 
4.3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The underlying assumption of this chapter is that carbon performance has significant 
implications for the valuation and future cash flows of ETS-covered companies. Several 
reasons can be put forward to justify this proposed association. These include, but are not 
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limited to, future environmental liabilities and abatement expenditures, concerns over 
negative publicity and adverse impact on the reputation of the firm, and the regulatory 
framework. 
First, compliance with the scheme presents a source of financial risk for covered 
companies. Regulated firms can choose to either abate internally or purchase allowances in 
the market. Both of these options are associated with cash outflows. Stringent emissions 
caps and a move away from grandfathering to auctioning of allowances from 2013 onwards 
imply that costs of compliance will go up, thereby increasing the operating costs for the 
business and lowering the expected profitability. Second, there are risks associated with 
potential changes in the set-up of the cap-and-trade programme. Uncertainty about the 
future regulatory and institutional framework undermines the signal embedded in carbon 
prices and fails to provide incentives for long-term investments in low-carbon technologies. 
Third, there is non-compliance risk which can be manifested as a financial loss28 or an 
intangible loss of credibility and reputation. Inability of firms to meet publicly 
communicated reduction targets may lead to increased criticism from environmental 
industry watchers and the alienation of environmentally-aware customers. 
In this chapter, I aim to test whether investors price carbon emissions into firm valuations. 
With no prior information about the amount of emissions which can be anticipated from 
individual firms29, 2005 is used as a benchmark year. Thus, expected emissions for the first 
ETS compliance event are taken to be equal to the amount of freely allocated allowances to 
every company. For the rest of the verification events, expected emissions are estimated as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 For a description of the monetary penalties for companies which fail to surrender EUAs corresponding to their actual 
emissions during the year, refer to Section 3.2.1.2 of Chapter 3.  
29 Prior to the launch of the EU ETS, any available carbon performance data was voluntarily disclosed and usually in a 
“soft”, non-monetary context. Actual emissions were rarely disclosed.   
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a projection of the actual emissions from the previous reporting period30 adjusted for 
changes in sales. Adjustments are made for the change in revenue to reflect higher (lower) 
emissions associated with expanding (shrinking) economic activity. The proposed model 
implicitly assumes that covered companies undertake the same internal abatement from one 
year to the next. Two alternative hypotheses related to investors’ reactions on the event day 
are tested. 
H1: Companies which emit less than what the market anticipates are associated with 
positive abnormal returns, and companies  which emit more are associated with negative 
abnormal returns. 
The rationale is that investors react to news about exactly how much a firm emits above or 
below expectations. The incremental information conveyed to the market on the event day 
is the unexpected level of emissions. Actual emissions below the level of expected 
emissions are viewed as good news and actual emissions in excess of anticipated emissions 
are seen as bad news by the market. Unanticipated excess allowances represent a profit 
component which needs to be factored into firm value while unanticipated shortages of 
EUAs are an unaccounted for cost component.  As allowances can be sold (bought) in the 
market for cash, they can represent an immediate cash inflow (outflow) for covered 
companies. Also, they can be banked (borrowed) for use in a later compliance period, 
creating an inter-temporal profile of benefits (costs).  
H2: Companies which were anticipated to be net short of allowances but ended up in a 
net long position experience positive abnormal returns, and vice versa 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 In cases where the number of installations which a firm is responsible for changes, this implies keeping the ratio of 
actual-to-allocated EUAs constant and multiplying it by the new amount of freely allocated allowances.!
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The underlying assumption is that investors react to unanticipated changes in the net 
position of companies rather than to discrepancies between the levels of actual and 
expected emissions. A negative price reaction is expected for companies which, contrary to 
prior belief, report a shortage of emissions certificates. Positive market reaction is 
anticipated for firms which are expected to be short of allowances but in reality end up on 
the long side. The rationale is that even if a company exceeds expected emissions levels, if 
the firm’s net overall position doesn’t change, no incremental information is contained in 
the emissions data release. The expectations are summarized graphically in Figure 4.1 
below.  
Figure 4.1 Investor reactions upon unforeseen changes in a firm’s net position 
This figure graphically depicts the expectations of the investors’ reactions at the news of unanticipated 
changes in the firm’s net position. Net position is defined as the difference between freely allocated 
allowances and verified emissions.  
   
Actual net position 
   
Short Long 
Expected net position Short No news Good news 
Long Bad news No news 
 
 
Both Hypotheses 1 and 2 are based on the premise that the release of verified emissions 
data constitutes news to the market. Because a firm’s EUA position can be measured in 
monetary terms, annual compliance events should enable market participants to adjust their 
assessment of firm values. And because data on the actual emissions of these companies is 
released only at the time of the emissions report publications, these should constitute 
market-moving events. If, however, information about the emissions of a certain company 
is leaked prior to the formal report publication, the event will no longer represent a true 
shock to the market and the observed stock price reaction will be understated. Testing for 
information leakage and significant price moves on the days surrounding report 
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publications represents an opportunity for future research. A second caveat to the analysis 
presented in this chapter is the model used to describe investors’ expectation formation 
processes. Although I propose two alternative models of possible behaviour, I acknowledge 
that the approach investors take in forming expectations about a firm’s emissions level may 
significantly differ from my assumptions. Therefore, the results and conclusions reported in 
this chapter are entirely conditional upon the validity of the employed expectation 
formation processes and the degree to which they reflect actual investment behaviour.  
Proceeding with the testable hypotheses, I also argue that the association between firm 
value and emissions performance is stronger for companies in carbon-intensive industries. 
H3: The incremental information contained in ETS reports plays a more important role 
for companies in carbon-intensive industries.  
The EU ETS has a differential impact on covered entities whereby firms in industries with 
low reduction targets and/or generous allocations of free EUAs are favoured by the scheme 
while firms in sectors with tight reduction targets and/or small amounts of freely granted 
EUAs are at a disadvantage (Anger and Oberndorfer, 2008). Carbon-intensive companies 
bear considerable financial risks, particularly in the context of tightening emissions targets 
and rising EUA prices. For these companies, future liabilities associated with ETS 
compliance might meaningfully affect investment returns. For less carbon-intensive 
industries where carbon performance is not a key company consideration, market 
participants may be less concerned with the ETS data. This hypothesis is in line with 
Derwall et al. (2004) who report smaller eco-efficiency premia for stocks of firms in 
environmentally-sensitive industries over those in not so sensitive industries. They 
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rationalize this by suggesting that in environmentally-sensitive industries “eco-efficiency is 
arguably a significant driver of future corporate performance” (p.16) so investors are more 
likely to incorporate the information in their valuations. 
H4: Market reactions are positively associated with the amount of freely allocated 
allowances and negatively associated with the amount of actual emissions 
A positive association is expected between the stock price reaction and the amount of 
freely allocated allowances, as these represent an asset on the company’s balance sheet. As 
already discussed, firms can sell the certificates in the market realising immediate financial 
gains or use them for compliance purposes, avoiding the need to buy EUAs at a later time. 
The expected relationship between verified emissions and abnormal returns is negative. As 
a firm’s actual emissions increase, it must purchase allowances in the open market or 
borrow inter-temporally from its following year allocations. The net position of the 
company and the allocation factor are also used to explain the observed market reactions on 
the event day. The firm’s net position is estimated as the difference between allocated and 
actual emissions and the allocation factor is estimated as their ratio (Anger and 
Oberndorfer, 2008; Abrell et al., 2011). Both of these measures describe whether a firm 
emits within its freely granted quota. The rationale for using them is that from the 
perspective of the financial markets, what is important is how much a covered company is 
net long or short. A positive relationship between the stock price response and the 
allocation factor (net position) is hypothesized.  
In the last part of the analysis, the focus is on the social utility of the ETS. As noted by 
Point Carbon (2010), “[…] a regulatory market such as the EU ETS cannot remain 
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politically viable unless companies are shown to reduce their GHG emissions” (p.4). The 
history of the Unites States’ sulphur emissions trading scheme is a testament to this view. 
H5: Negative abnormal returns lead companies to improve their carbon performance 
I test whether firms which experience negative returns following the release of verified 
emissions data tend to reduce their emissions intensity in the following year. The objective 
is to provide empirical evidence on whether the EU ETS has the intended economic and 
social effects of incentivizing companies to abate internally. Emissions intensity is selected 
as a measure of carbon performance over the alternative of absolute emissions. Some 
companies open new installations and close existing ones over time and a change in the 
overall level of emissions may not necessarily reflect an improvement or deterioration in 
the carbon performance of a company. Also, by default large firms emit more than small 
firms in any given industry due to the sheer volume of their operations. By scaling carbon 
emissions by net sales, companies of different size are levelled.  
H6: Disclosure of verified emissions data induces negative abnormal returns in carbon 
laggards and positive abnormal returns in carbon leaders  
I also test whether share price incentives exist for covered companies to alter their carbon 
performance. If the ETS is an effective environmental policy, a differentiated market 
reaction is expected for firms which continue to pollute at the same rates and firms which 
seek to decrease the carbon emissions from their installations. While companies in 
environmentally-sensitive industries tend to be among the biggest CO2 emitters (see Table 
4.3 in Section 4.6), firm valuations should be conditioned on the firm’s abatement efforts. 
Increasing emissions intensity signals higher future costs of compliance and, possibly, a 
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loss of competitiveness. Decreasing emissions intensity positions firms better in the eyes of 
the shareholders, regulators, and society as a whole. Carbon leaders are defined as those 
companies which decrease the emissions intensity of their operations, and carbon laggards 
as those which increase it. The hypothesis is that the financial market rewards the former 
and punishes the latter.  
4.4. METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1. EVENT STUDY SET-UP 
According to the market efficiency hypothesis, prices instantaneously incorporate new 
information as it becomes available. Thus, at any time market prices reflect asset fair 
values. While event studies are a common technique employed in the finance literature, 
there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to the design of the study. The dataset in this 
chapter is afflicted with event clustering because the report publications take place at the 
same calendar time for all firms. This suggests that cross-sectional dependence in the 
individual firm error terms may be present. It is well-documented in return-based studies 
that problems in inference exist when the data are cross-sectionally dependent (Bernard, 
1987).  
Traditional event study methods, such as OLS regression, are based on the premise of 
independently and identically distributed residuals. Violations of the underlying 
assumptions lead to misstatements of the standard errors and possibly incorrect inferences 
in hypotheses tests. To deal with the issue of contemporaneously correlated firm error 
terms, some researchers have chosen to combine firms in a portfolio and use portfolio 
returns in their event studies (e.g. Blacconiere and Patten, 1994). This approach is not 
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practical for the purposes of this chapter as the aim is to identify cross-sectional differences 
in market reactions associated with firm-specific characteristics of the regulated entities. 
Bernard (1987) identifies several approaches for dealing with cross-sectional dependence, 
among which I select Zellner’s (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) as the most 
suited for this analysis. The SUR technique has been used in several studies of regulatory 
change and its impact on asset prices (Binder, 1985a,b; Schipper and Thompson, 1983, 
1985; Sefcik and Thompson, 1986; Brown et al., 2004; Betzer et al., 2011). 
The number of time series observations and the calendar time frames are identical for all 
firms analysed here. The system of stacked equations for British and German companies is 
estimated jointly as seemingly unrelated regressions. The return-generating model for UK 
companies is:  
!!!! ! !! ! !!!!!!"#$!! ! !!!!!!"#!! ! !!!!!!"#$%&'$'%(!! ! !!!!!!"#$%!! ! !!! !!"!!!! ! !!!!  (1) 
The return-generating model for German companies is:  
!!!! ! !! ! !!!!!!"#!! ! !!!!!!"#!! ! !!!!!!"#$%&'$'%(!! ! !!!!!!"#$%!! ! !!! !!"!!!! ! !!!!   (2) 
where t refers to the time period !!!! is the continuously compounded return of firm i (i = 1,…, N) at time t  !!"#$!!/!!"#!!!!!"#!!  /!!"#$%&$'%(!!!!!"#$%!!   is the continuously compounded return at 
time t of FTSE All Share/DAX30/carbon/electricity/exchange rates as defined in Table 4.1 
of Section 4.5.4.  
The dummy variable !!!! takes on the value of 1 for each of the annual verification events 
and 0 otherwise. Thus, the return-generating process is conditioned on the occurrence or 
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non-occurrence of the verification event.  !!!  is the abnormal return experienced by 
company i over each verification event a=1,..,A. Two event windows are used. For the 
shorter event window, (0; +1), the event dummy variable takes on the value of 1 on the day 
of actual verified emissions data publication as well as the following day. For the longer 
window, (-1; +3), the event is defined as the time period from the day preceding the official 
data release to the third day (including) after the report publication.  
The standard assumptions of the SUR model require the residuals to be independently and 
identically distributed over time for a specific company. Unlike the strict assumptions of 
classical OLS analysis, the residuals are allowed to be contemporaneously correlated 
(E[!it!jt] "0) and to have different variances across equations (E[!it2]= "i2 " E[!jt2] = "j2) 
(Wooldridge, 2002). In his work on the SUR methodology, Zellner (1962) uses the Wald 
test for inference testing. Therefore, the significance of the abnormal return estimates for a 
given event a=1, ..., A is assessed against the null hypothesis that !!! ! !!! ! ! ! !!! = 0 
for firms i = 1, 2, …, N. Average abnormal return (AAR) for verification event a (a = 1,…, 
A) is calculated as the arithmetic mean of firm-specific abnormal returns for that event:   
                                                   !!!"!!! ! !!!!!!!!                                                              (3) 
With regards to the selection of regressors for the SUR model, I follow Galema et al. 
(2008) in my decision not to use a Fama-French-Carhart model. The authors demonstrate 
that in the context of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) event study such a model is 
inappropriate as it relies on risk premia which are directly affected by the level of CSR. 
Galema et al. (2008) document a trade-off between the financial and socially responsible 
investment (SRI) performance of a company, partly captured by the book-to-market ratio. 
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The authors report that socially responsible firms tend to be more growth-oriented than 
their competitors, which accordingly affects their returns. With carbon emissions 
representing an aspect of a firm’s environmental performance, to avoid any potential 
growth biases in case some firms use their carbon performance as a part of a SRI strategy 
in addition to ETS compliance, I decide against using the Fama-French model. As a 
robustness check, in Section 4.6 of this chapter Equations 1 and 2 are re-run with both firm 
size and value premia added as explanatory variables.  
4.4.2. SOURCES OF ABNORMAL RETURNS 
Having estimated abnormal returns through the SUR framework discussed above, I attempt 
to identify their sources. Panel data analysis allows me to capture the heterogeneity of 
firms with regards to the number of regulated installations they manage, their endowment 
of free EUAs and their actual emission levels. In order to link these firm-specific features 
to the presence of abnormal returns on the event days, I estimate the following models:  
!"!! ! ! ! !!!""#$%&'(!! ! !!!"#$%&&%$'("#!! ! !!!"#$%&!! ! !! !!!! ! !! ! !!!        (4)                                                     
!"!! ! ! ! !!!"#$%$"&!! ! !!!"#$%&&%$'("#!! ! !!!"#$%&!! ! !! !!!! ! !! ! !!!           (5) 
!"!! ! ! ! !!!!""#$%&'( ! !"#$%$"&!!! ! !!!"#$%&&%$'("#!! ! !!!"#$%&!! ! !! !!!! !!! ! !!!                                                                          (6) 
!"!! ! ! ! !! !""#$%&'(!"#$%$"& !! ! !!!"#$%&&%$'("#!! ! !!!"#$%&!! ! !! !!!! ! !! ! !!!            (7) 
where !"!!  is the abnormal return estimate (!!! ) for company i (i = 1,…, N) during 
verification event a (a = 1,…, A); 
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Allocated and Verified refers to the amount of freely allocated and actual emissions published 
for company i (i = 1,…, N) during event a (a = 1,…, A); 
Installations refers to the number of covered installations a company is responsible for; 
MktCap and D/E are, respectively, the market capitalization and debt-to-equity ratio of 
company i; 
 ! refers to industry, country and time effects.  
Large well-known companies tend to attract more investor interest and media coverage 
(Hamilton, 1995; Khanna et al., 1998). For instance, a “Dirty Thirty” index has been 
created to name and shame Europe’s biggest polluters in terms of carbon emissions 
intensity. Firm size is accounted for by including the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization as a control variable. To control for the possible impact of industrial 
affiliation, I include industry dummy variables in the panel analysis. There are fundamental 
differences between the European member states covered by the ETS across several 
dimensions - emission reduction targets under the scheme, the energy intensity of GDP and 
the carbon intensity of energy (Zachmann and von Hirschhausen, 2008; Sinclair, 2011). 
The heterogeneity across countries is accounted for by including a dummy variable to 
represent the two countries. Similar to Khanna et al. (1998), I control for the riskiness of 
the individual firms by using the Debt-to-Equity ratio as an independent variable. A 
detailed description of the variables can be found in Table 4.1 in Section 4.5.4.  
There are several potential problems with the error terms of Equations 4 to 7. The errors of 
firms at any given time may be correlated, for example, if the firms belong to the same 
industry.  The possibility of spatial dependence between a firm’s error terms cannot be 
ignored either. It is very likely that a firm’s balance between actual and verified EUAs in 
one year affects the balance in the following year, i.e. the residual for a firm i during event 
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a is likely to be correlated with the residual for the same firm during event a+1. Spatial 
dependence in the error terms may arise because firm-specific characteristics tend to be 
interdependent over time. For example, the emissions intensity of the firm’s operations 
remains fairly constant over time. To ensure the validity of the statistical inferences, robust 
standard errors adjusted for the clustering of individual firms are used. As an additional 
check, I perform Driscoll-Kraay (1998) adjustments to the standard errors and re-estimate 
the associated p-values. The method requires the estimation of a pooled OLS and adjusts 
the nonparametric time series covariance matrix estimator. Thus, “a Newey-West type 
correction to the sequence of cross sectional averages of the moment conditions” is applied 
(Hoechle, 2007).  
4.4.3. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EU ETS 
To test Hypothesis 5, a logistic regression is employed whereby the change in emissions 
intensity is modelled as a function of abnormal returns on the prior year’s report 
publication. The estimated model takes on the following form:  
           !!!"#$"%&#'!! ! !! !!!"!! !! ! ! ! !!!                                       (8) 
where # Intensity is the change in intensity measured over the period between verification 
events a-1 and a. It is coded as a binary variable, taking on the value of 1 for intensity 
reductions and 0 for intensity increases;  
ARi,a-1 is the abnormal return estimate for firm i (i = 1,…, N) during event a-1 (a = 2,…, A); 
 ! denotes industry, country and time effects.A statistically significant negative regression 
coefficient of the abnormal returns variable will suggest that companies which experience a 
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negative market response following the release of their emissions tend to improve their 
carbon performance in the following year by reducing their emissions intensity.  
To test Hypothesis 6, a pooled OLS in the following form is estimated:  
          !!"!! !! !! !!!!"#$"%&#'!! ! ! ! !!!!                                      (9) 
where # Intensity is the actual percentage change in intensity measured over the period 
between verification events a-1 and a. ARi,a  is the abnormal return estimate for company i (i 
= 1,…, N) during event a (a = 1,…, A). 
A statistically significant regression coefficient of the # Intensity variable suggests that the 
market response on the event day is conditioned on the change in corporate carbon 
performance.   
A potential endogeneity issue needs to be acknowledged with regard to Equations 8 and 9 
where event returns and emissions intensity are used interchangeably as independent and 
explanatory variables. Because Equation 9 uses a lagged estimate of emissions intensity 
and relies on a different estimation methodology (pooled OLS versus the logistic regression 
used in Equation 8), endogeneity is not explicitly accounted for in the regressions. Further 
work is certainly needed in order to establish the direction of causation between carbon 
performance and market reactions, and future research may explore this issue by 
employing co-integration models.  
4.5. DATA  
4.5.1. THE COMMUNITY INDEPENDENT TRANSACTION LOG (CITL) 
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Public access to government information about firm-specific environmental performance 
can empower market participants, spur public debate and provoke investor action (Jobe, 
1999). As discussed in Section 3.2.1.2 of Chapter 3, under the EU ETS there is a 
mandatory requirement for covered installations to provide information about their 
allocated and actual emissions for every calendar year. The community system of registries 
which contains all this information was set up to handle the purely administrative aspects 
of the ETS and to “ensure that the issue, transfer and cancellation of allowances does not 
involve irregularities and that transactions are compatible with the obligations resulting 
from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 
Kyoto protocol”31. Each Member State has a national registry which contains information 
on all of the regulated installations, their allocated allowances and actual emissions as well 
as the units surrendered for compliance purposes. All of the national registries are 
connected to a central European registry, the EC-run Community Independent Transaction 
Log (CITL). Unlike voluntarily disclosed data, all the information which firms provide to 
the EC about their actual carbon emissions throughout the year has to be checked by an 
independent verifier. Verified emissions data is posted on the CITL website in April/May 
of each year. Thus, the registry provides the ideal setting to examine the willingness of 
financial markets to incorporate carbon performance in the valuation of covered 
companies. 
Several shortcomings of the data available on the CITL database have been identified in 
prior literature. First, ex-post corrections to the information from the national registries 
may not be reflected in the CITL. Second, not all relevant information is included in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004 of 21 December 2004 for a standardized and secured system of registries 
pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 280/2004/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council 
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database i.e. Phase I lacked information on the EUA reserves created for new industry 
entrants32; there is still no clarity about the exact nature of the covered installation’s 
activity (Trotignon and Delbosc, 2008). A key piece of information missing from the 
registry is the fines, if any, and their amounts, imposed on those companies which have 
failed to report their verified emissions on time and those which have failed to supply 
enough allowances to cover their actual emissions. The most serious flaw in the CITL 
database remains, however, the format of the presented data. Within the EU ETS 
framework, carbon reporting is carried out at installation-level rather than at firm-level and 
the registry contains virtually no data on the identity of the parent company. This 
considerably reduces the transparency of the data and undermines the ability of investors to 
easily and quickly assess company performance.  
4.5.2. SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION 
All installations whose carbon emissions are covered by the ETS are grouped together by 
parent company. In order to determine the ultimate ownership of the installation, all 
facilities were manually checked against the Nexis database (including the Directory of 
Corporate Affiliations and the Extel cards database). Firm data is constructed by 
accounting for installations in which the company has a substantial interest i.e. it owns 50% 
or more of the installation. Thus, JVs and minority interests in installations are removed 
from the analysis. When a change in ownership is identified, a simple arithmetic rule is 
applied to calculate the amount of allocated EUAs or the number of installations covered 
by a company. For example, if RWE acquires an installation via M&A activity in February !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 New Entrants Reserves (NERs) for Phase I were not incorporated in the CITL data, leading to a biased estimate of a 
given installation’s compliance. This left market participants unable to assess the net position of each installation, as 
deficits would appear larger without the adjustment for NERs (Trotignon and Delbosc, 2008) 
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of a given year, the amount of allocated EUAs attributed to RWE from that installation 
alone is estimated as 10/12*(annual allocated EUAs for the installation). Similarly, RWE 
will be considered to have an additional 0.83 (rather than 1) installation during the year of 
acquisition. It is also worth noting that not all of the installations which a company is 
responsible for are located in the company’s home country. For instance, Diageo has 
distilleries covered by the EU ETS which are located in Ireland. For the purposes of this 
chapter, all covered installations which a company owns are counted regardless of their 
geographical location. Similarly, allocated and verified EUAs are added up across all 
installations for which a company is responsible.  
Following an in-depth analysis of the CITL data, installations were linked to 50 publicly -
traded companies in the United Kingdom33 and 46 in Germany. The initial dataset is    
limited to firms meeting the following criteria:  
1. Listing requirements - to be included in the analysis, a firm must be publicly traded 
throughout the entire time period under investigation, January 2006 – November 
2011. As a result, 8 companies are discarded – 5 from the German subsample and 3 
from the British subsample.  
2. Liquidity requirements – to minimize biases arising from thin trading, I remove 
companies in which no trading takes place more than 40% of the time, excluding 
official exchange holidays. 10 additional firms are eliminated – 5 in each of the two 
countries.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Royal Dutch Shell is considered a UK company as their country of incorporation is the United Kingdom and a 
substantial part of their activities take place there!
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In addition, another UK company is removed from the dataset as it files for receivership 
and stops trading actively in 2009. The final sample contains 41 British and 36 German 
publicly-traded companies. The full list of included companies and their industrial 
affiliations can be found in Appendix 4A. For each of the verification events, a smaller 
sample is used as confounding announcements are controlled for in the 5 days surrounding 
the emissions data release. Confounding events are defined as earnings announcements and 
publications of either interim financial statements or annual reports.  
4.5.3. EVENT DAYS 
The events analysed in this study take place on the following dates: 
! 25 April 2006 (VER2005a) – information is published by EU Member States before the 
officially scheduled release of data by the European Commission. France, the 
Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Spain all leaked information on the level 
of verified emissions for the calendar year 2005. 
! 15 May 2006 (VER2005b) – official release of data by the EC. The UK and Germany 
release information on the levels of verified emissions for the first time.  
! 2 April 2007 (VER2006) – data on verified emissions in 2006 is published by the EC 
! 2 April 2008 (VER2007) – data on verified emissions in 2007 is published by the EC 
! 1 April 2009 (VER2008) – data on verified emissions in 2008 is published by the EC 
! 1 April 2010 (VER2009) – data on verified emissions in 2009 is published by the EC 
! 1 April 2011 (VER2010) – data on verified emissions in 2010 is published by the EC 
4.5.4. RETURN-GENERATING MODELS FOR GERMAN AND BRITISH COMPANIES 
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As discussed in Section 4.4.1, the returns of the sample companies are modelled as a 
function of the market portfolio, carbon, electricity and the foreign exchange rate. In their 
work on multi-country event study methods, Campbell et al. (2009) demonstrate that 
market-adjusted and market-model methodologies with local market indices are sufficient 
to produce well-specified inference tests on the significance of the market response on the 
event day. Following Campbell et al. (2009), I use the FTSE All Share Index as a proxy for 
the UK market and the DAX index as a proxy for the German market.  
Electricity is selected as a priced risk factor because both energy producers and consumers 
are sensitive to changes in electricity prices, albeit in a different fashion and to a different 
extent. The choice of electricity price series is challenging because there is no common 
market for electricity in the EU. The spot price of the Phelix Month Base contracts traded 
on the European Energy Exchange is selected as a proxy for German electricity prices 
(following Veith et al., 2009; Oberndorfer, 2009) and the spot price of contracts traded on 
the Amsterdam Power Exchange UK (APX UK)  as representative of the UK power 
prices34.  
To ensure that changes in firm value on the event day are not driven by carbon price 
movements or currency fluctuations, I add the continuously compounded returns of EUA 
futures contracts and the returns on the spot exchange rate as independent variables. The 
exchange rate reflects relative movements between the Pound and the Euro, whereby a 
positive return signals an appreciation of the Pound/devaluation of the Euro. Detailed 
description of all the variables and the sources of data are presented in Table 4.1.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 APX-ENDEX acquired UK Power exchange, one of the three main power platforms in the United Kingdom, in 2000 
and renames it to APX Power UK. Given its size, the spot electricity prices on the APX UK are considered as 
representative of UK prices. <www.apxendex.com> 
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Table 4.1 Description of the variables and data sources 
Variable Description and Data source 
Electricity Electricity prices from the Amsterdam Power Exchange are selected as 
representative for the UK market. Spot prices are quoted in Pounds per Megawatt 
hour (Mwh). Electricity prices from the European Energy Exchange are used for 
the German market. Spot prices of the Phelix Month Base contracts are 
denominated in Euro per Mwh. 
Source: Datastream 
Local Market Index The FTSE All Share index is used as a proxy for the market potfolio in the United 
Kingdom. DAX30 is used as a local market index in Germany.  
Source: Datastream 
EUA Nearest to expiration December futures contracts traded on the European Climate 
Exchange are used to estimate returns on carbon allowances.  
Source: The ICE official website, www.theice.com 
FOREX The Thomson Reuters daily spot exchange rate of Pound Sterling to Euro is used.  
Source: Datastream  
Stock prices  Stock prices adjusted for capital events (P) like stock splits are used.   
Source: Datastream 
Market Capitalization 
(“MktCap”) 
Market capitalization (WC08001) is calculated as the market price at fiscal year-
end multiplied by the amount of common shares outstanding. It is measured in 
thousands.  
Source: Worldscope Database in Datastream 
Installations The number of installations which a company is responsible for under the EU ETS. 
Only installations in which a company has a controlling interest are considered. 
Verified EUAs 
(“Verified”)  
Actual carbon emissions over the year are measured in millions.  
 
Allocated EUAs  
(“Allocated”)  
Allocated carbon allowances for the year are measured in millions. 
 
Net Position  The difference between allocated EUAs and actual emissions over a given calendar 
year. The net position is measured in millions of allowances.  
Allocation Factor The ratio of freely allocated EUAs to the actual emissions over a given calendar 
year.  
Debt -to-Common 
Equity (“D/E”) 
 (Long Term Debt + Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long Term Debt) / 
Common Equity * 100 
Source: Worldscope Database 
Industry The variable “Industry” represents a firm’s industrial affiliation. It is assessed 
using Datastream Level 2 industry classification, which is based on the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) jointly established by the FTSE and Dow Jones. 
Level 2 industry levels divide the total market into 10 industries and cover all 
sectors within each group in each country.  
Source: Datastream Global Equity Indices 
Emissions Intensity Actual carbon emissions divided by the Net Revenue for a given year. !!
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4.6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics of the companies in the dataset are summarised in Table 4.2. The 
companies vary widely in size and riskiness (as evidenced by the large standard deviations 
of market capitalization and the debt-to-equity ratio). Over the 5-year period from 2006 
until 2010, the average firm was over-allocated emissions certificates. The excess of freely 
allocated EUAs to the actual needs of the business ranged from an average of 17% in 2006 
to 46% in 2009. The other point worth noting is the tendency towards a decrease in the 
average emissions intensity of companies over time. It remains unclear whether the 
observed intensity reductions are the result of compliance with the EU ETS. The return 
time series of all dependent and independent variables used in the analysis are tested for 
unit roots with an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test.   
Table 4.2 Firm characteristics  
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the firms included in the sample over the period January 2006 
– December 2010. The reported values are the arithmetic means of each indicator for any given year. 
Standard deviations are presented in italics.  
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Capitalization (in mln #) 21500 24400 16000 17800 20600 
 
33000 35200 25700 26700 29700 
Debt-to-Equity 1.23 1.16 1.22 2.67 1.13 
 
2.21 2.03 1.75 11.13 2.07 
EBITDA (in mln #) 4128 4182 3583 3138 3945 
 
7332 6950 5875 5055 6096 
Allocated EUAs (in 000) 5481 5593 3862 3872 3952 
 
19569 19745 12153 12129 12336 
Verified emissions (in 000) 5973 6119 5260 4692 5000 
 
21780 22147 19980 17607 18439 
Allocation factor 1.17 1.33 1.19 1.46 1.37 
 
0.50 0.78 0.56 1.12 0.83 
Installations 9 9 9 9 9 
 
17 17 17 18 17 
Emissions intensity 0.53 0.52 0.35 0.37 0.37 
 
2.09 2.24 1.52 1.61 1.63 
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As seen from Table 4.3 below, the two industries with the biggest representation in the 
sample are Consumer Goods and Industrials (accounting for 25% and 23% of all firms, 
respectively). However, these industries do not play a critical role for the ETS – they 
receive small amounts of free carbon certificates and jointly emit less than 5% of all the 
carbon released by the firms in the dataset. Utilities, on the other hand, are granted 60% 
(71%) of all free carbon allowances in Phase II (I) of the scheme and are responsible for 
72% (75%) of the actual emissions for the respective period. As reported by the carbon 
pressure group Sandbag, RWE35 and E.on have been the two companies most short of 
permits in the ETS, and together they had to abate internally or purchase allowances for 
more equivalent emissions reductions than the net reductions of the scheme as a whole 
(Sandbag, 2010).  
The second largest emitter is the Oil and Gas industry, represented by only 5 firms, all of 
which are located in the UK. The allocation of EUAs in the sample of firms appears to be 
representative of the population of firms, public and private, covered by the EU ETS. The 
number of firms from each industry represented in the sample and their allocated EUAs is 
in line with what Trotignon and Delbosc (2008) call “allowance concentration” in the 
market. In their analysis of the CITL data over the first trading period of the cap-and-trade 
programme, they find that the largest company in terms of freely allocated EUAs received 
6% of total allowances; the first 10 companies possessed a third of all the allowances and 
the first 100 held about 75% of all available allowances (Trotignon and Delbosc, 2008). 
Thus, the EU ETS appears to be dominated by the actions of a few large power companies.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 According to the Dirty Thirty ranking of Europe’s dirtiest power stations, 4 out of the top 10 biggest emitters in 2005 
were owned by RWE. The company was responsible for 4 out of the 7 dirtiest plants in both 2008 and 2009. 
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Table 4.3 Distribution of sample companies across industries 
This table reports the distribution of publicly-traded British and German companies with installations covered 
by the EU ETS across industries. Emissions certificates granted for free to any given industry over the 
different trading periods are calculated as the sum of all EUAs allocated to companies in that industry. 
Allocated allowances for each industry are presented as a percentage of all allowances received by the firms 
in the dataset. Actual emissions for each industry are estimated and reported in a similar fashion.  
 
Industry GER UK Industry as % of total 
Allocated EUAs as % 
of total sample 
Verified CO2 as % 
of total sample 
Consumer goods 10 9 24.68% Phase I: 1.08% Phase I: 0.92% Phase II: 1.46% Phase II: 1.07% 
Industrials 10 8 23.38% Phase I: 4.76% Phase I: 3.81% 
Phase II: 6.66% Phase II: 3.84% 
Basic materials 7 6 16.88% Phase I: 3.76% Phase I: 3.34% 
Phase II: 6.85% Phase II: 4.34% 
Utilities 4 7 14.29% Phase I: 71.61% Phase I: 75.84% 
Phase II: 60.33% Phase II: 72.00% 
Oil & Gas 0 5 6.49% Phase I: 18.32% Phase I: 15.76% 
Phase II: 24.10% Phase II: 18.42% 
Healthcare 3 3 7.79% Phase I: 0.41% Phase I: 0.29% 
Phase II: 0.53% Phase II: 0.28% 
Technology 2 1 3.90% Phase I: 0.05% Phase I: 0.03% 
Phase II: 0.04% Phase II: 0.03% 
Tele-
communications 0 1 1.30% 
Phase I: 0.01% Phase I: 0.01% 
Phase II: 0.01% Phase II: 0.01% 
Financials 0 1 1.30% Phase I: 0.00% Phase I: 0.00% 
Phase II: 0.02% Phase II: 0.01% 
 
4.6.1. INVESTOR REACTIONS TO UNANTICIPATED CHANGES IN THE LEVELS OF 
ACTUAL EMISSIONS  
All individual abnormal returns estimated from Equations 1 and 2 are reported in Appendix 
4B. The significance of the regression coefficients is confirmed with a Wald test. For 
brevity, the regression output for each company is not reported here. Some of the results, 
however, are worth noting. In line with Oberndorfer (2009), Veith et al. (2009) and 
Bushnell et al. (2009) a positive association (significant for the majority of firms) is found 
between the returns of electricity producers and emission allowances. The positive slope 
coefficient of the carbon variable in explaining returns of companies in the Utilities and Oil 
and Gas industries implies that EUAs are largely seen as an asset by these firms. On the 
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other hand, carbon allowances are seen as a production cost by firms in the Basic materials, 
Industrials and Consumer goods industries as evidenced by the negative coefficient of 
carbon.  
Because both the UK and Germany did not release their actual emissions until May 15th, 
2006, the majority of firms did not react to the leaked information by other EU Member 
States in late April 2006. Therefore, the “Ver2005a” event is discarded from the panel data 
and the analysis focuses on abnormal returns generated at the official release date only (i.e. 
“Ver2005b”). In the whole sample only 4 (7) firms experience significant abnormal returns 
in 2005 over the short (long) event window; only 1(0) in 2006; 2 (4) in 2007; 23 (24) in 
2008; none in 2009; and lastly, just 1 (0) in 2010. Average abnormal returns (AARs) are 
calculated separately for companies which experience good and bad news as specified in 
Hypothesis 1. The results are reported in Table 4.4. 
Contrary to expectations, no statistically significant market reactions are associated with 
the compliance events, except for the 2008 verified data release. The prevailing lack of 
significant price effects implies that the annual compliance event does not lead investors to 
re-assess the future cash flows associated with the company by making an allowance for 
greater/lower environmental compliance costs and/or windfall profits than previously 
anticipated. One alternative explanation is that the return-generating models for German 
and British companies would be flawed and abnormal returns may be understated. In 
Section 4.7 of this chapter, I confirm that the AAR estimates are robust to the additions of 
alternative priced risk factors. Another explanation could be information leakage. 
However, because informal release of emissions data prior to the official disclosure for all 
77 companies examined in this chapter seems unlikely, I tend to favour the view that  
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Table 4.4 Investor reactions to unanticipated changes in actual emissions relative to expectations 
Average abnormal returns (AAR) are calculated as the mean market reactions to a specific verification event across firms. AARs are estimates over both (0; +1) 
and (-1; +3) event windows. The Wald test is used to establish the significance of the abnormal return estimates. * denotes significance at the 1% level.  
 
 Actual < Expected emissions (Good news) Actual > Expected emissions (Bad news) H0: AARgood news >AARbad news 
 
AAR (o; +1) AAR (-1; +3) Firms AAR (o; +1) AAR (-1; +3) Firms AAR (o; +1) AAR (-1; +3) 
VER 2005b -0.247% -0.334% 38 0.049% -0.130% 26 -0.289% -0.204% 
       (0.8634) (0.8709) 
VER 2006 0.196% 0.059% 58 -0.022% 0.015% 6 0.218% 0.044% 
       (0.2425) (0.4216) 
VER 2007 -0.079% -0.094% 51 -0.307% -0.168% 13 0.228% 0.074 
       (0.2336) (0.3599) 
VER 2008 -0.123% * 0.192% * 53 0.687% * 1.067% * 18 -0.81% -0.878% 
       (0.9361) (0.9776) 
VER 2009 0.023% -0.028% 45 -0.042% 0.083% 27 0.065% -0.111% 
       (0.3256) (0.8370) 
VER 2010 0.226% 0.062% 44 0.628% 0.226% 28 -0.402% -0.164% 
       (0.9380) (0.9109) 
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investors simply don’t consider firm-specific carbon performance as value-relevant at 
present.  
Lack of investor interest in the carbon performance of companies would also explain why 
no statistically significant reaction was observed at the first compliance event which 
disclosed the verified emissions for 2005. Prior to the launch of the EU ETS, carbon 
emissions data was not publicly available and the first EC report arguably contained new 
information. It revealed to investors the firms’ actual carbon performance and their ability 
to achieve the required targets. All subsequent reports will contain less incremental 
information as there is now a benchmark against which future emissions performance can 
be forecasted. The lack of market reaction following the 2005 emissions data publication 
may be the result of the inefficiency of the market in its early stages, high levels of initial 
uncertainty surrounding the future of scheme, or inability of market participants to assess 
the implications of the ETS for a given company. 
There is also the possibility that the adjustments needed due to the discrepancy between 
actual and expected emissions are too small in monetary terms to meaningfully affect 
valuations. With the low carbon prices, the impact on profits (costs) arising from excess 
(shortage) of allowances may be negligible compared to firm size to induce a meaningful 
revaluation of the firm’s market value and its future profitability. For example, according 
to the model of expectations formation used here National Grid had an unanticipated 
excess of 656,539 carbon allowances in 2009. The average price of the futures with 
December 2009 expiration during the year was approximately !13.38 which would 
translate into a pre-tax profit of 656, 539 x !13.38 = ! 8,784,492 if the allowances were 
sold in the open market. With a total market capitalization of £44,330 mln at the 2009 
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fiscal year end, the unexpected after-tax profit from unused emission certificates may not 
be material enough to bring a significant market reaction. As noted by Veith et al. (2009) 
though: “investors perceive a trade in emission certificates as an additional factor in 
valuing the regulated firms only as long as it seriously impacts earnings: an ETS with 
certificate prices ranging marginally above zero …guarantees for inexpensive business-as-
usual scenarios”.  This reasoning is also in line with Grubb et al. (2009) who argue that 
carbon prices are not a critical factor affecting profitability. The authors state that “cost 
differentials due to labour and other input costs for most sectors far outweigh any 
international differences in the cost of carbon” and “the cost uncertainty induced by 
emissions trading is also less than that, for example, due to energy cost and exchange-rate 
fluctuation” (Grubb et al., 2009: p. 20).  
The release of the 2008 verified emissions data is the only event associated with a 
statistically significant price response among covered companies regardless of the event 
window over which abnormal returns are estimated. 2008 was the first year of Phase II and 
the amounts of allocated emissions to covered companies were substantially reduced. 
Uncertainty about the new EUA demand-supply balance for companies might have led 
investors to respond to the emissions data publication. Average abnormal returns of 0.69% 
(1.07% over the longer event window) are found for companies which experience bad news 
and -0.12% (0.19%) for companies which experience good news. The signs are contrary to 
those expected under Hypothesis 1, suggesting that the investor reactions on the event day 
are not likely to be conditioned upon the exact amount of over (under)-emitting relative to 
expectations. 
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In addition, a one-tailed t-test is performed to compare the average abnormal return 
estimates for the subsample of firms which emit less than anticipated and those which emit 
more than anticipated. The results of the test, along with the differences in average 
abnormal returns, are reported in the last two columns of Table 4.4. For all of the 
verification events, the null hypothesis that companies which experience good news have a 
higher abnormal return than those which experience bad news is rejected. This confirms 
that investor reactions on the event day do not depend on the amount of unanticipated 
emissions relative to expectations.  
4.6.2. INVESTOR REACTIONS TO UNANTICIPATED CHANGES IN THE NET EUA 
POSITIONS 
Table 4.5 below reports the results of Hypothesis 2 whereby investors react to news about 
unanticipated changes in the firms’ net positions with respect to emission allowances. As in 
Table 4.4, only AARs following the release of the 2008 report are found to be statistically 
different from zero. The signs are better aligned with expectations – positive abnormal 
returns are associated with companies which find themselves long on EUAs despite 
expectations of being short (0.35% and 1.11% for the short and long event windows, 
respectively) and negative (-1.51% for the short window) for companies which contrary to 
expectations end up net short. Over the long window, however, AARs for companies which 
experience bad news is positive at 0.57%. The “No news” subcategory of firms also 
experienced a positive price reaction to the report publication, contrary to the expected lack 
of abnormal returns. 
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The investor behaviour described in Hypothesis 2 seems to describe better than Hypothesis 
1 the observed stock price changes in covered companies, at least for the 2008 verification 
event which is the only one that resulted in abnormal returns distinguishable from zero. In 
addition, the one-tailed test comparing the average abnormal returns for companies which 
experience good news and those which experience bad news confirms that the former had 
higher abnormal returns than the latter during the 2006 (for both event windows used in the 
analysis) and during the 2008 (only for the short event window) verified emissions data 
releases. Investors appear to react to unexpected changes in the net EUA positions rather 
than unexpected levels of emissions. The net position may be interpreted as an indicator of 
the firm’s carbon practices, a signal for future compliance liabilities or benefits. 
Discrepancies between the actual and expected levels of emissions may be triggered by 
short-term changes in the firm’s level of production and may not be seen as a reliable proxy 
of future carbon performance.   
It should be noted that for the 2008 event, abnormal returns over the longer event window 
for all categories of companies are larger compared to the (0; +1) event window. If the 
market is efficient, abnormal returns over the longer event window should be close to zero, 
as the novelty of the carbon information gets gradually incorporated into stock prices. 
Larger abnormal returns over the (-1; +3) event window imply that market participants 
were slow to respond to the news about the carbon performance of ETS-covered 
companies. The reported delay in integrating carbon performance data into firm valuations 
might be caused by the time it takes investors to process the report released by the EC and 
to transform the installation-level data into meaningful company-level information. A 
policy change whereby carbon reporting is carried out on a firm-basis rather than per 
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Table 4.5 Investor reactions to unanticipated changes in the net EUA positions 
Net position is defined as the difference between actual and expected carbon emissions levels. Average abnormal returns (AAR) are calculated as the mean 
market reactions to a specific verification event across firms. AARs are estimates over both (0; +1) and (-1; +3) event windows. The Wald test is used to 
establish the significance of the abnormal return estimates. ***, **, * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%  levels, respectively.  
 
 Good news No news Bad news 
H0: AARgood news 
>AARbad news 
 
AAR 
(0;+ 1) 
AAR 
(-1;+ 3) Firms 
AAR 
(0;+ 1) 
AAR 
(-1;+ 3) Firms 
AAR 
(0;+ 1) 
AAR 
(-1;+ 3) Firms 
AAR  
(0;+ 1) 
AAR 
(-1;+ 3) 
VER 2006 0.016% -0.076% 17 0.249% 0.114% 46 -0.457% -0.461% 1 0.473%* 0.385%* 
          (0.0058) (0.0069) 
VER 2007 -0.252% -0.123% 16 -0.071% -0.100% 46 -0.059% -0.160% 1 -0.193% 0.037% 
          (0.7579) (0.4029) 
VER 2008 0.347% ** 1.109% ** 12 0.189% * 0.282% * 48 -1.505% *** 0.568% *** 6 1.852%** 0.541% 
          (0.0341) (0.3244) 
VER 2009 0.014% -0.079% 5 -0.026% 0.019% 64 0.498% 0.055% 3 -0.484% -0.134% 
          (0.8675) (0.6390) 
VER 2010 0.173% 0.008% 9 0.351% 0.160% 59 1.317% -0.111% 4 -1.144% -0.152% 
          (0.9724) (0.3587) 
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installation might facilitate the assimilation of information and improve the speed at which 
market participants digest the information. 
4.6.3. HIGH AND LOW CARBON-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 
To test whether carbon disclosures are more important for high carbon-intensive industries 
than for low carbon-intensive industries, I compare the magnitude of their market reactions 
following ETS report publications. The strength of the response is measured as the absolute 
size of the abnormal return estimate. Carbon intensity is calculated as the ratio of verified 
emissions for the year divided by the net sales for the year. The 20 companies with the 
highest and lowest intensities are identified for each of the compliance events. In a paired t-
test, the difference between the AARs experienced by high and low intensity companies is 
compared.  
Table 4.6 A comparison of the magnitude of price response between the two portfolios formed on 
emissions intensity 
At every annual compliance, 2 portfolios are formed each made up of 20 companies on the basis of emissions 
intensity – “high intensity” and “low intensity”. Emissions intensity is estimated as the ratio of verified 
emissions for a given calendar year divided by net sales over the period. For each portfolio, the table shows 
average absolute abnormal returns across verification events for the (0; 1) and (-1; +3) event windows. A one-
tailed paired t-test is carried out to compare the average absolute abnormal returns over the 20 companies 
with highest CO2 emissions intensity and the 20 with the lowest. Ho: mean(diff)=0, Ha = mean(diff)>0. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%  level.  
 
 
High Intensity Low Intensity Difference 
 
AR(0; +1) AR(-1; +3) AR(0; +1) AR(-1; +3) AR(0; +1) AR(-1; +3) 
2005 1.1234% 0.64% 0.6093% 0.4501% 0.5141%* 0.1898% 
    
(2.5642) (1.0715) 
2006 0.6867% 0.4622% 0.539% 0.4025% 0.1477% 0.0597% 
  
   
(0.853) (0.9681) 
2007 0.6165% 0.3866% 1.0413% 0.6502% -0.4247% -0.2636% 
  
   
(-1.6613) (-1.7166) 
2008 1.4821% 1.3984% 1.2621% 1.0466% 0.22% 0.3518% 
 
    
(0.7781) (0.8307) 
2009 0.4276% 0.386% 0.4539% 0.3473% -0.0264% 0.0387% 
 
    
(-0.1958) (0.4909) 
2010 0.9751% 0.4245% 0.5945% 0.3286% 0.3806%*** 0.0959% 
     
(1.411) (1.0193) 
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As seen in Table 4.6, with the exception of 2007, the average absolute market reaction for 
firms with high intensity was larger in magnitude than for low-intensity firms. Although 
the difference between high and low intensity firms is positive, it is significant only for the 
2005 and 2010 verification events when abnormal returns are calculated over the (0; +1) 
event window. These findings lend some credence to Hypothesis 3 that the ETS reports are 
more important for high carbon intensity companies relative to low carbon intensity ones.   
4.6.4. DETERMINANTS OF OBSERVED MARKET RESPONSES  
This section of the analysis attempts to identify the factors which drive observed market 
reactions on the event days. A random effects model is chosen over a fixed effects one 
because it allows for analysis of time-invariant determinants of abnormal returns such as 
country, industry affiliation and the number of installations which a company is responsible 
for under the EU ETS. Since these characteristics are constant over time, they cannot lead 
to changes in the firm-specific abnormal return estimates. In a fixed effects model these 
time-invariant independent variables are absorbed by the intercept. A Hausman test is used 
to empirically confirm the use of a random effects model over a fixed effects one.  
Table 4.7 presents the results of the panel data analysis where industry effects are 
controlled for. Four alternative models are estimated with the following determinants of 
market reactions: allocated EUAs, actual emissions, net EUA position, and the allocation 
factor. Overall model evaluation is based on a Wald test and the chi-square statistics as 
well as their corresponding p-values are reported for each model. Driscoll-Kraay (1998) 
standard errors are estimated but not reported because they lead to the same qualitative 
conclusions about the significance of the coefficients.  
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As seen in Table 4.7, allocated EUAs, verified emissions and the net EUA position show 
up with their hypothesized signs. In magnitude, however, the coefficient of allocated EUAs 
and actual emissions are so small that a Wald test rejects their statistical significance for 
both event windows used in this study. The net EUA position gains significance at the 10% 
only for the longer (-1; +3) event window. The regression slope is virtually equal to zero 
and implies that if a firm’s excess EUAs go up by 1 million, abnormal returns will go up by 
only 0.01%. The allocation factor, instead of having the expected positive sign, enters the 
regression output with a negative sign. It is, however, insignificantly different from zero. 
The insignificance of the allocated and verified emissions as determinants of abnormal 
returns suggests that, at face value, carbon performance doesn’t really matter.  
No evidence is found to support the conclusions of Hamilton (1995) that large companies 
attract more investor attention and experience greater market reactions. Capitalization 
remains insignificant, regardless of what event window is used to estimate abnormal 
returns. The debt-to-equity is found to be a statistically significant determinant, whereby 
riskier firms (i.e. higher debt-to-equity ratio firms) experience lower abnormal returns, 
holding everything else constant. The only industry affiliation which appears to have a 
significant impact on the market reaction is Oil and Gas, where companies in this industry 
experience lower abnormal returns. The results for the Telecommunications industry, while 
seemingly significant over the (-1; +3) event window, need to be interpreted carefully 
because the industry is represented by a single company, the British enterprise BT Plc. The 
number of installations which a company is responsible for remains insignificant.  
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In addition to the industry effects, country and time effects are also controlled for in Table 
4.8. The goodness-of-fit of the model improves slightly as evidenced by the increase in the 
coefficient of determination from (5.33%-6%) for the industry effects model to (8.16%-
11.16%) for the all-inclusive model. The results remain qualitatively identical as the 
findings reported in Table 4.7. The level of verified and allocated allowances remains 
insignificantly different from zero, albeit showing up in the regression output with the 
expected signs. The net position of the company remains significant over the longer event 
window. The allocation factor also gains significance at the 10% level over the (0; +1) 
event window. The number of firms which a firm is responsible for and the firm’s country 
are irrelevant in explaining abnormal returns. The results in Table 4.8 suggest that once 
time effects are accounted for, the rest of the regressors lose significance. This might 
suggest that instead of company specific factors, the observed abnormal returns are driven 
by an unobserved factor, common to the entire carbon market.   
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Table 4.7 Determinants of observed market reactions (Industry effects) 
This table reports the results of the following random effects model: !"!!! ! ! ! !!!"#$%&!!"#$"%&'!!! !!!!"#$%&&%$'("#!!! ! !!!"#$%&!!! ! !! !!!!! ! !! ! !!!!, where the four carbon variables which are examined 
are: Allocated EUAs (1), Verified emissions (2), Excess/Shortage of EUAs (3), Allocation ratio (4).  ! 
captures industry effects. A detailed description of all variables can be found in Table 4.1. The results of the 
Wald test for the joint insignificance of all explanatory variables are reported, along with the corresponding 
p-values. Robust standard errors are employed. ***, **, * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
Panel A: Average abnormal returns are measured over the (0; +1) event window  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Allocated EUAs 0.00002 
   Verified emissions 
 
0.00000 
  Excess/Shortage EUAs 
  
0.00009 
 Allocation factor 
   
-0.00074 
Installations 0.00002 0.00003 0.00005 0.00003 
Capitalization -0.00042 -0.00041 -0.00042 -0.00042 
Debt-to-Equity -0.00006*** -0.00006*** -0.00007*** -0.00006 
Consumer goods 0.00171 0.00169 0.00163 0.00106 
Industrials -0.00092 -0.00088 -0.00096 -0.00154 
Basic materials 0.00145 0.00147 0.00139 0.00088 
Utilities -0.00317 -0.00299 -0.00270 -0.00366 
Oil & Gas -0.00731*** -0.00723*** -0.00736*** -0.00781*** 
Healthcare -0.00224 -0.00223 -0.00226 -0.00275 
Technology -0.00700 -0.00694 -0.00694 -0.00748 
Telecommunications 0.00468 0.00468 0.00468 0.00384 
Constant 0.00798 0.00779 0.00794 0.00959 
Observations 407 407 407 407 
R-squared 5.82% 5.78% 5.91% 6% 
Wald Chi-squared (12df) 27.65 27.51 28.11 29.43 
p-value   0.0062 0.0065 0.0053 0.0034 
 
Panel B: Average abnormal returns are measured over the (-1; +3) event window 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Allocated EUAs 0.00000 
   Verified emissions 
 
-0.00001 
  Excess/Shortage EUAs 
  
0.00010*** 
 Allocation factor 
   
-0.00051 
Installations 0.00003 0.00004 0.00004 0.00002 
Capitalization -0.00030 -0.00029 -0.00031 -0.00031 
Debt-to-Equity -0.00011* -0.00011* -0.00011* -0.00010* 
Consumer goods 0.00104 0.00102 0.00098 0.00061 
Industrials 0.00053 0.00054 0.00044 0.00007 
Basic materials 0.00060 0.00060 0.00052 0.00020 
Utilities -0.00041 -0.00026 -0.00012 -0.00089 
Oil & Gas -0.00431** -0.00429** -0.00445** -0.00471** 
Healthcare -0.00162 -0.00162 -0.00164 -0.00198 
Technology 0.00424 0.00427 0.00422 0.00386 
Telecommunications 0.00910** 0.00910** 0.00910** 0.00852** 
Constant 0.00476 0.00468 0.00494 0.00603 
Observations 407 407 407 407 
R-squared 5.33% 5.37% 5.6% 5.53% 
Wald Chi-squared (12df) 26.59 27.18 29.98 27.6 
p-value   0.0089 0.0073 0.0028 0.0063 
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Table 4.8 Determinants of observed market reactions (Industry, country and time effects) 
This table reports the results of the following random effects model: !"!!! ! ! ! !!!"#$%&!!"#$"%&'!!! !!!!"#$%&&%$'("#!!! ! !!!"#$%&!!! ! !! !!!!! ! !! ! !!!!, where the four carbon variables which are examined 
are: Allocated allowances (1), Verified emissions (2), Excess/Shortage of EUAs (3), Allocation ratio (4).  ! 
captures the industry, country and time effects. A detailed description for the remainder of variables can be 
found in Table 4.1. The results of the Wald test for the joint insignificance of all explanatory variables are 
reported, along with the corresponding p-values. Robust standard errors are employed. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
Panel A: Average abnormal returns are measured over the (0; +1) event window 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Allocated EUAs 0.00003 
   Verified emissions 
 
0.00000 
  Excess/Shortage EUAs 
  
0.00011 
 Allocation factor 
   
-0.00083*** 
Installations 0.00002 0.00003 0.00005 0.00003 
Capitalization -0.00042 -0.00041 -0.00042 -0.00042 
Debt-to-Equity -0.00005 -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00005 
Consumer goods 0.00239 0.00233 0.00227 0.00168 
Industrials -0.00034 -0.00033 -0.00042 -0.00101 
Basic materials 0.00211 0.00209 0.00201 0.00149 
Utilities -0.00237 -0.00217 -0.00179 -0.00291 
Oil & Gas -0.00628 -0.00620 -0.00633 -0.00684 
Healthcare -0.00159 -0.00162 -0.00163 -0.00215 
Technology -0.00683 -0.00681 -0.00682 -0.00735 
Telecommunications 0.00548 0.00546 0.00550 0.00457 
United Kingdom -0.00047 -0.00052 -0.00056 -0.00045 
2006 0.00322** 0.00326** 0.00326** 0.00327** 
2007 0.00008 0.00011 0.00011 0.00025 
2008 0.00202 0.00202 0.00213 0.00204 
2009 0.00128 0.00127 0.00131 0.00150 
2010 0.00510* 0.00510* 0.00517* 0.00525* 
Constant 0.00558 0.00544 0.00557 0.00726 
     Observations 407 407 407 407 
R-squared 8.19% 8.16% 8.33% 8.38% 
Wald Chi-squared (18df) 36.17 36.4 37.79 38.02 
p-value   0.0067 0.0063 0.0041 0.0039 
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Table 4.8 Determinants of observed market reactions (Industry, country and time effects) (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Average abnormal returns are measured over the (-1; +3) event window 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Allocated EUAs 0.00000 
   Verified emissions 
 
-0.00002 
  Excess/Shortage EUAs 
  
0.00013** 
 Allocation factor 
   
-0.00049 
Installations 0.00002 0.00003 0.00004 0.00002 
Capitalization -0.00020 -0.00020 -0.00022 -0.00021 
Debt-to-Equity -0.00011** -0.00011** -0.00011** -0.00011** 
Consumer goods 0.00263 0.00258 0.00255 0.00223 
Industrials 0.00211 0.00211 0.00201 0.00171 
Basic materials 0.00211 0.00208 0.00201 0.00174 
Utilities 0.00111 0.00130 0.00158 0.00071 
Oil & Gas -0.00281 -0.00277 -0.00294 -0.00318 
Healthcare -0.00018 -0.00021 -0.00020 -0.00050 
Technology 0.00575 0.00576 0.00574 0.00544 
Telecommunications 0.01053* 0.01053* 0.01057* 0.01000** 
United Kingdom 0.00021 0.00016 0.00015 0.00024 
2006 0.00316* 0.00319* 0.00318* 0.00317* 
2007 0.00145 0.00147 0.00146 0.00154 
2008 0.00652* 0.00653* 0.00665* 0.00653* 
2009 0.00269* 0.00270* 0.00275* 0.00283* 
2010 0.00370* 0.00371* 0.00379* 0.00379* 
Constant -0.00127 -0.00135 -0.00115 -0.00019 
     Observations 407 407 407 407 
R-squared 10.71% 10.75% 11.16% 10.88% 
Wald Chi-squared (18df) 40.17 41.06 43.91 40.5 
p-value   0.002 0.0015 0.0006 0.0018 
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4.6.5. EVALUATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EU ETS 
The analysis proceeds with an evaluation of the cap-and-trade programme’s environmental 
effectiveness. Table 4.9 reports that firms in all industries but Financials, Technology and 
Telecommunications mostly reduced their intensities over the period 2006 - 2011. Out of 
334 firm year observations, 236 registered carbon intensity reductions. More importantly, 
the abnormal returns observed on the day of emissions data publication were on average 
negative for those firms which reduced their carbon intensity in the following year, 
respectively -0.054% and -0.034% for the (0; +1) and (-1; +3) event windows. Mean 
abnormal returns were positive for those companies which in the next year increased their 
carbon intensity (0.138% for the short window and 0.191% for the long event window).  
Table 4.9 Changes in emissions intensity across industries 
This table reports the direction of emissions intensity change over the 334 firm years covered by the dataset 
from January 2006 until June 2011. Average abnormal returns (AARs) and their standard deviations are 
calculated separately for the instances when firms reduced their intensities and when they increased their 
intensities. Abnormal returns are estimated over both the (0; +1) and the (-1; +3) event windows.  
  
 
Intensity Reduction 
Summary 
 
Yes No 
Financials 1 1 2 
Consumer goods 56 25 81 
Industrials 49 30 79 
Basic materials 41 9 50 
Utilities 39 15 54 
Oil & Gas 16 6 22 
Healthcare 25 4 29 
Technology 6 6 12 
Telecommunications 3 2 5 
Total sample 236 98 334 
AAR ( 0; +1) from previous year -0.054% 0.138% 0.002% 
St. Dev. AAR (0; +1) 1.11% 1.33% 1.18% 
AARs (-1; +3) from previous year -0.034% 0.191% 0.032% 
St. Dev. AAR (-1; +3) 0.83% 1.12% 0.93% 
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To confirm the causality, the logistic regression specified in Equation 8 is estimated, where 
the change in intensity is modelled as a function of abnormal returns experienced upon 
verified emissions release in the previous year. The specification of the logistic model is 
confirmed by a Wald test for the joint significance of all independent variables. In addition, 
goodness of fit is assessed by a Hosmer and Lemeshow test (for robustness, the results of 
separating the dataset into 4 and 10 groups is reported). Chi-squared statistics and 
corresponding p-values are reported in Table 4.10 below. The negative regression 
coefficient of abnormal returns implies that the log of the odds of a firm reducing its 
intensity is negatively related to abnormal returns. The lower the abnormal returns are, the 
more likely it is for a firm to subsequently reduce its emissions intensity. 
For a 1% reduction in the abnormal returns experienced following the ETS report 
publication, the expected change in the log odds of a firm improving its carbon 
performance increases by 13.314 for the (0; +1) event window and by 11.34 for the (-1; +3) 
event window. While in line with Hypothesis 5, the results are statistically insignificant. 
The odds ratios are virtually indistinguishable from zero which implies a nil chance of 
intensity reduction following a significant negative market response. In brief, no conclusive 
evidence is found that the likelihood of a firm reducing its intensity is related to the market 
reaction experienced following the release of carbon performance data. This finding is 
intuitive, especially in light of the primarily insignificant market reactions associated with 
the verified emissions report publications. 
The fact that abnormal returns were on average negative for companies which reduced their 
intensity in the following year (see Table 4.9) appears to have been spurious. In 70.66% of  
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Table 4.10 Modelling emissions intensity reductions as a function of abnormal returns 
This table reports the results of the logistic regression in Equation 8. Robust standard errors are used.  
Panel A: Abnormal returns are estimated over the (0; +1) event window. 
 
! SE Wald's "2 df p-value e^! (odds ratio) 
AR (o; +1) -13.314 10.4906 1.61 1 0.2044 0.0000 
Consumer goods 0.2694 1.3588 0.04 1 0.8429 1.3091 
Industrials -0.0843 1.3538 0.00 1 0.9503 0.9192 
Basic materials 1.0352 1.3743 0.57 1 0.4513 2.8158 
Utilities 0.3615 1.3676 0.07 1 0.7915 1.4354 
Oil & Gas 0.2325 1.4387 0.03 1 0.8716 1.2618 
Healthcare 
 
1.2928 1.4252 0.82 1 0.3644 3.6430 
Technology -0.6498 1.4486 0.20 1 0.6538 0.5222 
Telecommunications -0.1618 1.7239 0.01 1 0.9252 0.8506 
United Kingdom 0.0108 0.2747 0.00 1 0.9688 1.0108 
2007 -0.9892 0.5351 3.42 1 0.0645 0.3719 
2008 -1.3860 0.5204 7.09 1 0.0077 0.2501 
2009 -1.7308 0.5065 11.68 1 0.0006 0.1771 
2010 -2.2335 0.5036 19.67 1 0.0000 0.1072 
Constant 1.9753 1.4143 1.95 1 0.1625 7.2091 
Overall model evaluation "2 df p-value 
         Wald test 
 
41.58 14 0.0001 
Goodness-of-fit 
              Hosmer & Lemeshow (10 groups) 10.99 8 0.202 
          Hosmer & Lemeshow (4 groups) 1.79 2 0.408 
 
Panel B: abnormal returns estimated over the (-1; +3) event window. 
 
! SE Wald's "2 df p-value e^! (log odds) 
AR (-1; +3) -11.3400 13.8134 0.67 1 0.4117 0.0000 
Consumer goods 0.2795 1.3082 0.05 1 0.8308 1.3225 
Industrials -0.0337 1.3027 0.00 1 0.9794 0.9669 
Basic materials 1.0537 1.3241 0.63 1 0.4264 2.8682 
Utilities 0.4326 1.3148 0.11 1 0.7421 1.5413 
Oil & Gas 0.3172 1.3848 0.05 1 0.8188 1.3733 
Healthcare 1.3473 1.3737 0.96 1 0.3267 3.8470 
Technology -0.4676 1.4024 0.11 1 0.7388 0.6265 
Telecommunications -0.1143 1.7082 0.00 1 0.9467 0.8920 
UK 0.0024 0.2739 0.00 1 0.9931 1.0024 
2007 -0.9888 0.5354 3.41 1 0.0648 0.3720 
2008 -1.3618 0.5220 6.80 1 0.0091 0.2562 
2009 -1.6732 0.5193 10.38 1 0.0013 0.1876 
2010 -2.2130 0.5049 19.21 1 0.0000 0.1094 
Constant 1.9128 1.3685 1.95 1 0.1622 6.7723 
Overall model evaluation "2 df p-value 
          Wald test 40.96 14 0.0002 
Goodness-of-fit 
            Hosmer & Lemeshow (10 groups) 9.31 8 0.3165 
          Hosmer & Lemeshow (4 groups) 1.67 2 0.4349 
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all firm years companies reduced their emissions, a result which does not seem to have 
been driven by adverse stock price pressure on the covered companies. 
Table 4.11 presents the observed and predicted frequencies for emissions intensity 
decreases. The prediction for companies that reduced their carbon intensities is more 
accurate than that for companies which increased their intensities. The proportion of 
correctly classified intensity reductions is very high - 90.68% for the (0; +1) event window 
and 91.95% for the (-1; +3) event window. The proportion of correctly classified intensity 
increases is 26.53% for both event windows. Due to the observed general trend of intensity 
reduction across companies, I find a high rate of false negatives which is the ratio of firms 
wrongly predicted to increase their emissions intensities divided by all firms believed to 
increase their emissions intensities. The respective ratios are 45.83% for event window (0; 
+1) and 42.22% for the (-1; +3) event window.   This confirms that the observed intensity 
reductions were not driven by negative abnormal returns and they merely reflect the 
tendency towards emissions intensity decreases.  
Table 4.11 Observed and fitted frequencies for emissions intensity reduction 
 Event window (0; +1) Event window (-1; +3) 
Observed Predicted % Correct Predicted % Correct Yes No Yes No 
Yes 214 22 90.68% 217 19 91.95% 
No 72 26 26.53% 72 26 26.53% 
 Correctly Classified 
 
71.86%   72.75% 
 
No evidence is found that investors have used the available verified emissions data to exert 
pressure on polluters and incentivize them to improve their carbon performance. As it 
stands today, the cap-and-trade programme does not appear to meet the socially desirable 
objective of promoting the move to a low-carbon economy. These conclusions are in line  
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Table 4.12 Modelling abnormal returns as a function of carbon performance 
This table reports the results of an OLS with abnormal returns modelled as a function of the change in intensity over the year (Equation 9). Industry, country and 
time effects are separately controlled for. The Wald test is used to confirm the significance of regression coefficients. A total of 337 firm years is examined. 
Robust standard errors are used. ***, **, * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
Industry, country & time 
effects Industry & time effects Industry effects Time effects 
 
(o;1) (-1;3) (o;1) (-1; 3) (o; 1) (-1; 3) (o;1) (-1;3) 
Intensity 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Consumer goods 0.0026 0.0039 0.0037 0.0041* 0.0032 0.0032*** 
  Industrials 0.0010 0.0039** 0.0020 0.0041** 0.0016 0.0033*** 
  Basic materials 0.0022 0.0029 0.0031 0.0030*** 0.0027 0.0022 
  Utilities -0.0012 0.0027*** -0.0006 0.0028** -0.0011 0.0019 
  Oil & Gas -0.0043 -0.0010 -0.0043 -0.0010 -0.0047 -0.0020 
  Healthcare -0.0018 0.0006 -0.0010 0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0001 
  Technology -0.0064 0.0099** -0.0050 0.0102* -0.0053 0.0092** 
  Telecommunications 0.0044 0.0066** 0.0044 0.0066** 0.0039 0.0057 
  United Kingdom -0.0018 -0.0004 
      2007 -0.0030*** -0.0017 -0.0030*** -0.0017 
  
-0.0029*** -0.0016 
2008 -0.0011 0.0039** -0.0012 0.0039 
  
-0.0010 0.0040*** 
2009 -0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0019 -0.0006 
  
-0.0018 -0.0004 
2010 0.0021 0.0008 0.0020 0.0008 
  
0.0022 0.0009 
Constant 0.0023 -0.0024 0.0006 -0.0027 0.0003 -0.0013 0.0018*** 0.0005 
         F-statistic 3.02 14.71 3.20 15.9 3.31 16.37 4.29 35.65 
p-value 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 
R-squared 7.6% 10.06% 7.1% 10.02% 4.87% 5.39% 2.24% 4.7% 
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with Hoffman’s (2007) observations about the impact of carbon prices on the investment 
activities of covered companies. In a case study of five power generators in Germany, the 
author reports that coverage by the ETS has spurred only a wave of small-scale retrofit 
activities introducing minor changes in existing installations in order to increase carbon 
efficiency. Limited impact is found on medium and long-term technology investments, 
such as changes in R&D spending or the portfolio choices of electricity generation.  
To test whether the market provides financial incentives to companies to improve their 
carbon performance, I estimate a pooled OLS regression (Equation 9) where the observed 
market reaction at the event day is modelled as a function of the change in emissions 
intensity. Industry, country and time fixed effects are controlled for. The results, reported 
in Table 4.12, demonstrate that the regression coefficients of intensity change are mostly 
statistically significant but so small in magnitude that they are virtually indistinguishable 
from zero (even when rounding to 6 decimal places). No evidence is found to support 
Hypothesis 6 that the market rewards environmental leaders and punishes companies which 
continue to emit at increasing rates. The impact of carbon performance appears to be too 
immaterial to meaningfully impact investors’ behaviour.  
4.7. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
As a robustness check, an alternative formulation of the return-generating model for British 
and German companies is used in the SUR framework. As discussed in Section 4.4.1, a 
Fama-French model was not selected on the premise that some companies might use 
carbon performance as a part of their SRI strategy. However, participation in the EU ETS 
may not necessarily imply socially responsible behaviour. Under the scheme companies 
  Chapter 4 
!
194 
!
only have the obligation to report their actual emissions and surrender an equivalent 
amount of carbon allowances. To demonstrate that earlier findings are robust to changes in 
the priced risk factors in the return-generating model, Equations 1 and 2 are re-estimated 
after adding size and value premia to the explanatory variables. The new return-generating 
model for UK companies is:  
!!!! ! !! ! !!!!!!"#$!! ! !!!!!!"#!! ! !!!!!!"#$%&'$'%(!! ! !!!!!!"#$%!! ! !!!"#! !!!!"#! ! ! !!! !!"!!!! ! !!!!                                                                          (9) 
The return-generating model for German companies is:  
!!!! ! !! ! !!!!!!"#!! ! !!!!!!"#!! ! !!!!!!"#$%&'$'%(!! ! !!!!!!"#$%!! ! !!!"#! !!!!"#! ! !!! !!"!!!! ! !!!!                                                                                           (10) 
where SMBt is the difference in daily continuously compounded return between a small-
cap and a large-cap portfolio and HMLt is the difference in daily continuously compounded 
return between a value and a growth portfolio. The MSCI Germany Small and Large cap 
indices are used for Germany, and the FTSE Small and Large cap indices are used for the 
United Kingdom. The MSCI Germany Value and Growth indices are used for Germany, 
and the FTSE Value and Growth indices are used for the United Kingdom. All data are 
sourced from Datastream.  
Individual abnormal returns are reported in Appendix 4C but, for the purposes of brevity, 
this chapter does not report the regression output of all analysed companies. It is worth 
noting, however, that the average German company had a greater exposure to the size 
factor over the period 2006-2011 than the average British company. The regression 
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Table 4.13 Investor reactions to unanticipated changes in actual emissions (robustness check) 
Average abnormal returns (AAR) are calculated as the mean market reactions to a specific verification event across firms. AARs are estimates over both (0; +1) 
and (-1; +3) event windows. The Wald test is used to establish the significance of the abnormal return estimates. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Actual > Expected emissions Actual < Expected emissions 
 
AR (o; +1) AR (-1; +3) Firms AR (o; +1) AR (-1; +3) Firms 
2005b 0.200% 0.052% 26 -0.131% -0.190% 38 
2006 -0.067% 0.018% 6 0.212% 0.044% 58 
2007 -0.251% -0.168% 13 -0.021% -0.180% 51 
2008 0.492* 0.878%* 18 -0.125%* 0.133%* 53 
2009 -0.100% -0.01% 27 -0.033% -0.107 45 
2010 0.193% 0.084% 28 -0.021% -0.017% 44 
 
 
Table 4.14 Investor reactions to unanticipated changes in the net EUA positions (robustness check) 
Average abnormal returns (AAR) are calculated as the mean market reactions to a specific verification event across firms. AARs are estimates over both (0; +1) 
and (-1; +3) event windows. The Wald test is used to establish the significance of the abnormal return estimates. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Good news No news Bad news 
  AR (o; +1) AR (-1; +3) Firms AR (o; +1) AR (-1; +3) Firms AR (o; +1) AR (-1; +3) Firms 
2006 0.09% -0.11% 17 0.24% 0.11% 46 -0.58% -0.54% 1 
2007 -0.19% -0.22% 16 -0.01% -0.16% 46 -0.03% -0.21% 1 
2008 0.355%** 1.057%* 12 0.187%* 0.230%* 48 -1.694** 0.368%* 6 
2009 -0.04% -0.12% 5 -0.08% -0.06% 64 0.36% -0.11% 3 
2010 0.05% -0.04% 9 0.04% 0.06% 59 0.40% -0.43% 4 
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coefficient of the SMB variable is 0.45 for both event windows in Germany and only 0.17 
in the United Kingdom. The results also show that the average company in Germany 
exhibited an almost negligible value bias (!HML=0.01 for both event windows) while the 
average British company had a growth bias (!HML= -0.13). The relationship between the 
returns of covered companies and all other independent variables is maintained after the 
introduction of the two Fama-French factors. The re-estimated results of Hypothesis 1 are 
summarized in Table 4.13. A comparison with Table 4.4 demonstrates that there are no 
quantitative and qualitative changes in the results. This suggests that the return-generating 
model is specified accurately and the results are robust.  The same conclusions hold for the 
results of Hypothesis 2. A comparison between Tables 4.5 and 4.14 shows no changes in 
the results after the introduction of size and value premia in the return-generating model. 
4.8. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined the impact of mandatory environmental information disclosure 
on market value and carbon performance in the framework of the EU ETS. Limited 
evidence is found that firm-specific carbon performance matters for investors. The results 
of the event study demonstrate that only one out of the six verification events over the 
period 2006 -2011 has led to statistically significant market responses. Several possible 
explanations have been offered to account for the reported results. The lack of reaction to 
the first compliance event is attributed to market inefficiency in the early days of the 
scheme. Low carbon prices and an immaterial impact on the firm value may be the reason 
for the lack of reactions following the more recent verification events.  
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The only observed significant reaction, following the 2008 compliance event, offers more 
support to the hypothesis that investors react to unanticipated changes in the net EUA 
positions of companies rather than unanticipated changes in their level of actual emissions. 
The incremental information is not compounded instantaneously in the stock prices of 
covered companies and remains significant even when longer event window are used. This 
result suggests that policy-makers should improve the quality and quantity of data released 
to the general public in order to utilize the power of financial markets to stimulate socially 
desirable changes in the performance of companies. More focus on increasing the 
awareness of the public by disseminating information would be desirable.  
No evidence is found to support the hypothesis that the observed market reactions are 
positively associated with the amount of freely allocated allowances and negatively 
associated with the amount of actual emissions. Both the level of free allowances and 
actual emissions during the year are found to be indistinguishable from zero as 
determinants of the stock price responses. The market reactions for high carbon-intensive 
companies are found to be larger, although not always significantly so, in magnitude than 
those for their less carbon-intensive counterparts. This result supports the hypothesis that 
carbon performance matters more for companies with high carbon-intensive activities. A 
caveat to the analysis is the short-term nature of the event study. Short-term reactions of 
market participants might differ substantially from the long-term view if investors are more 
focused on immediate profits/ losses and fail to account for the long-term cost-benefit 
analysis of environmental performance.  
Despite the growing social awareness of anthropogenic climate change, the recent 
corporate trends of improving carbon footprints, and the dedicated political effort to move 
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the EU to a lower-carbon economy, this chapter provides evidence that the scheme has had 
no material effect on the stock performance of covered companies and has not brought 
about the hoped for changes in their carbon performance. Contrary to expectations, I find 
that companies which experienced negative market reactions following the release of their 
actual emissions do not alter their carbon performance in the following year. Also, no 
evidence is found that the market reacts differently towards environmental leaders and 
laggards upon disclosure of their carbon emissions data. The analysis leads me to conclude 
that effective climate change mitigation and carbon emission reductions are not achievable 
via the EU ETS as it is presently constituted. The signal embedded in the price of carbon is 
not strong and credible enough to provoke investor action and improvement in corporate 
environmental performance.  
Throughout the short life of the EU ETS, it has become apparent that setting up the 
emissions caps for the European countries is very challenging. Over-allocations in Phase I 
and sluggish economic activity as a consequence of the financial crisis and Eurozone debt 
woes in Phase II have adversely impacted carbon prices. Low carbon prices have 
questioned both the environmental effectiveness and the credible survival of the scheme. 
The inability of formal institutions to set tight limits on emissions, the slow decision 
making, and the overall regulatory uncertainty have undermined the functioning of the ETS 
and the willingness of financial markets to provide the necessary financial and behavioural 
incentives to polluting firms to alter their carbon performance. In short, the flaw lies with 
the way in which the EU ETS is structured, rather than with the underlying concept of 
emissions trading. Among the key changes in the structural design of the EU ETS which 
will be implemented during Phase III is the move to full auctioning of allowances in the 
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power sector, which is responsible for the largest amount of carbon emissions. Therefore, 
the conclusions of this chapter may alter in a post-2012 context.     
It is worth reiterating, however, that the results and conclusions reached in this chapter are 
entirely premised on two assumptions: 1. that the verified emissions reports represent 
genuine shocks to the market; and 2. that the employed models of expectations formation 
behaviour accurately reflect the way in which market participants think about the levels of 
emissions expected by a given company. As discussed in Section 4.3, it is possible that 
information about the emissions levels is released prior to the report publications. In 
addition, given the depressed carbon price, the quantitative impact on firm valuations may 
be too small to be considered market-moving by investors. The results therefore need to be 
interpreted with caution. 
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APPENDIX 4A LIST OF SAMPLE COMPANIES 
 
Germany United Kingdom 
1. Heidelbergcement Industrials 1. National Grid  Utilities 
2. Suedzucker Consumer Goods 2. AstraZeneca  Healthcare 
3. Dyckerhoff  Industrials 3. BAE Systems Industrials 
4. Carl Zeizz  Healthcare 4. Barclays Financials 
5. Fresenius Medical Healthcare 5. Croda Internaitonal Basic materials 
6. E.on Utilities 6. BHP Billiton  Basic materials 
7. RWE Utilities 7. Dairy Crest Group Consumer Goods 
8. Merck KGAA Healthcare 8. Rolls-Royce Industrials 
9. Wincor Nixdorf  Technology 9. Centrica  Utilities 
10. WMF Wuertt. 
Metall.  
Consumer Goods 10. BT Group Telecommunications 
11. Sud-Chemie Basic materials 11. Drax Utilities 
12. Bayer  Basic materials 12. GlaxoSmithKline Healthcare 
13. Henkel Consumer Goods 13. Serco Industrials 
14. MTU Aero Engines Industrials 14. Severn Trent  Utilities 
15. Infineon Technologie Technology 15. Balfour Beatty  Industrials 
16. Heidelberger Druck. Industrials 16. Carillion  Industrials 
17. Siemens  Industrials 17. Marston's Consumer Goods 
18. K+S  Basic materials 18. Tate & Lyle  Consumer Goods 
19. Aurubis  Basic materials 19. Johnson Matthey Basic materials 
20. Porsche Automobil Consumer goods 20. Anglo-American Basic materials 
21. BMW Consumer goods 21. Associated British 
Foods 
Consumer Goods 
22. Pfleiderer Industrials 22. BP PLC Oil & Gas 
23. Linde Basic materials 23. Scottish & Southern 
Energy 
Utilities 
24. Audi  Consumer goods 24. Diageo  Consumer goods 
25. BASF SE Basic materials 25. Premier Oil  Oil & Gas 
26. ThysssenKrupp  Industrials 26. Premier Foods  Consumer Goods 
27. Villeroy & Boch  Industrials 27. International Power Utilities 
28. MVV Energie  Utilities 28. Babcock 
International 
Industrials 
29. Daimler  Consumer goods 29. BG Group Oil & Gas 
30. Hochtief Industrials 30. Smith & Nephew Healthcare 
31. MAN SE Industrials 31. De La Rue Industrials 
32. Salzgitter  Basic materials 32. DS Smith Industrials 
33. Continental Consumer Goods 33. Tullow Oil Oil & Gas 
34. Deutsche Lufthansa Consumer goods 34. Greene King Consumer Goods 
35. EnBW Energie 
Baden 
Utilities 35. Rio Tinto Basic materials 
36. Volkswagen  Consumer goods 36. British American 
Tobacco 
Consumer Goods 
   
37. Filtronic  Technology 
   
38. Elementis Basic materials 
   
39. Imperial Tobacco Consumer Goods 
   
40. United Utilities  Utilities 
   
41. Royal Dutch Shell Oil & Gas 
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APPENDIX 4B FIRM-LEVEL ABNORMAL RETURN ESTIMATES 
Event window (0; +1)  
 
VER05A VER05B VER06 VER07 VER08 VER09 VER10 R^2 
HEI 
 
-0.0175 -0.0001 0.0022 -0.0051 0.0020 0.0069 32.73% 
SZU 0.0017 -0.0194*** 0.0098 -0.0116 0.0192 0.0011 0.0049 23.58% 
DYK -0.0121 -0.0028 -0.0014 0.0017 0.0241*** 0.0039 -0.0066 2.42% 
AFX -0.0291*** 
 
0.0089 -0.0024 -0.0208 -0.0050 0.0128 10.02% 
FME 0.0017 -0.0033 0.0093 0.0070 -0.0131 -0.0047 0.0076 13.97% 
EOAN -0.0088 -0.0030 0.0279* -0.0019 -0.0129 -0.0013 -0.0021 48.27% 
RWE -0.0201** 
 
0.0083 -0.0002 -0.0146 -0.0029 0.0068 44.22% 
MRK 0.0018 -0.0145 0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0037 0.0107 17.96% 
WIN -0.0044 -0.0031 -0.0063 -0.0137 0.0237*** -0.0032 0.0096 31.57% 
WMF 0.0028 -0.0051 0.0135 0.0072 -0.0092 0.0197 -0.0042 3.22% 
SUC 0.0121 -0.0042 
     
2.04% 
BAYN -0.0037 -0.0106 -0.0036 -0.0004 -0.0241** -0.0005 0.0098 45.95% 
HEN -0.0039 -0.0054 0.0004 -0.0006 0.0029 0.0047 0.0023 30.50% 
MTX 0.0075 -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0164 0.0356** 0.0000 0.0288*** 32.62% 
IFX 
 
0.0112 -0.0073 0.0054 -0.0423*** -0.0066 0.0210 23.12% 
HDD -0.0100 0.0024 0.0077 0.0002 -0.0061 0.0129 0.0158 30.52% 
SIE 0.0023 0.0107 -0.0009 -0.0127 -0.0214** -0.0001 0.0013 58.54% 
SDF 0.0035 0.0193 0.0065 0.0146 0.0055 -0.0151 0.0186 32.19% 
NDA 0.0002 -0.0097 0.0008 -0.0120 0.0054 0.0096 0.0122 35.75% 
PAH3 0.0046 0.0032 0.0142 -0.0202 0.0173 0.0015 0.0014 39.06% 
BMW -0.0061 0.0087 
 
0.0007 0.0537* 0.0061 0.0147 50.85% 
PFD4 -0.0126 0.0018 -0.0117 
  
0.0118 
 
12.26% 
LIN 
     
-0.0050 0.0093 45.41% 
NSU -0.0044 -0.0020 0.0093 -0.0062 0.0156 -0.0085 -0.0017 5.14% 
BAS -0.0137*** 0.0046 -0.0031 0.0008 0.0049 0.0028 0.0011 63.14% 
TKA -0.0111 -0.0227*** -0.0077 0.0051 0.0146 -0.0025 0.0155 55.35% 
VIB3 -0.0018 0.0006 -0.0060 -0.0184 -0.0181 -0.0154 0.0270 5.45% 
MVV1 0.0119 -0.0111 0.0065 -0.0129 -0.0181*** -0.0060 -0.0013 4.42% 
DAI 
 
0.0089 -0.0031 -0.0105 0.0201*** -0.0042 0.0156 58.87% 
HOT -0.0196 
 
0.0143 0.0351** -0.0077 -0.0014 0.0048 44.06% 
MAN -0.0194 -0.0012 -0.0037 0.0019 0.0257** -0.0053 0.0090 52.01% 
SZG -0.0159 -0.0119 0.0076 0.0100 0.0022 -0.0101 0.0247 49.68% 
CON -0.0098 0.0058 0.0061 0.0066 0.0245 -0.0063 0.0108 27.43% 
LHA -0.0038 0.0095 0.0019 -0.0034 -0.0051 0.0091 -0.0016 44.44% 
EBK 0.0049 -0.0091 0.0007 0.0032 -0.0083 -0.0003 -0.0027 1.54% 
VOW 0.0212 -0.0102 -0.0155 0.0059 0.0095 -0.0028 -0.0065 8.98% 
NG 0.0007 0.0099 0.0086 0.0066 -0.0063 0.0013 -0.0022 32.88% 
AZN -0.0014 0.0048 -0.0039 0.0083 -0.0111 -0.0016 -0.0008 33.04% 
BA -0.0054 -0.0120 0.0009 0.0030 -0.0069 -0.0010 0.0016 37.41% 
BARC 
    
0.0079 -0.0073 0.0002 42.61% 
CRDA 0.0072 0.0116 -0.0001 0.0112 0.0158 0.0013 0.0024 33.34% 
BLT 0.0016 -0.0093 0.0017 0.0070 -0.0008 -0.0023 0.0003 62.95% 
DCG 0.0124 -0.0013 -0.0044 0.0058 0.0397* -0.0054 -0.0017 14.29% 
RR -0.0036 -0.0127 
  
0.0319* 0.0061 -0.0022 53.11% 
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CNA 0.0046 -0.0123 0.0045 0.0004 -0.0154 0.0027 0.0025 26.49% 
BTA 0.0079 0.0075 0.0090 0.0090 0.0072 -0.0008 -0.0037 33.48% 
DRXG -0.0133 -0.0143 -0.0060 -0.0068 -0.0091 0.0023 0.0142 19.63% 
GSK 0.0031 0.0034 -0.0021 0.0031 -0.0162** -0.0057 0.0034 28.52% 
SERC 
    
-0.0120 -0.0021 -0.0108 29.13% 
SVT 0.0029 0.0051 0.0059 -0.0054 -0.0159*** 0.0020 -0.0012 30.99% 
BBY -0.0095 0.0032 0.0069 -0.0282* 0.0198*** 0.0006 -0.0121 41.68% 
CLLN -0.0439* 0.0092 0.0008 -0.0158 0.0050 0.0065 -0.0028 37.64% 
MARS 
    
0.0069 0.0064 0.0074 27.77% 
TATE 0.0062 -0.0029 0.0050 -0.0085 0.0140 0.0038 -0.0107 17.35% 
JMAT 
    
0.0165 0.0042 0.0084 51.80% 
AAL 
    
0.0091 
 
-0.0018 62.92% 
ABF 
   
-0.0065 0.0036 -0.0013 -0.0031 34.21% 
BP -0.0099 -0.0105 -0.0064 0.0061 -0.0228** 0.0002 0.0075 50.60% 
SSE -0.0009 0.0091 0.0099 -0.0040 -0.0233* -0.0024 0.0067 32.59% 
DGE 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0053 0.0042 -0.0057 44.66% 
PMO -0.0021 -0.0240*** -0.0065 -0.0041 -0.0090 0.0049 0.0123 34.56% 
PFD 0.0066 0.0116 0.0031 0.0030 
  
0.0390 11.60% 
IPR -0.0111 0.0003 0.0126 0.0145 -0.0013 0.0014 -0.0052 34.93% 
BAB -0.0022 -0.0052 0.0004 -0.0110 -0.0211*** 0.0039 -0.0057 20.95% 
BG -0.0109 0.0045 -0.0066 
    
50.30% 
SN -0.0109 0.0081 -0.0005 -0.0062 0.0027 -0.0073 -0.0017 27.16% 
DLAR 
    
-0.0266** 0.0043 -0.0019 08.58% 
SMDS -0.0163 0.0162 0.0062 -0.0078 0.0441** 0.0064 0.0040 23.57% 
TLW 0.0045 -0.0268*** -0.0022 -0.0155 -0.0361** 0.0028 0.0007 38.73% 
GNK 
    
0.0385* 0.0052 -0.0017 34.09% 
RIO 0.0031 -0.0005 0.0051 0.0095 -0.0121 0.0010 0.0016 51.51% 
BATS -0.0006 0.0022 -0.0034 -0.0096 
   
28.69% 
FTC 
    
-0.0197 -0.0021 -0.0388 3.83% 
ELM -0.0117 0.0269 0.0024 -0.0029 0.0195 -0.0052 
 
13.10% 
IMT -0.0028 -0.0017 -0.0046 -0.0045 -0.0041 -0.0039 0.0032 24.36% 
UU 0.0013 0.0049 0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0122 0.0040 0.0001 35.55% 
RDSB -0.0021 -0.0051 -0.0082 0.0068 -0.0127*** -0.0024 -0.0027 63.34% 
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Event window (-1; +3) 
 
VER05A VER05B VER06 VER07 VER08 VER09 VER10 R^2 
HEI 
 
-0.0139 0.0022 -0.0060 0.0430* -0.0029 -0.0028 33.54% 
SZU 0.0018 -0.0155** 0.0089 0.0057 0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0011 23.59% 
DYK -0.0045 -0.0032 -0.0025 -0.0014 -0.0024 -0.0080 -0.0034 2.29% 
AFX -0.0105 
 
-0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0148 -0.0065 0.0023 9.94% 
FME 0.0026 -0.0016 0.0015 0.0028 -0.0139** -0.0009 0.0026 14.12% 
EOAN 0.0031 -0.0008 0.0094 -0.0016 -0.0049 -0.0020 0.0014 48.08% 
RWE -0.0110*** 
 
0.0044 -0.0006 -0.0071 -0.0019 0.0028 44.17% 
MRK 0.0146** -0.0164** 0.0011 0.0003 -0.0082 -0.0009 0.0058 18.45% 
WIN 0.0018 -0.0108 -0.0063 0.0032 0.0108 0.0022 0.0025 31.58% 
WMF 0.0139 -0.0036 0.0059 -0.0026 -0.0002 0.0021 -0.0031 3.19% 
SUC 0.0040 -0.0045 
     
2.00% 
BAYN 0.0099 -0.0016 0.0004 -0.0037 -0.0128** -0.0046 -0.0024 45.94% 
HEN 0.0011 -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0049 0.0036 0.0083 0.0023 30.60% 
MTX 0.0049 -0.0054 -0.0068 0.0016 0.0258* 0.0100 0.0040 32.81% 
IFX 
 
0.0003 -0.0030 0.0144 0.0484* 0.0022 0.0096 23.71% 
HDD 0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0167 0.0270** 0.0090 -0.0012 30.98% 
SIE -0.0030 0.0082 0.0032 -0.0015 -0.0069 0.0028 -0.0004 58.47% 
SDF 0.0144 0.0024 0.0071 0.0050 0.0071 -0.0079 0.0059 32.33% 
NDA -0.0122 -0.0050 -0.0109 0.0038 0.0042 0.0070 0.0082 35.90% 
PAH3 0.0026 0.0007 -0.0060 -0.0191*** 0.0124 0.0024 -0.0091 39.21% 
BMW -0.0032 0.0004 
 
-0.0017 0.0087 0.0057 0.0027 50.23% 
PFD4 0.0115 -0.0046 -0.0052 
  
0.0079 
 
12.29% 
LIN 
     
-0.0029 0.0048 45.43% 
NSU 0.0048 -0.0048 0.0047 -0.0006 0.0046 -0.0078 -0.0035 5.12% 
BAS -0.0032 0.0031 0.0008 0.0001 0.0081 0.0014 0.0073 63.24% 
TKA -0.0032 0.0011 -0.0029 -0.0027 0.0163** 0.0046 0.0065 55.34% 
VIB3 -0.0023 -0.0039 -0.0129 -0.0014 -0.0010 -0.0027 0.0152 5.34% 
MVV1 0.0130*** -0.0130*** 0.0030 -0.0050 -0.0054 -0.0011 -0.0004 4.50% 
DAI 
 
0.0044 -0.0031 -0.0128*** 0.0116*** 0.0006 0.0094 58.99% 
HOT 0.0009 
 
0.0076 0.0096 0.0131 0.0008 0.0002 44.06% 
MAN -0.0037 -0.0076 -0.0022 0.0021 0.0047 0.0052 0.0065 51.97% 
SZG -0.0048 -0.0035 0.0026 -0.0053 0.0058 -0.0004 0.0097 49.71% 
CON 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0010 0.0045 0.0427* -0.0031 -0.0012 28.05% 
LHA 0.0056 -0.0076 0.0069 0.0000 0.0052 0.0042 -0.0027 44.58% 
EBK -0.0002 -0.0025 -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.0026 0.0056 -0.0005 1.48% 
VOW -0.0068 -0.0095 -0.0088 0.0001 -0.0025 0.0061 -0.0023 9.06% 
NG 0.0037 0.0101*** 0.0034 0.0016 -0.0027 0.0002 -0.0039 32.92% 
AZN 0.0025 0.0009 -0.0009 0.0127** -0.0036 -0.0017 -0.0001 33.16% 
BA -0.0025 -0.0096 -0.0033 -0.0020 -0.0061 -0.0064 -0.0016 37.53% 
BARC 
    
-0.0002 -0.0047 0.0009 42.59% 
CRDA 0.0062 -0.0004 -0.0056 -0.0042 -0.0024 -0.0048 0.0039 33.35% 
BLT -0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0086 -0.0116 -0.0034 0.0020 62.91% 
DCG 0.0101 -0.0084 0.0029 -0.0096 0.0204** 0.0022 -0.0026 14.34% 
RR -0.0015 -0.0083 
  
0.0144** 0.0025 -0.0018 52.96% 
CNA 0.0031 -0.0094 0.0070 0.0045 0.0028 -0.0016 -0.0066 26.54% 
BTA 0.0093 0.0215* 0.0034 0.0013 0.0178** -0.0019 0.0012 34.04% 
DRXG -0.0029 -0.0073 -0.0008 0.0005 0.0029 -0.0054 0.0091 19.51% 
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GSK 0.0108** 0.0038 0.0020 0.0065 -0.0052 -0.0010 0.0005 28.62% 
SERC 
    
-0.0057 0.0008 -0.0076 29.12% 
SVT -0.0008 -0.0041 0.0016 -0.0038 0.0084 0.0001 -0.0049 30.85% 
BBY -0.0105 -0.0056 0.0057 -0.0114*** 0.0107 -0.0028 -0.0074 41.61% 
CLLN -0.0151** 0.0023 0.0050 -0.0108 0.0067 0.0022 0.0028 37.30% 
MARS 
    
0.0246* -0.0052 0.0014 28.15% 
TATE 0.0027 -0.0036 0.0049 -0.0109 0.0187** -0.0003 0.0090 17.62% 
JMAT 
    
0.0067 0.0021 0.0045 51.76% 
AAL 
    
0.0150*** 
 
-0.0007 63.00% 
ABF 
   
-0.0028 0.0049 -0.0001 -0.0011 34.18% 
BP -0.0063 -0.0046 -0.0041 -0.0008 -0.0142** 0.0034 0.0051 50.59% 
SSE -0.0017 0.0000 0.0044 -0.0031 -0.0012 -0.0038 0.0018 32.07% 
DGE 0.0012 -0.0014 0.0007 0.0024 0.0006 0.0010 0.0016 44.63% 
PMO -0.0004 -0.0143 -0.0064 -0.0016 -0.0083 0.0039 0.0067 34.57% 
PFD 0.0156 0.0089 0.0130 0.0124 
  
0.0177 11.69% 
IPR -0.0023 -0.0047 0.0072 0.0069 0.0154** -0.0026 -0.0003 35.04% 
BAB -0.0045 0.0040 0.0077 -0.0048 -0.0147*** 0.0045 -0.0016 20.94% 
BG -0.0084 0.0013 -0.0040 
    
50.32% 
SN -0.0237* -0.0008 -0.0050 -0.0040 -0.0094 -0.0042 0.0005 27.77% 
DLAR 
    
-0.0230* -0.0039 -0.0009 8.78% 
SMDS -0.0014 0.0057 0.0095 -0.0094 0.0541* -0.0024 -0.0014 24.43% 
TLW 0.0063 -0.0246* -0.0038 -0.0093 -0.0199** 0.0024 -0.0010 38.87% 
GNK 
    
0.0195** -0.0033 -0.0052 34.02% 
RIO -0.0021 0.0020 0.0059 0.0073 -0.0389* -0.0017 -0.0026 51.80% 
BATS -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0030 -0.0083 
   
28.64% 
FTC 
    
-0.0114 0.0091 0.0017 3.68% 
ELM -0.0005 0.0053 0.0033 0.0008 0.0151 0.0130 
 
13.13% 
IMT -0.0028 -0.0006 -0.0046 -0.0018 -0.0055 -0.0057 0.0026 24.50% 
UU -0.0009 0.0037 0.0023 -0.0016 0.0058 -0.0012 -0.0055 35.47% 
RDSB -0.0038 -0.0004 -0.0056 0.0011 -0.0127* 0.0014 -0.0010 63.43% 
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APPENDIX 4C FIRM-LEVEL ABNORMAL RETURN ESTIMATES (ROBUSTNESS 
CHECK) 
Event window (0; +1) 
 
VER05A VER05B VER06 VER07 VER08 VER09 VER10 R^2 
HEI 
 
-0.0157 0.0005 0.0018 -0.0025 0.0009 0.0017 34.68% 
SZU 0.0029 -0.0171 0.0103 -0.0102 0.0192 -0.0002 -0.0018 27.56% 
DYK -0.0114 -0.0008 -0.0009 0.0022 0.0239*** 0.0037 -0.0101 3.19% 
AFX -0.0278*** 
 
0.0102 -0.0001 -0.0175 -0.0070 0.0049 15.99% 
FME 0.0011 -0.0032 0.0094 0.0082 -0.0140 -0.0048 0.0072 13.97% 
EOAN -0.0093 -0.0033 0.0257* -0.0004 -0.0204** -0.0007 -0.0013 56.33% 
RWE -0.0204** 
 
0.0060 0.0011 -0.0217** -0.0023 0.0079 53.99% 
MRK 0.0022 -0.0129 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0039 -0.0044 0.0079 20.38% 
WIN -0.0029 -0.0007 -0.0052 -0.0119 0.0263** -0.0052 -0.0002 38.75% 
WMF 0.0033 -0.0040 0.0138 0.0068 -0.0090 0.0193 -0.0060 3.55% 
SUC 0.0128 -0.0027 
     
2.75% 
BAYN -0.0038 -0.0102 -0.0039 0.0000 -0.0263* -0.0004 0.0096 46.67% 
HEN -0.0036 -0.0040 0.0005 0.0006 0.0021 0.0037 -0.0026 33.17% 
MTX 0.0102 0.0043 -0.0014 -0.0131 0.0363** -0.0028 0.0153 44.20% 
IFX 
 
0.0171 -0.0070 0.0087 -0.0401*** -0.0103 0.0058 31.04% 
HDD -0.0069 0.0074 0.0082 0.0030 -0.0029 0.0098 0.0019 39.44% 
SIE 0.0027 0.0121 -0.0010 -0.0105 -0.0232** -0.0007 -0.0042 61.86% 
SDF 0.0048 0.0234 0.0092 0.0173 0.0097 -0.0169 0.0066 39.89% 
NDA 0.0022 -0.0048 0.0017 -0.0092 0.0070 0.0076 0.0014 44.44% 
PAH3 0.0053 0.0050 0.0142 -0.0183 0.0159 -0.0002 -0.0081 43.77% 
BMW -0.0059 0.0087 
 
0.0021 0.0526* 0.0050 0.0103 53.85% 
PFD4 -0.0092 0.0089 -0.0111 
  
0.0085 
 
17.94% 
LIN 
     
-0.0056 0.0058 48.30% 
NSU -0.0029 -0.0002 0.0089 -0.0057 0.0152 -0.0097 -0.0061 9.28% 
BAS -0.0134*** 0.0053 -0.0041 0.0018 0.0011 0.0027 -0.0012 66.82% 
TKA -0.0098 -0.0200*** -0.0069 0.0070 0.0147 -0.0040 0.0063 61.73% 
VIB3 -0.0003 0.0054 -0.0047 -0.0174 -0.0157 -0.0166 0.0200 8.10% 
MVV1 0.0125 -0.0096 0.0066 -0.0123 -0.0192*** -0.0064 -0.0041 5.19% 
DAI 
 
0.0101 -0.0042 -0.0084 0.0156 -0.0049 0.0101 64.27% 
HOT -0.0173 
 
0.0145 0.0379* -0.0062 -0.0038 -0.0068 52.50% 
MAN -0.0184 -0.0001 -0.0038 0.0042 0.0255** -0.0071 -0.0004 58.43% 
SZG -0.0138 -0.0068 0.0092 0.0131 0.0050 -0.0124 0.0109 59.39% 
CON -0.0092 0.0061 0.0060 0.0075 0.0229 -0.0081 0.0038 30.78% 
LHA -0.0028 0.0104 0.0006 -0.0019 -0.0079 0.0078 -0.0076 51.69% 
EBK 0.0053 -0.0080 0.0003 0.0037 -0.0095 -0.0005 -0.0036 2.18% 
VOW 0.0162 -0.0174 -0.0047 -0.0036 0.0380** -0.0004 0.0125 61.81% 
NG -0.0002 0.0076 0.0081 0.0075 -0.0032 0.0003 -0.0007 35.85% 
AZN -0.0028 0.0003 -0.0055 0.0091 -0.0063 -0.0036 0.0013 37.46% 
BA -0.0060 -0.0134 0.0003 0.0034 -0.0044 -0.0023 0.0030 38.77% 
BARC 
    
0.0016 -0.0032 0.0028 52.12% 
CRDA 0.0083 0.0119 -0.0006 0.0109 0.0132 0.0012 -0.0022 34.97% 
BLT 0.0015 -0.0110 0.0005 0.0071 0.0027 -0.0034 -0.0015 66.06% 
DCG 0.0132 0.0009 -0.0045 0.0053 0.0358** -0.0050 -0.0035 15.63% 
  Chapter 4 
!
206 
!
RR -0.0036 -0.0144 
  
0.0334* 0.0053 -0.0032 53.22% 
CNA 0.0038 -0.0154 0.0032 0.0011 -0.0123 0.0012 0.0031 28.73% 
BTA 0.0078 0.0096 0.0099 0.0089 0.0059 0.0000 -0.0018 34.85% 
DRXG -0.0134 -0.0130 -0.0064 -0.0071 -0.0105 0.0024 0.0137 19.97% 
GSK 0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0035 0.0041 -0.0104 -0.0079 0.0065 35.36% 
SERC 
    
-0.0128 -0.0028 -0.0121 31.95% 
SVT 0.0024 0.0043 0.0058 -0.0052 -0.0150*** 0.0017 -0.0007 31.59% 
BBY -0.0083 0.0060 0.0072 -0.0289* 0.0153 0.0011 -0.0152 43.88% 
CLLN -0.0422* 0.0142 0.0011 -0.0169 -0.0023 0.0074 -0.0072 42.05% 
MARS 
    
-0.0031 0.0079 0.0003 33.37% 
TATE 0.0063 -0.0014 0.0049 -0.0091 0.0117 0.0039 -0.0107 18.02% 
JMAT 
    
0.0143 0.0044 0.0082 53.38% 
AAL 
    
0.0128 
 
-0.0032 65.11% 
ABF 
   
-0.0064 0.0037 -0.0018 -0.0031 34.97% 
BP -0.0101 -0.0087 -0.0042 0.0062 -0.0221** 0.0017 0.0110 55.23% 
SSE -0.0012 0.0085 0.0095 -0.0033 -0.0222** -0.0030 0.0070 33.91% 
DGE -0.0003 -0.0022 -0.0007 0.0012 -0.0041 0.0032 -0.0056 46.64% 
PMO 0.0007 -0.0184 -0.0058 -0.0051 -0.0167 0.0065 0.0058 36.20% 
PFD 0.0103 0.0249 0.0040 0.0007 
  
0.0332 15.81% 
IPR -0.0111 0.0015 0.0121 0.0143 -0.0028 0.0011 -0.0063 36.08% 
BAB -0.0021 -0.0047 0.0000 -0.0114 -0.0231*** 0.0036 -0.0077 22.72% 
BG -0.0113 0.0030 -0.0069 
    
51.27% 
SN -0.0113 0.0083 -0.0010 -0.0060 0.0031 -0.0080 -0.0013 28.17% 
DLAR 
    
-0.0288** 0.0045 -0.0027 9.12% 
SMDS -0.0147 0.0214 0.0062 -0.0091 0.0356** 0.0077 -0.0005 26.52% 
TLW 0.0059 -0.0246*** -0.0022 -0.0163 -0.0387* 0.0033 -0.0032 39.47% 
GNK 
    
0.0298** 0.0068 -0.0078 38.87% 
RIO 0.0024 -0.0034 0.0027 0.0093 -0.0071 -0.0015 0.0005 57.52% 
BATS -0.0033 -0.0014 -0.0044 -0.0091 
   
33.95% 
FTC 
    
-0.0254 -0.0010 -0.0430*** 4.58% 
ELM -0.0093 0.0360*** 0.0026 -0.0052 0.0080 -0.0036  17.67% 
IMT -0.0047 -0.0053 -0.0058 -0.0039 -0.0021 -0.0049 0.0036 29.19% 
UU 0.0005 0.0040 0.0015 -0.0003 -0.0107 0.0034 0.0013 36.62% 
RDSB -0.0027 -0.0040 -0.0066 0.0070 -0.0113 -0.0015 0.0008 66.09% 
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Event window (-1; +3) 
 
VER05A VER05B VER06 VER07 VER08 VER09 VER10 R^2 
HEI 
 
-0.0113 0.0020 -0.0077 0.0436* -0.0040 -0.0044 35.42% 
SZU 0.0019 -0.0126*** 0.0093 0.0044 0.0046 -0.0071 -0.0033 27.56% 
DYK -0.0043 -0.0010 -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0085 -0.0045 3.07% 
AFX -0.0101 
 
-0.0007 -0.0032 -0.0148 -0.0089 -0.0005 15.95% 
FME 0.0022 -0.0016 0.0017 0.0032 -0.0147** -0.0012 0.0023 14.12% 
EOAN 0.0016 -0.0014 0.0102*** 0.0000 -0.0077 -0.0018 0.0015 56.12% 
RWE -0.0124** 
 
0.0050 0.0010 -0.0095*** -0.0015 0.0030 53.90% 
MRK 0.0141** -0.0147** 0.0015 0.0003 -0.0096 -0.0019 0.0047 20.86% 
WIN 0.0021 -0.0070 -0.0060 0.0008 0.0107 0.0000 -0.0007 38.63% 
WMF 0.0141 -0.0022 0.0055 -0.0037 -0.0009 0.0016 -0.0036 3.51% 
SUC 0.0041 -0.0028 
     
2.70% 
BAYN 0.0097 -0.0013 0.0006 -0.0029 -0.0137** -0.0046 -0.0025 46.63% 
HEN 0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0060 0.0025 0.0070 0.0007 33.25% 
MTX 0.0053 0.0011 -0.0062 -0.0011 0.0244* 0.0065 -0.0005 44.20% 
IFX 
 
0.0084 -0.0030 0.0104 0.0475* -0.0021 0.0043 31.40% 
HDD 0.0012 0.0059 -0.0008 -0.0201*** 0.0270** 0.0054 -0.0059 39.77% 
SIE -0.0033 0.0099 0.0040 -0.0015 -0.0080 0.0019 -0.0023 61.80% 
SDF 0.0152 0.0076 0.0080 0.0035 0.0072 -0.0102 0.0019 39.87% 
NDA -0.0120 0.0013 -0.0101 0.0021 0.0037 0.0045 0.0045 44.52% 
PAH3 0.0027 0.0038 -0.0058 -0.0212** 0.0107 0.0002 -0.0123 43.91% 
BMW -0.0033 0.0012 
 
-0.0028 0.0080 0.0044 0.0011 53.24% 
PFD4 0.0122 0.0038 -0.0047 
  
0.0039 
 
17.94% 
LIN 
     
-0.0037 0.0035 48.30% 
NSU 0.0049 -0.0022 0.0049 -0.0018 0.0043 -0.0091 -0.0050 9.24% 
BAS -0.0037 0.0038 0.0014 0.0008 0.0067 0.0011 0.0064 66.88% 
TKA -0.0031 0.0051 -0.0021 -0.0039 0.0154** 0.0027 0.0032 61.70% 
VIB3 -0.0016 0.0016 -0.0130 -0.0031 -0.0015 -0.0042 0.0129 7.99% 
MVV1 0.0129*** -0.0115*** 0.0030 -0.0057 -0.0068 -0.0018 -0.0013 5.26% 
DAI 
 
0.0062 -0.0025 -0.0132** 0.0093 -0.0007 0.0074 64.37% 
HOT 0.0012 
 
0.0084 0.0076 0.0130 -0.0020 -0.0037 52.34% 
MAN -0.0038 -0.0051 -0.0016 0.0005 0.0042 0.0031 0.0033 58.30% 
SZG -0.0040 0.0030 0.0036 -0.0072 0.0055 -0.0034 0.0050 59.34% 
CON -0.0001 0.0018 -0.0006 0.0025 0.0414* -0.0051 -0.0037 31.26% 
LHA 0.0051 -0.0057 0.0070 -0.0014 0.0037 0.0026 -0.0048 51.68% 
EBK -0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0031 0.0053 -0.0008 2.10% 
VOW -0.0015 -0.0180 -0.0119 -0.0007 0.0093 0.0103 0.0047 61.78% 
NG 0.0029 0.0080 0.0036 0.0009 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0038 35.88% 
AZN 0.0011 -0.0026 -0.0018 0.0106** 0.0004 -0.0031 0.0000 37.58% 
BA -0.0031 -0.0107*** -0.0037 -0.0027 -0.0043 -0.0073 -0.0015 38.89% 
BARC 
    
-0.0055 -0.0014 0.0030 52.14% 
CRDA 0.0065 0.0007 -0.0064 -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0053 0.0026 35.00% 
BLT -0.0028 -0.0006 -0.0014 0.0075 -0.0089 -0.0044 0.0008 65.99% 
DCG 0.0103 -0.0068 0.0021 -0.0096 0.0170*** 0.0020 -0.0028 15.60% 
RR -0.0015 -0.0093 
  
0.0158** 0.0019 -0.0022 53.08% 
CNA 0.0019 -0.0119*** 0.0064 0.0028 0.0056 -0.0026 -0.0068 28.87% 
BTA 0.0096 0.0227* 0.0040 0.0022 0.0164** -0.0012 0.0020 35.39% 
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DRXG -0.0031 -0.0064 -0.0015 0.0002 0.0013 -0.0057 0.0090 19.85% 
GSK 0.0093** -0.0002 0.0013 0.0044 -0.0005 -0.0023 0.0008 35.44% 
SERC 
    
-0.0068 -0.0001 -0.0081 31.94% 
SVT -0.0011 -0.0049 0.0016 -0.0041 0.0094*** -0.0001 -0.0048 31.60% 
BBY -0.0098 -0.0034 0.0050 -0.0109*** 0.0067 -0.0031 -0.0080 43.72% 
CLLN -0.0143** 0.0063 0.0041 -0.0102 0.0003 0.0020 0.0020 41.60% 
MARS 
    
0.0166*** -0.0051 0.0000 33.48% 
TATE 0.0028 -0.0026 0.0042 -0.0112 0.0164*** -0.0006 0.0092 18.23% 
JMAT 
    
0.0042 0.0018 0.0045 53.34% 
AAL 
    
0.0181** 
 
-0.0017 65.21% 
ABF 
   
-0.0034 0.0049 -0.0006 -0.0012 34.95% 
BP -0.0054 -0.0038 -0.0016 0.0018 -0.0134** 0.0052 0.0064 55.18% 
SSE -0.0023 -0.0008 0.0044 -0.0036 0.0000 -0.0043 0.0017 33.53% 
DGE 0.0006 -0.0027 0.0001 0.0012 0.0017 0.0003 0.0014 46.62% 
PMO 0.0010 -0.0094 -0.0066 0.0000 -0.0146 0.0044 0.0053 36.22% 
PFD 0.0173 0.0190 0.0109 0.0146 
  
0.0172 15.95% 
IPR -0.0026 -0.0039 0.0063 0.0065 0.0140*** -0.0032 -0.0006 36.17% 
BAB -0.0044 0.0047 0.0067 -0.0050 -0.0169** 0.0038 -0.0022 22.76% 
BG -0.0089 0.0003 -0.0039 
    
51.30% 
SN -0.0241* -0.0008 -0.0057 -0.0046 -0.0093 -0.0049 0.0005 28.78% 
DLAR 
    
-0.0254* -0.0041 -0.0009 9.37% 
SMDS -0.0005 0.0095 0.0079 -0.0089 0.0465* -0.0026 -0.0022 27.09% 
TLW 0.0070 -0.0225** -0.0046 -0.0088 -0.0221** 0.0023 -0.0020 39.61% 
GNK 
    
0.0124 -0.0029 -0.0063 38.76% 
RIO -0.0031 0.0005 0.0029 0.0047 -0.0358* -0.0039 -0.0038 57.78% 
BATS -0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0037 -0.0099*** 
   
33.96% 
FTC 
    
-0.0165 0.0092 0.0009 4.44% 
ELM 0.0008 0.0124 0.0009 0.0017 0.0043 0.0127 
 
17.61% 
IMT -0.0039 -0.0035 -0.0054 -0.0035 -0.0038 -0.0064 0.0024 29.30% 
UU -0.0014 0.0027 0.0023 -0.0021 0.0070 -0.0015 -0.0053 36.65% 
RDSB -0.0034 -0.0003 -0.0038 0.0030 -0.0115* 0.0026 0.0002 66.11% 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH !
This thesis has examined three different aspects of the efficiency of the new European 
carbon market. The findings provide new empirical evidence about the information content 
of carbon options, investors’ ability to respond to changes in the institutional framework 
and the value-relevance of carbon performance to firm valuations. The results are, 
however, subject to a number of limitations which suggest avenues for further research.  
Chapter 2 demonstrates that the volatility embedded in carbon options traded on the 
European Climate Exchange is highly informative about future volatility up to a year 
ahead. It is also found to be a directionally accurate forecast of future variance. Implied 
volatility is shown to be both a biased forecast, as it overestimates ex-post realized 
volatility, and an inefficient forecast, as it does not subsume all information contained in 
historical volatility, particularly over short-term forecasting horizons. The conclusions 
about the inefficiency of implied volatility as a forecast may be reinforced by using more 
sophisticated forecasts derived from historical carbon prices. It was noted in Section 2.4.2. 
that there appears to be asymmetry in the way that carbon prices react to positive and 
negative shocks of the same magnitude. The use of volatility forecasts based on an 
EGARCH model or any other model which explicitly allows for differentiated responses to 
good and bad news would be one way to improve the empirical analysis. Alternatively, 
recent literature (e.g. Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998; Blair et al., 2001) has advocated the 
use of high-frequency data in modelling historical volatility-based forecasts. Due to the 
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lack of access to such data, this thesis has not been able to employ such measures of carbon 
volatility.  
Further research is also needed into the issue of whether implied volatility forecasts are in 
fact good or bad forecasts. Chapter 2 has focused on whether implied volatility is 
informative about future variance, or put simply, whether regulated companies and 
financial investors are justified in using option implied volatility as a forecast of how 
volatile carbon prices will be. I examine three features of the forecasts – their unbiasedness, 
their efficiency and their directional accuracy – but do not explicitly test the quality of the 
prediction. All conclusions are based on the coefficient of determination obtained from the 
conducted regression analyses. Ultimately, however, a biased forecast is not necessarily 
bad in and of itself – if the bias is persistent and known it can be easily taken into 
consideration by carbon market players.  
Also, as noted in Section 2.6, the analysed time period overlaps with the recent financial 
crisis. The ensuing period of slow economic growth has led covered companies to sell off 
excess allowances in order to strengthen their balance sheets. Access to a longer data series 
will allow for the assessment of the impact of such short-term fluctuations on the 
relationship between implied and ex-post realized volatility.  A re-examination of the 
information content of carbon options is needed when the depth and size of the market 
increase enough so that options with quarterly expiry are actively traded. The present 
concentration of liquidity in options on long-dated futures may partially explain the 
reported inefficiency of implied volatility forecasts. Similarly, the observed bias towards 
overestimating future volatility, which may be somewhat driven by the high level of 
uncertainty in the market due to its politically-motivated nature and susceptibility to 
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regulatory changes, may be minimized when the EU ETS matures and confidence in its 
continuation grows.  
Chapter 3 has examined the market sensitivity to announcements about the institutional 
design of the EU ETS. Market participants are found to incorporate new information 
regarding both supply and demand-side announcements, albeit failing to accurately assess 
the price impact on futures contracts with expirations in the different trading periods. The 
reactions are mostly small in magnitude, suggesting that much of the information may 
already be anticipated by the market and hence, do not represent true shocks .A diminished 
market sensitivity to institutional announcements and a disconnect between the carbon 
price and its fundamental drivers (extreme weather and energy prices) are documented 
following the onset of the financial crisis. This thesis has modelled carbon returns as a 
function of the broad market, the energy prices and extreme weather. To strengthen the 
conclusions of the chapter, carbon-generating models with alternative price determinants 
may be estimated. For example, Chevallier (2009) uses electricity as one source of priced 
risk, Alberola et al. (2008) and Koop and Tole (2011) use clean spreads and the switching 
EUA price, while Bonacina et al. (2009) add coal prices to their multifactor model.  
There is room for further development in terms of the econometric structure of the return-
generating process as well. Chapter 3 relies on ordinary least squares analysis where carbon 
is a linear function of the independent variables. More sophisticated distributed lag models 
may be used instead to better capture the impact of past carbon behaviour and past energy 
prices. For example, Miclaus et al. (2008) model carbon as an AR-GARCH process while 
Benz and Trück (2008) model carbon prices according to both AR-GARCH and Markov 
regime switching models. Fezzi and Bunn (2009) combine a structural vector 
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autoregressive approach with co-integration and model the relationship between gas, 
electricity and carbon prices according to a structural, co-integrated vector error-correction 
model. Examination of the significance of price moves on days surrounding the actual 
announcements presents another area of future research. Significant cumulative event 
returns on days preceding the announcements might be indicative of information leakage 
(however unlikely) while significant returns on the following days may suggest a delayed 
response by market participants.  
Chapter 4 looks at the stock price reactions of British and German companies upon 
mandatory emissions data releases over the period 2006 – 2011. No conclusive evidence is 
found that investors use information on the carbon performance of companies in their 
valuations. No change is found in the carbon performance of companies as a result of EU 
ETS compliance either. These results are attributed to the weak signal embedded in the 
carbon price and the context of known allowances oversupply. The move to auctioning, 
instead of giving away free allowances to covered companies, and the imminent EC 
intervention to remove excess EUAs from the market36 suggest that ETS compliance will 
become more difficult and more expensive for companies. The pending changes in the 
institutional framework of the scheme may provide the needed incentives to provoke 
investor action. Therefore, the relevance of carbon performance for firm valuation needs to 
be re-examined when post-2012 data becomes available. Also, the chapter has offered two 
alternative hypotheses with regards to investor reactions upon carbon emissions publication 
– a response to the unanticipated level of emissions and a response to the unanticipated 
changes in the net EUA positions of covered companies. Supplementing the results with a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 European Commission, “Commission prepares for change of the timing for auctions of emission allowances”. 
Available at: < http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2012072501_en.htm> 
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qualitative study (for example, through a survey or an interview of market participants) 
may shed more light on how exactly investors form their expectations and to what extent 
they see carbon performance as a component of firm value.  
Several additional caveats to the analysis are needed. First, the results are limited to the 
British and German market only. Extrapolating the inferences for all covered EU Member 
States may not be appropriate. Under the EU ETS, the less developed European countries, 
such as the former Eastern bloc countries, are allowed to increase their emissions levels 
while their more industrialized counterparts bear the emission reduction burden. For the 
former group of countries, the generous freely granted allowances may represent a 
considerable source of revenue relative to the market values of their companies (which are 
substantially smaller than the average British company, for example). Therefore, the 
conclusions from the German and British companies may not hold across the EU. 
Comprehensive research across countries is needed to establish if a differential impact of 
carbon performance exists. Second, the analysis in Chapter 4 has been limited to publicly-
traded companies. The reported lack of carbon performance improvement following 
emissions disclosure may not necessarily represent the behaviour of the underlying 
population of public and private companies. Finally, as with Chapter 3, examination of 
market reactions on days before and after the actual report publication may provide insight 
into the speed with which investors respond to verified emissions data release. Exploring 
the direction of the causal association between carbon emissions levels and financial 
performance is also needed.  
Overall, the evidence from the empirical analyses in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 lead me to 
conclude that currently the carbon market is not fully efficient. There are many possible 
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explanations as to why the EU ETS is not efficient yet – the market is still young, trading 
in carbon is still thin and there is too much uncertainty about the future of Europe’s 
environmental policies. It is my view, however, that the main reason behind the 
inefficiencies I document is the imperfect implementation of the emissions trading concept 
coupled with the unforeseen effects of the economic recession in Europe since 2008.  
Because the market has been artificially created as a part of an environmental policy, it is 
extremely complex and inherently prone to uncertainty and instability. A mistake anywhere 
in the set-up of the scheme – be it proposed rules on future EUA allocations, misaligned 
incentives"# for regulated companies, concerns about the continuation of the scheme, 
distributional unfairness across regulated sectors – risks undermining the entire market and 
its efficiency. A combination of such problems has plagued the scheme since its inception. 
First, regulators generously over-allocated emitters with free EUAs. Add to this the effects 
of the economic downturn following the financial crisis of 2008 and the market was soon 
oversupplied with permits, pushing the carbon price down and creating a disconnect with 
what should be its fundamental drivers. While a withdrawal of excess allowances from the 
market is currently debated, its critics argue that such an ex-post regulatory intervention 
will compromise the integrity of the market and will punish companies which have unused 
EUAs as a result of genuine abatement effort rather than excessive allocation. Such an 
intervention may scare investors away from the market, where risk-return trade-offs cannot 
be ascertained and governing rules change as a response to unforeseen developments. 
Policy uncertainty is a cost to regulated companies as well, where investments in carbon-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 For example, if allocations continue to be based mostly on historic emissions (as were most of the Phase I and II 
allocations), firms have no strong incentive to improve the carbon efficiency of their systems and processes.  
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reducing technology projects and improvements in energy efficiencies may be delayed or 
forgone altogether.  
The cost of error in the EU ETS is high and failure to fulfil the intended socio-economic 
objectives risks making the market redundant. With carbon prices remaining low, 
companies may continue to pay little attention to their carbon performance, and investors 
may continue to disregard emissions in their financial valuations. Therefore the current 
levels of EUAs, coupled with the failure to agree on the future of the scheme38 and seeming 
lack of commitment from many European member states (most notably the Eastern bloc 
countries which see the EU’s environmental aspiration as a hurdle to their economic 
growth and development), raise perhaps the biggest concern – will the EU ETS last or will 
it follow the fate of the U.S. sulphur dioxide market, where regulation replaced the market-
based mechanism for emissions reduction? Such an environment of heightened uncertainty 
may be one possible explanation for the inefficiencies reported in this thesis. 
In conclusion, this thesis has offered some new empirical evidence into the efficiency of 
the European carbon market. The results are, however, subject to several limitations and 
there is room for further improvement. Availability of longer price series, particularly in 
the post-2012 context when major changes to the EU ETS are planned, will allow for the 
informational efficiency of the market to be re-examined.     
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 The inclusion of the aviation industry is the best illustration of this – although it was initially agreed that all airlines 
which use European airports will be covered by the EU ETS from 2012, the starting date was pushed to 2013 and then 
non-European airlines refused to comply and began lengthy negotiations with the aviation authorities.  
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